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This dissertation examines U.S. travel in the context of Sino-American relations 
between 1949 and 1968. Building on recent scholarship on tourism and foreign relations, 
this dissertation argues that historians cannot develop a comprehensive understanding of 
the U.S. relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong without establishing travel and travelers as significant agents of hit rical change. 
Using tourism as a centerpiece of historical inquiry, moreover, adds complexity to the 
traditional Cold War narrative and suggests that other forces, aside from East-West 
struggle, defined the international climate in the post-World War II period. 
 The post-1945 boom in recreational tourism did not materialize uniformly around 
the world. On the mainland of China, swept up in civil war, travel was difficult and 
unappealing. The emergence of Cold War tensions in the region added a new obstacle to 
tourism as Washington imposed restrictions on American travel. Using the founding of 
  
the PRC as a starting point, this dissertation follows the course of American travel and 
travel policy in the region. As opposed to being marked by isolation and disengagement, 
the period from 1949 to 1968 saw incredible activity in the area of travel. In terms of 
U.S.-PRC relations, travel served as a medium of engagement and both sides showed a 
willingness to initiate travel exchanges and reforms to travel policy as a means of feeling 
out the opposing camp. Moving beyond the mainland of China, U.S. officials, private 
industry, and individual travelers perceived Taiwan and Hong Kong as “alternatives” to 
the PRC and both destinations experienced huge booms in tourism. 
In all these realms, travel developed both as a crucial element of U.S. containmet 
policy and as a phenomenon that seemed disconnected from Cold War strategy. Using 
government archival material, travelogues, travel guides, records from international 
tourism associations, and popular advertisements, this dissertation demonstrates that 
tourism was not always the most efficient channel for foreign policy. The expectations 
and motivations of individual tourists, the overwhelming belief in a “right to travel,” and 
the unpredictable impact of tourism on local economies, all worked to add complexity 
and nuance to the Sino-American post-World War II relationship. 
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Introduction: The Traveler, the Tourist, and the Cold War 
 
The traveler sees what he sees, the tourist sees what he has come to see. 
  
-- G.K. Chesterton 
 
But why don’t we call a tourist a “tourist”? What useful purpose does it serve, for 
example, to refer to him as “sojourner,” “transit passenger”…“overland touris ,” or 
“transit”?1 
 
-- The Future of Tourism in the Pacific and Far East, Commerce Department tourism 
survey, 1961 
 
As the post-World War II civil war was raging in China, tourism to the region 
persevered. American Presidents Line (APL), America’s leading cruise liner, filled the 
pages of travel periodicals with advertisements for luxurious cruises to the Far East. 
Advertisements showed passengers on deck enjoying shuffleboard and swimming, 
seemingly unaware of any turmoil on the Chinese mainland. The President Wilson and 
the President Cleveland – APL’s transpacific “vacation ships” – tempted travelers with 
“swimming, dancing, games, motion pictures.”2 Beyond promotional material, tourism 
industry insiders spoke optimistically about international travel to the region. John Diggs, 
APL’s vice president of passenger traffic, noted in early 1950, a few months after the 
Chinese Communists (CCP) claimed victory, that tourist interest in the Far East was on 
the rise and that the region would see a “rapid return…to its prewar position as one of the 
world’s most interesting tourist areas.”3 When Pacific travel organizations met during the 
Korean War to discuss the potential obstacles to increasing tourism to the Far East, 
moreover, it was the insufficient numbers of hotels and restaurants, not political or 
                                                
1 Harry G. Clement, The Future of Tourism in the Pacific and Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1961), 83. 
2 American Presidents Line advertisement, Travel, September 1947 
3 “APL Officer Makes Trip to Orient,” ASTA Travel News, April 1950. 
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military instability, that topped the list.4 With the appropriate accommodations and 
facilities, it seemed that tourism to the Far East had limitless possibilities.  
The quixotic activities and language surrounding the ascent of mass tourism to the 
Far East suggest that overseas travel was somehow immune from the conflict, divisions, 
tensions, and geopolitical considerations of the Cold War. This, of course, was not true. 
In November 1950, as U.S. and Chinese troops were waging battle on the Korean 
peninsula, federal law demanded an immediate cessation of business transactions 
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Cruise lines, 
airlines, and other components of the American tourism industry, terminated their 
connections with China. Even in Nationalist Taiwan and British Hong Kong, the ensuing 
U.S.-PRC conflict disrupted nascent tourism industries, discouraging frightened trav lers 
and weary developers alike. More broadly, travel boosters and government officials 
regularly used Cold War rhetoric when discussing the role of American tourists overseas. 
John Steelman, President Harry S. Truman’s chief of staff, for instance, hailed tourism 
and the “[f]ree movement of people” as one of the major distinctions between the free 
and communist worlds.5 Y. T. Tan, Chairman of the Taiwan Tourism Council (TTC), 
similarly referred to tourism as the “symbol of democracy.”6 Beyond the rhetoric, the 
Cold War and tourism intersected in terms of passport restrictions, landing rights for 
planes, currency controls, private American investment overseas, and the dissemination 
of America’s image abroad. U.S. policymakers, moreover, consistently saw mass tourism 
                                                
4 F. Marvin Plake, executive director of the Pacific Area Travel Association, for example, later asserted that 
[o]f all the problems of China, this [the lack of suitable hotels in Taiwan] has been one of the most 
perplexing.” “Orient Showing Vigorous Approach to Travel Problems, Says PATA Director,” Pacific 
Travel News, January 1961. Also see, “PATA’s Phenomenal Growth – Nine Conferences in Review,” 
Pacific Travel News, January 1961. 
5 John R. Steelman, “The Meaning of Korea,” ASTA Travel News, November 1950. 
6 Y. T. Tan, “The Pacific Message,” Pacific Travel News, April 1959.  
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as an implicit argument in favor of the American democratic, capitalist system and 
unapologetically incorporated it into Washington’s general policy of containment.  
Using tourism as the focus of a study on the United States and China thus does 
not suggest that the Cold War narrative misrepresents Sino-American relations; instead, it 
demonstrates that a Cold War lens is too narrow. As historian Anders Stephanson 
paradoxically but perceptively notes, the Cold War “is not everything that happens in 
international politics…during the Cold War.” An international approach, which offers a 
more accurate depiction of post-World War II foreign affairs, requires examining trends, 
actors, and themes outside of a bipolar framework.7 
In this same way, American mass tourism did not always fit neatly into 
Washington’s Cold War strategy nor did tourists and members of the tourism industry 
always see their activities as supportive of, or even a part of, American foreign policy. 
Focusing on “suitcase diplomacy” – including the impact of individual tourists as they 
traveled en masse overseas, the concerted efforts of the federal government to supervise 
and capitalize on that travel, and the cooperation and conflict between private industry, 
individual tourists, and Washington officials – enables an examination of another side of 
Sino-American relations. In this supplementary narrative, the U.S. government and 
individual Americans practiced engagement alongside containment and often approached 




                                                
7 Anders Stephanson, “Cold War Origins,” in E cyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, eds. Alexander 





In 1994 David Engerman encouraged historians, specifically diplomatic 
historians, to bring tourism to the center of inquiry. Tossing out the notion that tourism 
amounts to a superficial, trivial activity outside the realm of diplomatic history, 
Engerman argues that American travel abroad “has constituted one of the most prominent 
and, on occasion, spectacular features of the economic and social relations between this 
country and other countries.”8 Since then, only a few historians have taken up the call; 
those that have, however, have produced excellent scholarship on the intersection of 
foreign policy and tourism.  
Christopher Endy, in his examination of American tourism to France during the 
Cold War, offers one of the most comprehensive explorations of tourism in the context of 
post-World War II affairs. Interspersing discussion of the Marshall Pln, people-to-
people programs, and de Gaulle’s search for a “third way,” with critical examinations of 
Frommer’s travel guides, the architecture of Hilton hotels, and speeches and writi gs 
from industry leader such as Juan Trippe, Horace Sutton, and Conrad Hilton, Endy 
successfully designates mass tourism as a crucial component of American Cold War 
policy and Franco-American relations. Expanding the borders of diplomatic historical 
inquiry, Endy’s approach requires the use of nontraditional source material – travel 
advertisements, travel guides, hotel blueprints, photographs, travel diaries, and post-travel 
speeches – as well as the integration of non-state, apolitical actors into the arrative of 
foreign relations. Finally, Endy demonstrates that to understand the post-World War II 
                                                
8 David Engerman, “Research Agenda for the History of Tourism: Towards an International Social 
History,” American Studies International Vol. 32 (October 1994). 
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world, historians must look beyond the Cold War to other international forces – in this 
case consumerism and globalization.9 
Dennis Merrill’s Negotiating Paradise broadens the temporal framework, 
examining the impact of U.S. tourism on twentieth century U.S.-Latin American 
relations. In separate essays on interwar Mexico, early-Cold War Cuba, and Cold War 
Puerto Rico, Merrill suggests that while U.S. tourism was a major component of national 
expansion and empire, the resulting “clash” between guests and hosts was quite nuanced. 
Though the United States clearly exercised hegemony over Latin America and, in fact, 
maintained a physical and virtual empire in the region, Latin Americans were “not 
passive victims.” Indeed, these hosts were able to maintain a great deal of auton my by 
negotiating relationships with incoming tourists, manipulating the look and feel of the 
local tourism industry, and actually sharing in the creation of “empire.”10  
Neal Moses Rosendorf’s “Be El Caudillo’s Guest” examines the relationship 
between private Americans and the Spanish Franco government in the development of 
recreational tourism to Spain in the early Cold War. Beyond linking tourism to Spain’s 
postwar economic rehabilitation, Rosendorf’s study highlights the remarkable degr e to 
which Washington officials were unable or unwilling to control American tourists’ 
interactions with Spain. Instead, Hollywood movie producers, airline executives, travel 
agents, publicity firms, and tourists themselves were major players in U.S.-Spanish 
relations, creating a sort of “Hispano-U.S. corporatism.”11 By downplaying the role of the 
                                                
9 Christopher Endy, Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2004). 
10 Dennis Merrill, Negotiating Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Twentieth-Century Latin America 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). 
11 Neal Moses Rosendorf, “Be El Caudillo’s Guest: The Franco Regime’s Quest for Rehabilitation and 




U.S. government in American tourism to Spain, Rosendorf points to a crucial and unique 
component of suitcase diplomacy. While landing rights for planes, passport controls, 
customs regulations, and airline and shipping subsidies have provided government 
officials with significant resources to manipulate the scope and impact of American 
travel, tourists are, in the end, very much on their own when they travel abroad and their 
influence on foreign relations is as uncontrollable as it is unpredictable.   
Offering a slightly different approach to tourism studies, Yale Richmond, in 
Cultural Exchange and the Cold War, expands on efforts to complicate the Cold War. 
Examining Soviet-American cooperation in the form of cultural exchange, Richmond 
explores how U.S. officials relied on these nontraditional channels of diplomacy to 
achieve foreign policy objectives. Merging public policy and diplomatic history in a book 
that is both memoir and monograph, Richmond argues that cultural contacts and 
exchanges between the United States and the USSR constituted a significant component 
of Gorbachev’s reform policies in the late 1980s.12 
Taken in sum, these studies introduce American tourism both as a crucial 
component of U.S. economic, political, and cultural policy, and an activity that often 
operated outside the immediate jurisdiction and control of government officials. The 
manner in which international travel maneuvered between structured, official diplomacy, 
and unpredictable, disengaged exploration, gives tourism a unique role in U.S. foreign 
relations and makes it worthy of further study. 
No historian, however, has viewed the history of post-World War II Sino-
American relations through the lens of travel. Building on the historiography discussed 
                                                
12 Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003). 
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above, this methodology promises to add nuance and complexity to the historical 
narrative. The multitude of actors involved in tourism, the diversity and unpredictability 
of tourism’s impact, and the connotation of recreation and escape that are associated with 
the act of international travel, create a remarkable and insightful contrast to the Cold War 
narrative centered state-to-state relations, conflict, and containment that has dominated 
the historiography of Sino-American relations. A focus on tourism and travel thus avoids 
forcing the entirety of Sino-American relations under the Cold War umbrella, a tendency 
which seems unnecessarily simplistic and teleological.   
Approaching Sino-American relations solely as a product and producer of Cold 
War tends toward three results. First, it forces historical analysis of the U.S.-PRC 
relationship into a framework of containment, conflict, and disengagement. The years 
1950 and 1972 become “bookends” – to use Richard Bush’s term – flanking a period of 
mutual hostility and distrust.13 Chen Jian speaks of Sino-American relations in the post-
Korean War era as one of “total confrontation” and Warren Cohen summarizes U.S. 
policy toward the PRC in the 1950s as an effort to “isolate, encircle, and bring about the 
collapse of the Peking government.”14 Only in the late 1960s, when the Nixon 
administration recognized favorable geopolitical shifts and embraced Chinese overtures, 
did the era of conflict come to an end. This general approach to Sino-American relations 
– which associates the pre-rapprochement era with absolute conflict – makes it difficult 
to locate, or even look for, episodes of engagement, cooperation, or harmony between the 
United States and the PRC. Anders Stephanson, referring to post-1945 U.S.-Soviet 
                                                
13 Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942 (Armonk, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2004), 85. 
14 Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 1; Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of 
Sino-American Relations Fourth Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 180-81. 
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relations, makes this point as well, noting that the “inflated” Cold War narrative tends to 
“conceal or obliterate variations in the nature of the relationship.”15  
Second, this approach relegates U.S. interaction with the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) and Hong Kong – the two most significant remnants of Chinese culture and 
politics that remained in Washington’s camp following the Chinese civil war – either to 
the sidelines or to the role of mere PRC counterweight. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, for 
example, writes that Taiwan lived “in the shadow of China” and she refers to Hong Kong 
as “a pawn in the Cold War.”16 Robert Accinelli, likewise, defines the U.S. dilemma 
surrounding Taiwan in the post-civil war era: “how to keep this strategically mportant 
territory from falling into Communist hands without incurring unwanted responsibilities 
or liabilities.”17 Mark Chi-kwan discusses Hong Kong in much this same light. From the 
perspective of U.S. officials, Hong Kong was a window to the PRC and it served as a 
crucial post for propaganda, covert operations, intelligence gathering, and export controls 
– all of which were direct means of containing the Chinese Communists.18  
Third, the tendency to depict Taiwan and Hong Kong as mere byproducts of 
nascent U.S.-PRC rivalry has led numerous historians, who are critical of Washington’s 
Cold War policy toward the PRC, to focus only on the “debit side” of Washington’s 
                                                
15 Anders Stephanson, “Fourteen Notes: On the Very Concept of the Cold War,” H-Diplo Essays (February 
2007), 2. 
16 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain Friendships. 
(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 7, 215. 
17 Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 3. 
18 Mark Chi-kwan, Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations, 1949-1957 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2004), 2. 
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relationship with “Free China.”19 This argument points to the corruption and inefficiency 
of the Nationalist government as the primary explanation for its defeat in the civil war 
and depicts the defunct government (now on Taiwan) as a nag and a burden for the 
United States throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Tucker, for example, depicts the U.S.-
ROC relationship as one of mutual frustration. Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) 
consistently wanted more American military and economic support than American 
officials were willing to give and the demands of the Nationalists tended to distract 
Washington policymakers from more pressing issues of national security. 
Simultaneously, Hong Kong was cause for major headaches in Washington since its mer  
existence forced U.S. officials into the difficult position of carrying out strict containment 
against the PRC without bringing damage to the economy or prestige of Hong Kong and 
its British supervisors.20  Seldom does this literature suggest that the United States gained 
anything substantial from its associations with “Free China.” 
All of this focus on the Cold War in Sino-American historiography acts to narrow 
the scope of historical inquiry. Limiting Sino-American relations to a binary of 
conflict/non-conflict and examining “Free China” purely in relation to the PRC prevents 
historians from asking key questions. Were U.S. and PRC officials able to navigate a 
course of comity or engagement in the years following the Chinese civil war? Was the 
U.S. policy of rapprochement in the late 1960s truly a radical shift from Washington’s 
earlier approach to China? Did American officials ever define their relations with Taiwan 
and Hong Kong in terms unrelated to the PRC? Did popular perceptions and images of 
                                                
19 John W. Garver attempts to counter this line of argument, writing that the U.S. relationship with the
Nationalist leadership “was an important and valuable element of U.S. strategy in Asia during the two 
decades between 1950 and 1971.” Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American 
Cold War Strategy in Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 1,7.  
20 Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 45. 
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Taiwan and Hong Kong – namely those that did not portray those regions as “Chinese 
alternatives” to the PRC – noticeably influence U.S. China policy? Did American 
interaction with “Free China” produce any benefits for the U.S. economy and American 
cultural development? In sum, does the Cold War explain the entirety of Sino-American 
relations in the post-World War II world? 
Historians have begun to address the problems of the Cold War-centric approach 
to postwar American history. Cultural historians have successfully demonstrated th  the 
Cold War was not as omnipresent – at least not at the level of average Americans – as 
some historians tend to assume. Peter Filene, for example, argues that gender rol s, 
mainstream entertainment, suburbia, and the concerns of “Main Street,” all fell outside of 
the purview of the Cold War. Many Americans had little in depth knowledge of foreign 
or even domestic political issues and spent far more time poring over newspaper comics 
than they did front-page news.21  
It has proven much harder for diplomatic historians to turn their gaze from the 
Cold War. The Sino-Soviet-U.S. geopolitical conflict loomed large, especially at the top 
levels of government; Cold War and post-1945 international relations have thus become 
synonymous for many in the field. But the complexity that Filene introduces to theCold 
War seems as applicable to the study of foreign relations as it does domestic culture. As 
Steven Phillips suggests, “the Cold War provides only a general framework for 
understanding the history of Sino-American relations. It has become an ideal typ  – a 
                                                
21 Peter Filene, “‘Cold War Culture’ Doesn’t Say it All,” in Rethinking Cold War Culture, eds. Peter J. 
Kuznick and James Gilbert, 156-74 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001). A 1952 
Gallup Poll seems to confirm this generalization about the American public. While a sizable portion of the 
sample pool (35 percent), listed “clean[ing] out communism in this country” among the presidential 
initiatives that would matter the most, similar or greater numbers pointed toward eliminating government 
corruption, reducing the cost of living, and lowering taxes. Gallup Poll #488, 19 March 1952.   
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model against which actual policies and attitudes are compared – rather than the sole
defining characteristic of the era.”22 
Some recent scholarship on foreign relations in general and Sino-American 
relations in particular has begun to move in this direction, demonstrating both that Soviet-
American conflict (the essence of the Cold War) does not explain the entirety of postwar 
international relations and that Washington officials were far more nuanced i their 
approach to foreign affairs than the Cold War narrative might suggest. In a verybroad 
sense, several historians, including Jussi Hanhimaki, John Zubritzky, and Mark Chi-
kwan, downplay the relative importance of the U.S.-Soviet conflict by focusing on small 
or middle-range powers that sought distinct international objectives in the postwar 
world.23 With other powers on the international stage, all with unique political, economic, 
and ideological motivations, Soviet-American hegemony becomes less apparent and 
consequential. Cary Fraser makes this point more explicit, insisting that an international 
approach to post-World War II history – that is, one that “reaches beyond the bipolar 
paradigm” of superpower relations – is the only way to get a truly comprehensive 
assessment of the period.24 
Andrew Preston launches a more direct challenge to the traditional Cold War 
narrative. In his book on U.S. Vietnam War policy, Preston questions the sense of 
                                                
22 Steven Phillips, “Forming America’s Cold War Policy,” review of Congress and the U.S.-China 
Relationship: 1949-1979, by Guangqiu Xu and Washington’s China: The National Security World, the
Cold War, and the Origins of Globalism, by James Peck. Diplomatic History 32 no. 5 (November 2008), 
995-96. 
23 Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Containing Coexistence: America, Russia, and the “Finnish Solution,” 1945-1956, 
(Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997); John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, 
Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysin-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-5 (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 2000); and Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War. 
24 Cary Fraser, “A Requiem for the Cold War: Reviewing the History of International Relations since 




inevitability that defines much of the scholarship on the Cold War, suggesting that a 
“Cold War consensus” was not the driving force behind American military intervention. 
Instead of American involvement being a natural, almost knee-jerk, response to 
American strategic and ideological concerns during the Cold War, U.S. intervention was 
instead the result of conscious, deliberate decisions from within the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations. While Cold War considerations were a factor in U.S. foreign 
policy, they did not establish an impermeable framework within which all decisions were 
made.25 
Applying this challenge of the Cold War to a broader geographic area, Matthew 
Connelly, Daniel Spiech, and Jason Parker argue that a Cold War perspective is not 
entirely appropriate when viewing parts of the Third World. In his examination of 
Algeria’s anti-colonial movement in the 1950s, Connelly notes that while Algerian 
nationalists recognized the existence of U.S.-Soviet rivalry and used it to their advantage, 
they did so in a way that muddles basic assumptions about the Cold War. Instead of 
merely playing the United States off of the Soviet Union, or vice versa, the Algerians 
“exploited every international rivalry that offered potential leverage – revisionist against 
conservative Arab states, the Arab League against Asian neutrals, China against the 
USSR, the communist powers against the Western allies, and, above all, the United States 
against France itself.”26 Spiech argues that Nationalist leaders in 1960s Kenya similarly 
blurred traditional Cold War categories by thinking in north/south terms when 
approaching issues such as technical assistance and industrialization. To these leaders, 
                                                
25 Andrew Preston, The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006). 
26 Matthew Connelly, “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian 
War for Independence,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33 (2001), 239. 
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the industrialized nations of both the United States and the USSR served as attractive 
models to imitate; from the perspective of Kenyan leaders, the countries of the “north” 
(the U.S. and the USSR included) belonged in the same camp.27 Finally, Parker, in his 
examination of Third World decolonization, suggests that the overstuffed periodizatin of 
the 1945-1990 Cold War is too large to be useful. Other forces at work in the Third 
World, such as campaigns for self-determination and racial struggle, deman other 
temporal divisions.28 In other words, when examining this area of international history, 
the traditional Cold War framework alone is not sufficient. 
Gordon Chang’s Friends and Enemies provides an excellent basis for this 
approach in the field of Sino-American relations. Rejecting Cold War inevitability and 
downplaying partisan rhetoric, Chang argues that the State Department’s eventual policy 
of isolating the PRC through non-recognition, embargo, and military deterrence was not a 
given from the start, nor was it beyond the possibility of modification. Rational political 
calculation, not narrow-minded assumptions of communist monolithism, determined 
policy.29 Similarly, Robert Accinelli’s Crisis and Commitment depicts the relationship 
between the U.S. and Taiwan as one of restraint and moderation. Maintaining the support 
of vital European allies and avoiding full-scale war with the PRC, Accinelli argues, 
usually took priority over both the needs of the Nationalist government and the desires of 
the China Lobby within the United States. Eisenhower’s talk of “unleashing Chiang,” 
along with other examples of aggressive rhetoric, were meant more to please domestic 
                                                
27 Daniel Spiech, “The Kenyan Style of ‘African Socialism’: Developmental Knowledge Claims and the 
Explanatory Limits of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 33 (June 2009). 
28 Jason Parker, “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the 
Reperiodization of the Postwar Era,” Diplomatic History 30 (November 2006). 
29 Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990). 
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and international audiences than they were reflective of actual U.S. intentions.30 More 
recently and dramatically, Yafeng Xia has challenged the notion that the Sino-American 
Cold War rivalry necessitated disengagement and unqualified enmity. Examining several 
instances of high-level U.S.-PRC talks, Xia argues that mutual distrust and public 
animosity did not preclude the possibility of comity and official contacts. Negotiations, 
easing of relations, and cultural contacts – alongside containment, isolation, and hostility
– characterized Sino-American relations during this period.31 
 
II 
Continuing down this intellectual path, this dissertation argues that the U.S. 
relationship with the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong cannot be understood if historians 
approach it merely as an extension of the rise and fall of Cold War hostility. The 
transcendence of the Cold War happened in several ways related to travel and tourism. 
First, while policymakers consistently maintained some sort of ban on travel to th PRC 
during the 1950s and 1960s, Washington’s tough policy was coupled with a stronger 
trend toward liberalization. In other words, the general policy of containment that 
Washington maintained on the political, economic, and military fronts did not translate 
fully into the realm of travel. During this period U.S. officials regularly amended and 
eased restrictions on American travel to China, granting numerous Americans permi sion 
to visit the PRC. In a pattern that would repeat itself throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
U.S. officials found that travel policy reform – more so than changes to economic, 
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military, or political policy – was a relatively politically safe mechanism for engaging or 
testing the PRC regime.  
Responding to the changes in U.S. travel policy and eager for further elimination 
of travel barriers, a number of Americans, moreover, violated travel restrictions and 
visited the PRC during the 1950s and 1960s, often with invitations from Chinese officials 
in hand. For decades before the American table tennis team made its landmark 1971 visit 
to the PRC during the period of Sino-American rapprochement, these American travelers 
maintained a presence on the Chinese mainland. While the number of these individuals 
was quite small (likely under one hundred) their travel was the topic of discussion in 
countless Washington meetings and their actions no doubt sped up further government 
liberalization of travel policy. Furthermore, because the PRC government maintained 
near-total control over visitors to the mainland, these American travelers exercised far 
more political influence than their small numbers would suggest. 
Second, as demonstrated by the gradual increase of lawful and unlawful American 
travelers in the PRC, efforts to stimulate domestic tourism were not the domain f 
“democratic” governments alone. U.S. officials regularly cited internatio l travel as a 
crucial distinction between the worlds on either side of the Iron Curtain, but Tito’s
Yugoslavia and post-Stalinist Russia both maintained active tourism industries and 
attracted a good deal of American tourists and American capital.32 Soviet success at 
drawing foreign tourists, of which U.S. officials were well aware, was actually a 
considerable inducement for U.S. policymakers to put more funding toward the American 
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tourism industry.33 Similarly, in the 1950s the PRC conducted a significant campaign to 
increase travel to the mainland. Japanese, Russian, Indian, and North Korean tourists 
flocked to the PRC in these years. Though the numbers of incoming tourists never 
approached the figures for Taiwan or Hong Kong (the peak was around 5,000 in 1956) 
the effort of the PRC government to accommodate tourists signals a degree of 
universality in international travel and demonstrates that certain trends in inter ational 
development do not fit into simple Cold War categories.34  
Third, the same Cold War exigencies that limited the options of policymakers in 
terms of travel to the PRC, pushed officials toward increasing contact with “Free China” 
– namely Taiwan and Hong Kong. Though Taiwan and Hong Kong served dramatically 
different roles in Washington’s military, political, and economic policies, the two regions 
played remarkably similar parts in U.S. cultural diplomacy. To many Americans, T iwan 
and Hong Kong represented the “true China,” and vacations to these destinations 
succeeded in filling the void created by the Communist takeover of the mainland. To 
policymakers, tourism to Taiwan and Hong Kong appeared to be an efficient means of 
bringing foreign exchange, technical assistance, symbolic support, and increased prestige 
to these crucial outposts. In this sense, U.S. travel policy toward China was not wholly 
negative and policymakers developed, guided, and co-opted travel connections to serve 
foreign policy objectives. Large-scale travel initiatives, run by the State Department, sent 
hundreds of artists, athletes, and lecturers to Taiwan and Hong Kong to entertain and 
enlighten locals. In addition to government-supported programs, travel agents, popular 
magazines, international travel associations, and airline and shipping companies 
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34 Greg MacGregor, “Foreign Visitors See Peiping’s Bet Side,” New York Times, 26 August 1956. 
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recognized that Taiwan and Hong Kong were untapped “Chinese” tourist destinations 
and they focused much of their resources into getting recreational tourists and tourist 
dollars to move in. 
Fourth, in the course of discussing and promoting travel to the region, U.S. 
officials, travel boosters, and private tourists often avoided depicting Taiwan and Hong 
Kong in terms of Cold War significance. Travel writing and advertisements – both of 
which served as a key medium for generating American images of China and shaping 
travel patterns in the region – regularly depicted Taiwan and Hong Kong on their own 
terms. Hong Kong and Taiwan were not merely democratic, capitalist altern tives to the 
PRC, nor were they means by which to undermine the Communist leadership on the 
mainland. Instead, they were serene destinations, exotic and exciting, and largely free 
from war and disorder. Travel agents, who sold package tours of Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
maintained this depiction by highlighting the modern hotels, beautiful landscapes, 
bargain shopping, and proximity to Japan and the Philippines. Communism and 
containment rarely entered the picture – at least not explicitly. If tourists are included 
among the numerous legitimate actors in Sino-American relations, it must be recognized 
that few saw themselves as extensions of U.S. foreign policy when their plane touch d 
down at Kai Tak Airport or when they boarded APL’s President Cleveland en route to 
Taiwan. 
Fifth, American tourism, which no doubt contributed to Washington’s efforts to 
compete with and challenge the communist world, also frequently butted up against or 
directly conflicted with Cold War containment. Individual tourists were not necessarily 
the best carriers of official U.S. foreign policy overseas. American travelers – who 
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understandably preferred relaxing and sightseeing to engaging in political debate – were 
prone to behave in ways that damaged, or at least failed to advance, America’s image and 
objectives overseas. Washington’s gradual liberalization of travel policy toward the PRC, 
for instance, made it increasingly difficult to impose any travel restrictions and the 
American public overwhelmingly opposed efforts of government officials to obstruct 
overseas travel. Strong pressure against travel restrictions meant that offici ls o ten had 
to allow leftist scholars, social critics, and American communists, to travel to the PRC, a 
development that seemed to threaten U.S. interests in the region.  
In regard to recreational travel to Taiwan and Hong Kong, U.S. policymakers, 
through official correspondence and adopted policy, placed more focus on the economic 
benefits of tourism than they did its contributions to containment or the collapse of the 
PRC. Economic advancement often worked hand in hand with Cold War containment 
policy, but sometimes these two objectives clashed. Most blatantly, though American 
tourists often had to change their shopping habits – primarily in Hong Kong – to comply 
with the U.S. embargo on the PRC, there is no doubt that significant monetary and 
political benefit came to the PRC through American tourism to the region. 
Finally, just as tourism does not fit neatly into the thematic framework of the Cold 
War, neither does it fit entirely in its temporal framework. Tourism’s place in 
international relations, in other words, did not emerge suddenly with the advent of Cold 
War and its significance did not dissipate with the Cold War’s conclusion. Ever sinc it 
emerged as a recreational activity, tourism influenced the ways that foreign governments 
and foreign peoples interacted with and perceived one another. Exemplifying this point, 
in December 1929 Harper’s Magazine writer Hiram Motherwell commented on the 
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steady and dramatic rise in overseas tourism. From the 1870s, when Mark Twain’s 
Innocents Abroad “was at the full peak of its efficiency as a stimulus to foreign travel,” to 
the 1920s, as Motherwell wrote his article, tourist numbers had increased more than 
tenfold and expenditures had increased 2700 percent. The American tourist, moreover, 
had “become a dominant factor in the modern world.” Despite tourists’ occasional gaffe, 
arrogant demeanor, or parochial outlook, Motherwell saw tourists as crucial to human 
progress: 
 
Judged merely by the annual sums of money transferred abroad, they are more important 
than all the famous American foreign investments taken together and four times more 
important as the war debts. And as a factor in international relations, b th economic and 
cultural, they constitute nothing less than a major element in the growth of modern 
civilization.35 
 
Motherwell’s observations, rooted in the climate of postwar disillusionment and 
economic depression, were as relevant to his time as they would be during the boom 
years of the 1950s and 1960s. In this manner, as well, the Cold War loses some of its 
explanatory power. Tourism – in terms of its influence on international affairs – 
developed independently of the Cold War and carried with it connotations and 
ramifications that far predated, and outlasted, the post-World War II Sino-American 
conflict. 
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Ch. 1 – Expectations and Change: Developing a Travel Policy 
Toward China, 1945-1952 
 
Ten years, five years, three years, perhaps even one year from now, the Orient will be a 
fascinating – and a pleasant – place to visit. But not this summer. 
 
-- Foster Hailey, New York Times war and travel correspondent, May 1947 
 
In Hong Kong’s harbor, a huge Royal Navy Yard repairs and services the ships of 
Britain’s Far Eastern Fleet. On land, a military air base is jammed with long-range flying 
squadrons and antiaircraft nests. 
 
-- Holiday, November 1950 
 
Only by sea can you leave care and dull routine so very far behind. When you sail the 
serene and sparkling Pacific in “President” style, to romantic Honolulu and storied Far 
East ports of call – then, indeed, is your escape complete. 
 
-- American Presidents Line advertisement, Holiday, November 1952 
 
The years following the Second World War saw the rapid rise in overseas travel. 
Tourist destinations, long closed due to military conflict and political instability or 
unreachable due to a lack of tourist infrastructure and transportation, were now open to
the eager traveler. As one writer noted, “There are so many countries inviting the 
American tourist…that his hardest job, perhaps, will be deciding where he wants to go.”1 
This revitalized middle-class activity seemed to offer something for everyon . U.S. 
policymakers, eager to prevent postwar depression by stabilizing (primarily) European 
economies, salivated over the potential impact of millions of American tourists, and 
billions of American dollars, making their way overseas. For the first time, the U.S. 
government explicitly integrated mass travel into foreign policy; officials encouraged the 
dissolution of travel restrictions and the commensurate rise in tourism. Internationalis s 
and “one-worlders,” inside and outside the government, saw the travel boom as an 
                                                
1 Paul J. C. Friedlander, “The American Tourist Comes Into His Own,” New York Times, 6 March 1949. 
 21 
 
opportunity to promote understanding and cultural harmony between nations and to heal 
the wounds of the war. Members of the travel industry latched on quickly to the new 
trends in travel, expanding their presence around the globe and establishing their 
companies as significant representatives of American power and prestige. Finally, 
anxious Americans, tired of sitting on their wartime savings, eagerly exp or d the world.  
In a handful of countries, however, the legacy of World War II and the emerging 
reality of the Cold War kept the average American tourist on the outside looking in. As
late as 1948, the State Department maintained restrictions on travel to the former Axis 
powers of Germany, Austria, and Japan. Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Albania – all falling 
behind the “Iron Curtain” – were also off limits to most American travelers. The 
Republic of China, engaged in civil war between Communist (CCP) and Nationalist 
(GMD) forces until late 1949, was among this small group of nations to which most 
American tourists could not travel. By the end of 1950, with the CCP consolidation of 
power on the mainland and Chinese “volunteers” waging war against U.S. troops on the 
Korean peninsula, temporary restrictions became permanent and U.S. passports soon bore 
prohibitory stamps eliminating the PRC as a legitimate destination.  
The fact that restrictions on China remained in place even as the former Axis 
powers became more accessible to Americans, demonstrated that the Cold War had 
arrived in East Asia and that U.S. containment policy toward the newly formed PRC 
would extend to travel as well. At the same time, however, the process of eliminating 
American travel to China and developing travel as an integral component of U.S. Cold 
War strategy was a gradual and unwieldy development that challenges, to an extent, the 
traditional narrative of the Cold War. Various groups of American travelers lingered in 
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China during and even after the end of the civil war. Even as CCP victory became a f it 
accompli, airlines and cruise lines cooperated with Communist officials and actually 
expanded their presence in China. Similarly, though the collapse of the Nationalist 
government brought about the demise on the mainland of cultural exchange programs, 
such as the Fulbright Program, those programs withered away slowly and participants 
remained behind for years.2 
 
I 
Recreational travel overseas was nothing new for Americans.3 The 1920s and 
1930s, which saw the perfection of luxury, “round-the-world” cruises, and the nascent 
years of commercial air travel, comprised only the most recent “golden age” in American 
international tourism. In the interwar years, however, short lists of cruise tav lers 
vacationing to exotic locales had been staples of most leading newspapers, signaling the 
uniqueness and elitism associated with international travel.4 Travel to the Far East, in 
particular, was an exclusive activity. Highlighting this status, whereas European tourism 
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understandably dipped during the Great Depression, tourism to the Far East – which 
required more time, money, and connections – actually increased. It was only the 
wealthiest of Americans who journeyed over the Pacific toward Asia.5  
With the end of the Second World War, recreational travel emerged as a new 
middle-class activity. Elite lists of overseas travelers gave way to popular advertisements 
and columns dedicated to inexpensive and comfortable travel. Travel, in other words, 
became a way of fitting in as opposed to standing out. This changing dynamic led to 
dramatic increases in overseas tourism. Wartime savings, the conversion of military
airstrips and planes for commercial use, and the general stability of the postwar climate, 
gave anxious Americans an unprecedented opportunity to see the world. The “boom,” 
though significant, was initially not strong enough to bring post-World War II numbers 
up to par with figures from the early 1930s, years that served as a benchmark for 
international tourism.6 Nonetheless, the rate of growth and the remarkably smooth 
transition from war to leisure, made the late 1940s rise of mass travel quite remarkable. 
In 1947 only 200,000 Americans had valid passports. In 1949, which the New York Times 
designated the first “normal international travel year of the post-war era,” 1,500,000 
Americans traveled abroad.7 
The popularity and scope of postwar travel gave it a newfound prominence in 
government circles. Before World War II, Washington officials had not, in any 
substantive way, integrated tourism into their foreign policy. While officials were no 
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doubt aware of the economic, political, and cultural benefits that arose from mass travel, 
there was no explicit effort to harness those assets. After 1945, on the other hand, 
officials actively encouraged the expansion of tourism and used a heavy hand to guide its 
development in a way that best suited U.S. foreign policy.  
To this end, the Truman administration developed a primitive infrastructure 
within the government to develop travel policy recommendations. In the Department of 
Commerce, officials established a Travel Branch and geared it toward the research and 
facilitation of tourism. Through this division Commerce lobbied the White House and 
private industry for the reduction of travel barriers, the construction of overseas hotel , 
and the development of faster transportation technologies.8 In October 1945 the 
administration oversaw the establishment of the Interdepartmental Committee on Foreign 
Travel, a purely advisory group consisting of representatives from Commerce, State, 
Agriculture, Interior, Treasury, Justice, and the Civil Aeronautics Board. The various 
agencies worked closely with overseas U.S. posts and foreign governments in order to get 
a better picture of the tourist scene and to pinpoint specific obstacles. Meeting roughly 
six times a year, the Committee developed and proposed means by which the federal 
government could facilitate overseas travel.9 There was notable progress on this front. 
Government decisions to simplify visa formalities, offer hefty government subsidies to 
the cruise lines and airlines, and raise the duty-free allotment from $100 to $500, 
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stemmed largely from Committee recommendations and signaled the central posiion that 
Washington was assigning international travel. 
As demonstrated by the role that Commerce played in the promotion of American 
tourism, the most immediate advantage that tourism presented was economic. The 
dramatic rise in tourism buoyed the hopes of U.S. policymakers who, in the aftermath of 
World War II, understandably were concerned about postwar recession and financial 
instability around the world. Experts had, for some time, recognized that American 
tourists could serve foreign economies by building up dollar reserves overseas. Until the 
end of World War II, however, this rarely developed beyond an academic appreciation.10 
Turning away from this hands-off policy, in the late 1940s the Truman administration 
officially recognized tourism as a means of distributing U.S. currency around the world 
and worked to incorporate this “invisible export” into its foreign economic policy.11 The 
most direct example of this was Truman’s decision to make tourism a key component of 
the Marshall Plan. The Department of Commerce, the European Travel Commission, and 
the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) worked closely to bring billions of 
non-grant, non-loan dollars – in the form of private investment and tourist expenditures – 
into western European economies. Private industry worked with the ECA and facilitated 
this fusion between tourism and foreign economic policy.12 American Express, for 
example, distributed a brochure to various members of the Truman administration titled, 
“The Quickest Way to Help Foreign Countries Earn American Dollars.” The document 
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explained that “dollar-spending Americans” could significantly reduce the dollar gap 
overseas.13  
Like the Marshall Plan in general, “tourism aid” would, in addition to benefiting 
western European economies, bring economic benefits back to the United States. 
Powerful European economies meant that foreign governments could purchase more 
American-made products and American-grown crops. So much of the tourism industry 
was in American hands, moreover, that a trip abroad (during which one would fly in a 
Pan American plane, sleep in a Hilton Hotel, and purchase American Express travelers’ 
checks) directly boosted the U.S. economy. Playing off this idea, United Nations World 
frequently ran advertisements assuring readers that the money spent abroad while 
vacationing would likely “fly back, too.”14  
To American policymakers tourism aid was, quite simply, a less burdensome 
form of assistance and economic stimulus. First, the influx of tourist dollars meant that 
taxpayers did not have to pay the entire bill for foreign assistance. “Pleasure dollars,” as 
one Pan American Airways report called them, could have the same positive impact as 
more traditional forms of foreign aid, while avoiding backlash from fiscal conservatives 
and tax weary citizens.15 Second, in economic terms, an increase of American tourist 
dollars into foreign economies would serve the same function as an increase in foreign 
exports to the United States. Tourism, however, would avoid the political and economic 
complications associated with tariff disputes and manufacturing competition.16 Finally, 
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based on the trends emerging in the late 1940s, overseas tourism was increasingly 
popular and was going to expand regardless of U.S. government action. If tourism could, 
unbeknownst to its participants, simultaneously benefit U.S. and foreign economies, 
Washington officials were not about to object.  
Officials also quickly recognized the cultural advantages of mass travel. Just as 
tourists served as “one-man and one-woman Marshall Plans,” so too did they play the 
role of goodwill ambassadors and cultural diplomats.17 For many foreign peoples, the 
American tourist was the face of Washington; the impression that tourists made was thus 
crucial to U.S. foreign relations. Recognizing that most tourists traveled overseas for 
purposes of recreation, luxury, and escape – as opposed to furthering U.S. foreign policy 
interests – Truman officials worked closely with travelers and industry leaders to develop 
means by which tourists effectively could play the dual roles of vacationer and diplomat. 
To this end, in 1949 the ECA teamed up with the American Society of Travel Agents 
(ASTA) in publishing a booklet titled “How to Help Your Clients Preserve Democracy.” 
The booklet fell somewhere in between propaganda and a traditional travel guide. It told 
travelers what sights to see and what locations to avoid, but it also alerted travelers to 
typical anti-American criticism and provided useful information and rebuttals for any 
verbal attacks they might encounter. Focusing primarily on explaining the Marshall 
Plan’s benefits to both Europeans and Americans, the booklet provided tourists with 
sufficient ammunition to deflect charges of American “imperialism” and “war-
mongering”18 Expanding this approach beyond Europe, the State Department, in an effort 
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to “educate” potential travelers, issued a supplement with all passports that highlighted 
the importance of appropriate behavior overseas: 
 
As we act, so are we judged. Tourists who assume an air of arrogance or who transcend 
the common bounds of decency in human conduct can do more in the course of an hour 
to break down the elements of friendly approach between peoples than the government 
can do in the course of a year in trying to stimulate friendly relations.19 
 
II 
Washington’s interest in promoting Far East tourism resembled the general 
government approach toward international travel. In the late 1940s the Far East did not 
have an equivalent to the European Travel Commission and there were no large-scale 
government initiatives comparable to the integration of tourism into the Marshall Plan. 
Nonetheless, the State Department, working mostly through the United Nation’s 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), lobbied Asian nations to 
streamline their tourist procedures and open their doors to American travelers. A 
“Resolution on Travel” adopted by ECAFE in October 1949 demonstrated that member 
delegations saw tourism as an underexploited yet effective foreign policy tool.20 Not 
surprisingly, the benefit to local economies was the most relevant to ECAFE members. A 
report produced by an assemblage of ECAFE delegates noted: “One need not be steeped 
in economics to know the significance in obtaining dollars and other foreign exchange for 
the balance of trade in dollar-thirsty countries. Greater travel traffic af ords a means of 
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expanding invisible incomes in the balance of payments.”21 To facilitate these 
developments, ECAFE urged governments to establish well-funded and effective travel 
organizations, reduce prohibitive taxes and restrictions on travel, and develop scenic 
attractions and hotel accommodations.22 
Despite modest efforts to integrate Far East tourism into U.S. economic policy, 
the Truman administration showed relatively little interest in dedicating government 
resources toward transpacific travel. Government indifference reflected, and in turn 
shaped, middle-class Americans’ own tendencies not to vacation in East Asian 
destinations. Viewed from the other perspective, Truman’s integration of European 
tourism into the Marshall Plan and the numerous trade and travel agreements that his 
administration negotiated with the United States’ northern and southern neighbors, 
highlighted the fact that Western Europe, Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean 
pulled in the vast majority of American tourists.23 In 1947 officials estimated that only 
85,000 Americans traveled to the Far East. By comparison, in the same year Switze land, 
Britain, and France alone welcomed around 200,000 American tourists. In general, until 
the late 1950s, travel to Asia accounted for around 2 percent of all American international 
tourism.24 While “confirmed optimists,” like Leo Matthews of American Presidents Line 
(APL), insisted that the potential of the Far East’s postwar tourist industry was “almost 
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beyond comprehension,” such a cheery outcome was not on the immediate horizon.25 
Representatives from American Express surveyed the Far East soon after the wa ’s 
conclusion and noted that it would be years until tourism in the region returned to pre-
war levels.26 As one 1947 travel article noted, “it is a hardy traveler who goes west of 
Honolulu today if he doesn’t have to.”27 
In this context, tourism to China floundered during these postwar boom years. 
Though APL proudly announced in 1946 that a massive, $100 million project was 
underway to convert its warships into a “luxury fleet” – an undertaking that would have 
had enormous ramifications for recreational tourism to Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
Yokohama, Manila, and other major East Asian ports – the numbers show that this 
campaign was slow to produce results.28 Likewise, in 1947 Northwest Airlines 
demonstrated an interest in establishing an air route from Japan to Beiping (Peiping), 
“basically for tourist purposes,” but U.S. officials voiced concern that the military 
situation in China “was sufficiently dangerous to warrant the flights not being made at 
present.”29 In the end, around 15,000 Americans traveled to China in 1947, but even this 
number is misleading; government and military representatives made up a significant 
portion of this travel flow.30  
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Travel restrictions, frequent electricity outages, and inhospitable hotel 
accommodations kept most tourists away. One postwar survey estimated that 90 percent 
of tourist facilities on the mainland of China were unfit for use – a result of years of 
Japanese looting and general wartime destruction.31 A Marine, returning to China in 1947 
as a tourist, described the havoc that war had played on China’s tourism industry: 
 
The Palace, once a fine hotel but run down even before the war, is rickety and shabby. In 
my room there is an ugly patch on the wall where the radiator used to stand. (The Japs 
tore out the radiators for scrap metal but, because of shipping shortage, left them all piled 
somewhere near Woosung.) The rug is in holes, the linen tattered and gray; the e is only 
one small electric light bulb in the room; hot water comes on only every other day.32 
 
War and travel correspondent Foster Hailey, surveying the Far East tourist scene,
confirmed these dreary depictions. Few of China’s hotels, Hailey wrote, furnished more 
than “the minimum amount of heat, light and water.” Tourists supplied their own towels, 
soap, and toilet paper. Compounding these problems, runaway inflation meant that these 
bleak hotel rooms were beyond the means of many middle-class Americans.33 
Hailey’s article pointed to another factor in China’s pathetic tourism industry. In 
an era when travel periodicals were becoming increasingly popular and influentia , China 
rarely received positive publicity. In general in the late 1940s, stories on recreational 
tourism focused on the traditional destinations of Europe, North America, and the 
Caribbean. The average travel article on China, on the other hand, stayed away from the
                                                
31 “Tourists in Orient Find Housing Poor,” New York Times, 4 September 1948. 
32 Letter to the Editor, “Former Marine Colonel Returns to Shanghai, Finds City Changed But Not Its 
People,” Holiday, January 1947. 
33 Hailey, “West of Honolulu,” New York Times, 4 May 1947. 
 32 
 
theme of recreational tourism entirely. When Travel or Holiday offered the occasional 
story on China, they normally highlighted the lingering effects of Japanese occupation, 
air raids, uncontrollable inflation, oppressive heat and severe cold, and widespread 
poverty.34  When pitted against the photographs and articles depicting the ease, luxury, 
and fantasy of vacations in France or Cuba, these travel reports did not exactly ignite 
enthusiasm in the hearts of tourists. 
It was not merely infrastructural and promotional problems that burdened tourism 
during this period. As the ability of the Nationalist government to maintain control over 
China waned in the latter years of the 1940s, Washington officials approached future 
travel to the mainland with trepidation. While Washington officials recognized both that 
communism was not monolithic and that Jiang Jieshi was not an ideal ally, the Truman 
administration always leaned toward the Nationalists – to use Mao’s phrase – and 
anticipated a future in which the anticommunist government would dominate the 
region.35 On the Chinese side as well, while Mao Zedong was not entirely opposed to 
courting the Americans from time to time, his ideological mission of revolution and the 
maintenance of Chinese sovereignty, prevented him from cooperating too closely with 
the Washington government.36 Thus, as a CCP victory loomed, the future of Sino-
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The unfriendly and unstable conditions of China did not, however, entirely 
dissuade American presence in the region. Despite emerging economic restriction  on the 
PRC, U.S.-China trade in 1950 equaled nearly 60 percent of 1946 levels. Contributing to 
this continuity of trade, during these transition years numerous American businesse  
remained in China. Shanghai Power Company, Stanvac, Caltex, Stantelco, Pan American, 
General Electric, and APL all remained and actually expanded their businesse in 
China.37 In this context, while tourism to China was never a huge business, various 
interest groups had developed a niche in the region and they saw little incentive to bail 
out in the late 1940s.38  
Even after April 1949, when CCP forces seized the Nationalist capital of Nanjing 
and all but secured victory in the civil war, American businessmen remained optimistic. 
Representatives from Pan American and Northwest Airlines – which combined to offer 
seven weekly flights into China – announced in May that they would continue servicing 
Shanghai until “invited to leave.” Both companies maintained full staffs in China and 
showed no immediate concern about a change in regimes.39 Executives of APL, as well, 
showed an eagerness to resume and expand business with the new Chinese government.40 
Displaying his confidence, company president George Killion sent APL ships carrying 
American passengers and cargo to the Chinese coast throughout early 1950. 
Advertisements from this period still listed Shanghai as one of the stops on APL’s famed 
                                                
37 Shuguang Zhang, Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo Against China a d the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 
1949-1963 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 23, 75. 
38 Chang, Friends and Enemies, 53-54; “The Pacific Coast: Recognition of Communist China is a Widely 
Debated Issue,” New York Times, 9 October 1949. 
39 Frederick Graham, “Airlines to Ignore Fall of Shanghai,” New York Times, 7 May 1949. 
40 “Shanghai Cargo Accepted,” New York Times, 4 June 1949. 
 34 
 
“Round-the-World Tour.” In the context of the 1948-49 Angus Ward affair and the failed 
1949 Huang-Stuart talks – two events that historian Chen Jian cites as evidence of the 
inevitability of confrontation between Washington and the CCP leadership – the fact that 
the U.S. tourism industry persisted is especially significant.41 
Many within the travel industry actually saw hidden potential in the tumultuous 
atmosphere surrounding China’s regime change. George Killion was sure that bringing 
American goods and American tourists to China was the “surest way to peace and 
international good will” and he was confident that CCP officials shared his enthusiasm.42 
Reflecting this, one popular APL advertising campaign adopted the slogan, “To visit and 
enjoy – to like and understand.” It was, after all, “easier to be friends with people you 
know and have visited.”43 
APL’s campaign was, of course, largely an effort to salvage profits in a 
tumultuous part of the world.44 China was APL’s most important market and the triumph 
of the CCP constituted a major reason for the company’s dramatic loss in revenue 
between 1947 and 1950.45 At its core, however, the effort to link travel to international 
harmony resonated among American citizens and officials alike. It was common for 
travel writers and government officials to embrace the “one world” theme in the postwar 
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years.46 In the aftermath of World War II – a war that appeared to be the product of 
nationalist extremism – travel seemed like a logical and effective means of erasing 
international borders, misunderstanding, and conflict. Former Republican presidential 
candidate Wendell Willkie’s One World, written during World War II, suggested how 
private travel served the cause of internationalism and world harmony.47 In the postwar 
years United Nations World magazine (unrelated to the international body) highlighted 
these themes on a monthly basis. The periodical’s articles and advertisemen  routinely 
linked overseas travel to international cooperation, harmony, and understanding. Trans 
World Airlines advertisements, for example, depicted their sky routes as “fast and free” 
and noted that the sky was a place “where the world was one.” APL was “dedicated to 
serving the cause of world peace and international goodwill by transporting friedly 
commerce to more than 30 ports ‘round the world.”48 Similarly, a New York Times travel 
writer praised the new travel guide genre as the “tome of peace.”49 
Regardless of whether members of the travel industry genuinely saw tourism as 
the key to universal harmony, the continuing presence of passenger ships in the waters 
off of war torn China demonstrated that travel was not crippled by political and military 
realities. Tourists, traveling by ship, could visit the region without necessarily forgoing 
the comforts to which they were accustomed. The leveled hotels, inadequate roads, 
unsubstantial restaurants and entertainment, and even the threat of warfare, meant little to 
the cruise passenger. The N w York Times noted, “the best quarters for tourists in the Far 
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East now are to be found on several liners.”50 APL, in fact, proudly and accurately 
declared itself “America’s Hotel Abroad.” Sticking to the coastline (usually docking at 
Shanghai or Hong Kong), American tourists could sightsee by day and return to their ship 
to eat and sleep. 
Even the more rugged transpacific freighters guaranteed “high quality food” and 
comfortable staterooms. These cargo ships were surprisingly popular among American 
tourists throughout the 1940s and 1950s; by 1958 roughly one of every thirteen ship 
passengers traveled in this manner.51 Freighters appealed to those individuals seeking 
greater adventure at a reduced price. For about half the cost of accommodations on 
luxury liners, these cargo ships promised tourists a “more realistic picture” of s a life 
than they would receive on a traditional cruise ship.52 Passengers often dined with 
crewmembers and had to perform minor chores as they crossed the ocean.  
Despite the conscious effort to downplay the glitz of modern cruises and to 
disassociate freighter passengers from the category of the helpless “touri t,” these ships, 
too, offered the recreational, hedonistic, and “all-inclusive” attributes of a traditional 
cruise liner. Pacific Travel News assured travel agents that most freighters had private 
lounges for passengers, rooms with private baths, and well-stocked bars.53 Travel writer 
David Dodge recalled his Mediterranean cruise on board a French freighter, during which 
he enjoyed “French bread every day, two kinds of French wine free with meals, a double 
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cabin just under the bridge wing with real beds, carpets and windows.”54 Such 
descriptions underlined the fact that freighters, like other cruise ships, served as a buffer 
between tourists and the potentially unsavory elements of their vacation destination. All 
cruises to the Far East – especially during years of war – intentionally steered clear of the 
political and economic realities of the region. Despite a stated desire to see the “ xotic,” 
tourists to China sought comfort, familiarity, and safety above all else. 
This separation from regional turmoil allowed tourism to operate as a link 
between the United States and China even as other economic, political, and cultural links 
withered. State Department officials were well aware of APL’s lingeri  business and it 
encouraged – or at least condoned – its continued presence in communist-controlled 
portions of China. Underscoring this attitude, State Department restrictions, which 
prevented most Americans from traveling to mainland China in the years immediately 
after World War II, exempted those arriving via passenger ship.55  
This inconsistency in China policy was due, in part, to the fact that Washington 
officials were more confident in the safety of cruise travelers than they were other 
varieties of visitors to China. More significantly, most officials still likened travel to 
Communist China to relations with European communist nations and thus saw little need 
for immediate prohibitions.56 Even if the civil war resulted in a CCP victory – a 
conclusion that seemed quite likely by 1948 – it would not necessarily translate into a 
severing of all ties with China. Officials clearly wished to divide the Sino-Soviet camp 
but were not united on the most efficient means of doing so. While some felt that harsh, 
punitive policies toward the Chinese Communists would accomplish the goal, others 
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argued that cooperation and assistance was more appropriate.57 In his context, the 
continuation of travel and trade contacts seemed like an appropriate means of wooing the 
Chinese or, at the least, a harmless deviation from an otherwise confrontational policy. 
Hovering over all of this, moreover, was the sense that travel was, to some extent, an 
apolitical activity that should not be held to the same strict standards as military, 
economic, or political endeavors. This connotation of recreation was to be a defining 
characteristic of American travel and travel policy and gave suitcase diplomacy a unique 
position in U.S. foreign relations. 
 
IV 
Just as Washington’s general travel restrictions in the years following World War 
II had not definitively ended recreational tourism to China, so too did they leave room for 
participants in Sino-American cultural exchange programs. China, by November 1947, 
had become the first country to sign a Fulbright agreement with the United Stats.58 
Chinese and U.S. officials got to work quickly to assemble the United States Educational 
Foundation in China (USEFC), the board that would oversee Fulbright operations. A year 
later, forty-one scholars received grants to travel to China, but because of the local 
conditions only twenty-seven made the trip.59 Despite the small numbers, Washington 
officials had high hopes for the program. The Chinese Fulbright Program fit into a larger
effort to combat both the Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at Chinese universities and 
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a rising tide of anti-Americanism in the region. Top-level officials discus ed using 
Fulbright funds to distribute American periodicals and films, send American professors to 
China to “explain our viewpoint,” and translate American history and political science 
textbooks into Chinese.60  
There was little time, however, to carry any of these plans to completion. A 
month after Chinese and U.S. officials signed the Fulbright agreement, CCP forces were 
in the midst of a major offensive in Manchuria. By November 1948, when the first wave 
of American Fulbright grantees were arriving in China, Communist troops occupied 
Shenyang (Mukden), China’s largest city in the northeast. Tientsin fell on January 15, 
1949, Beiping on January 31, Nanjing – the Nationalist capital and the site of Fulbright 
headquarters – on April 20, and Shanghai on May 25. The China Fulbright Program, the 
first one of its kind, soon held the less dignified distinction of being the first to close 
shop. By August 1949 the Fulbright office had shut down and by October, when Mao 
formally declared the establishment of the PRC, USEFC staff had evacuated the country. 
While the program was extremely short-lived, the participating scholars played a 
significant role in the transition to PRC control and their lingering presence highlighted 
the attributes and weaknesses of suitcase diplomacy. Unlike cruise travelers, who enjoyed 
brief, antiseptic glimpses of China, Fulbright grantees engaged in longer, mor 
“purposeful” visits. For this reason, it was far more difficult for Fulbrighters o avoid the 
region’s tumultuous atmosphere. In the transition years of 1948-50 State Department 
officials, however, did not take a firm stand on the future of the Fulbright grantees. While 
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Washington officials encouraged the scholars to return to the U.S., they nonetheless gave 
the Fulbrighters the option to stay.  
To this end, Fulbright officials in China and the U.S. negotiated an agreement 
with Pan American Airways for prepayment in Chinese gold yuan for return airfare for 
all Fulbright students. U.S. officials, moreover, prepaid Fulbrighters their stipends in a 
lump sum, as opposed to monthly installations. These moves ensured that the grantees 
could live comfortably and had a way of getting home, regardless of what events 
transpired in China.61 Derk Bodde, a leading historian on Chinese history who had been 
the first American to receive a Fulbright grant for study in China, recalled that the efforts 
of the Fulbright Program in the late 1940s allowed him and other scholars “to continue 
working in Peking…despite political change.”62 At the same time, Bodde was surprised 
that the Washington Fulbright office kept sending scholars to China, assuming that U.S. 
officials were not entirely aware of the seriousness of the military situation.63 In August 
1949, Bodde and his family returned home to Philadelphia. 
Most of the American scholars in China followed Bodde’s lead and evacuated the 
country along with U.S. officials. Thirteen Fulbrighters, however, chose to remain in 
China after October 1949, a move that U.S. officials opposed but did not officially 
prohibit. As Wilma Fairbank, the Cultural Attaché to the U.S. Embassy in Chongqing, 
noted, the bulk of these scholars – who remained an additional few weeks or months 
following the establishment of the PRC – continued their work with only minor 
inconveniences.64 State Department officials, in fact, kept in close contact with several of 
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the Fulbrighters and relied on them for intelligence on the new Chinese regime. After 
leaving Beijing in August 1950 – about a month and a half after the start of the Korean 
War – James Parsons, for example, held lengthy discussions with officials at the U.S. 
Consulate in Hong Kong. Parsons discussed the general attitudes of the Chinese toward 
the new government, the Soviet Union, and the United States. U.S. officials in Hong 
Kong and Washington eagerly read through Parson’s substantial report, which stressed 
his belief that the vast majority of the Chinese population questioned the “official line” 
on issues such as the Korean War and Taiwan.65 Likewise, U.S. officials kept in contact 
with Frances Spieth, an American chemistry professor at Lingnan University in Canton, 
who arrived in China – outside the auspices of the Fulbright Program – in 1949. After 
leaving Canton in early 1951, she discussed her experiences with U.S. officials in Hong 
Kong, providing details on the rise of CCP influence on university campuses.66  
For other scholars, however, the transition of power was not entirely smooth. 
Most notably, in 1951 the Chinese arrested three Fulbright students  – Harriet Mills, 
Adele Rickett, and Walter Rickett – on charges of espionage.67 Another Fulbrighter, 
Frank Bessac, fled from Beiping in early 1949 and joined up with three Russians and 
Vice Consul Douglas Mackiernan – who was left with the task of closing the U.S. 
Consulate in Urumchi. Upon entering Tibet, local guards shot and killed Mackiernan and 
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two other members of the party, leaving only Bessac and one of the Russians to complete 




As signaled by the unfortunate dissolution of the Fulbright Program on the 
mainland and the chaotic experiences of those scholars who remained behind, travel to 
China could not remain aloof indefinitely from political realities and the emerging Cold 
War divisions. CCP officials, consolidating power on the mainland, began to cast their 
net over the nation’s tourist plant. Two National Geographic journalists, writing about 
Beijing in late 1949, noted the dramatic changes: 
 
[I]ts once luxurious habits are so different that Americans and other foreigne s who knew 
it in its palmy tourist times would now hardly recognize it. Such famed hotels as the 
Pekin and the Wagons-Lits no longer shelter foreigners. Guarded by sentries, they are 
reserved for Chinese Communist officers and officials. Drab uniforms are eve ywhere. 
Men in European dress are scarce.69 
 
Continuing this campaign of consolidation, a month after the founding of the PRC 
CCP officials took ownership of twelve commercial airliners – ten from China National 
Aviation Corporation (CNAC) and two from Central Air Transport Corporation (CATC) 
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– and transported the planes from Hong Kong’s Kai Tak Airport to the mainland. The 
seventy-one remaining planes from these two companies remained immobilized in Hong 
Kong.70   
Time seemed to be on the side of the PRC. Were the British to recognize the PRC 
government – a move that looked likely in the months following the Communist victory – 
the transfer of the remaining planes to PRC ownership would be relatively smooth. It was 
not, however, merely a matter of cooperation between British and PRC officials. Just as 
APL executives had pursued a normal working relationship with CCP officials, so too did 
American employees of CNAC and CATC. American pilots working for CNAC – a 
subsidiary of Pan American Airways of which the Chinese Nationalists owned 80 percent 
– showed especially little concern for the regime change; in the months after the CCP 
victory the pilots kept their jobs and announced proudly that they would continue to work 
under the new management.71 Juan Trippe, president of Pan American, also was hesitant 
to make any sudden changes, preferring to continue operating the airline from the 
mainland.72 
Not all American representatives in China, however, were so agreeable. Retired 
Lieutenant General Clair Chennault and Whiting Willauer, who in 1946 had founded a 
third airline in the Republic of China, voiced strong concern that a transfer of the 
seventy-one planes to the Communist regime would doom the Nationalist government 
and cripple Washington’s standing in the region. In December 1949, to address the issue 
head on, Chennault and Willauer sought to transfer ownership of the planes to their 
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company – the wholly American-owned Civil Air Transport (CAT) – in order to keep 
them out of Communist hands. Faced with foot-dragging from British and Hong Kong 
officials, Jiang Jieshi showed enthusiastic support for the move and Juan Trippe, 
recognizing that the Truman administration would not be issuing diplomatic recognition 
to the new Communist regime, sold his 20 percent share of CNAC to the Nationalist 
government. In 1950 Truman made his position clear when he approved the CIA’s 
purchase of the financially desperate CAT company.73  
The transfer of ownership hardly settled the issue. The initial legal dispute quickly 
devolved into a media circus, with lawyers of Chennault and Willauer criticizing British 
and Hong Kong officials for their lack of grit. Despite Chennault and Willauer’s efforts 
to use the increased publicity to nudge British and Hong Kong officials quickly into the 
Americans’ corner, the battle soon stalemated in a drawn out court proceeding over the 
fate of the planes. While Hong Kong court’s initially sided with the PRC, in 1952 British 
officials – frustrated with the status of Sino-British relations and hesitant to augment 
tensions with Washington – overturned the Hong Kong ruling and confirmed American 
ownership of the planes.74 The court decision, however, marked more of a symbolic 
victory than it did a substantive change in Sino-American travel relations. By the time 
British officials overturned the Hong Kong decision, neither American nor Chinese 
officials allowed tourism between the U.S. and the PRC to continue. 
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The immediate cause for this cessation of travel was the outbreak of the Korean 
War in June 1950. With U.S. and Chinese troops waging war on the Korean peninsula, 
Washington’s attitude toward travel to the PRC gradually became less ambivalent. This 
strengthened travel ban was a component of a larger shift in U.S. policy toward the PRC 
that emerged following the outbreak of the Korean War. The American trade embargo, 
the placement of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits, and the 1954 U.S.-ROC mutual 
defense treaty, all aimed to “bring about the collapse of the Peking government” and 
signaled the arrival of the Cold War in Asia.75 
The nuanced approach discussed above, however, did not go away entirely. In 
August 1950 the State Department’s Bureau of Chinese Affairs felt it was still 
“inadvisable” to stamp all U.S. passports “not valid for travel in China.” While the 
Department did not foresee sending significant numbers of Americans to the PRC, it 
opted to leave the option on the table, “so that certain individuals might be allowed to 
go.” It was not until the beginning of 1952 that the Department began inserting 
prohibitory stamps on U.S. passports, making all travel to the PRC illegal.76 The 
relatively slow pace of the State Department on the passport front did not signal a strong 
desire on the part of U.S. officials to engage the Chinese in a program of cultural or 
recreational exchange. The hesitation toward passport restrictions, especially in the 
context of the Korean War and the strict economic embargo placed on the PRC, 
nonetheless highlighted how travel policy developed along a slightly different trajectory 
than other components of U.S. foreign policy.  
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By the time that the State Department enacted its official ban on travel to th  PRC 
in 1952, it had also eliminated the ability of private tourism companies to do business 
with the Communist regime. New government restrictions, emerging in between 1949 
and 1951, meant that companies like APL and the American-owned airlines could no 
longer participate in trade with the PRC or bring American passengers to the mainland. 
By expanding the Trading With the Enemy Act to cover the PRC and North Korea in 
1950, moreover, the Truman administration effectively made American travel to those 
countries illegal.77 Under this statutory authority, the Treasury Department could 
prosecute or at least penalize even the casual tourist purchasing souvenirs in Shanghai 
while his ship waited offshore. 
The emerging U.S.-PRC conflict also resonated in Hong Kong and Taiwan – both 
of which emerged as crucial outposts for U.S. officials after the “loss” of China. Hong 
Kong’s hotels and infrastructure were overwhelmed in 1949-1950, as refugees, U.S. 
officials, Chinese troops, and journalists congregated in response to the CCP takeover on 
the mainland. Karl Rankin, who arrived in the British colony in summer 1949, recalled 
that he, his wife, and his entire staff had to quarter on the U.S.S. Dixie, which was docked 
in Victoria Harbor.78  
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Beyond logistical setbacks, Hong Kong’s geographic location gave travel there a 
palpable precariousness. A 1950 Holiday article depicted the dual roles of Hong Kong as 
a “money-maker” and “British fortress,” placing photographs of Hong Kong soldiers 
alongside those of bustling curio shops. “As long as Communist China does not attack,” 
the article assured readers, “China indirectly benefits by having a nearby m rket. Should 
the Reds attack, many feel, World War III would start.”79 This image of Hong Kong as a 
garrison state on the brink of Armageddon proved difficult to shake; even as Hong 
Kong’s future seemed more certain and the colony’s tourist industry became the envy of
the region, this dreary image maintained a place in tourists’ minds.  
The island of Taiwan, suddenly thrown in the center of the Chinese conflict as the 
new home for the Nationalist government, had none of the allure of Hong Kong but 
suffered from the same sense of uncertainty. A National Geographic journalist, traveling 
to Taiwan in the early days of 1950, recalled that the “illusion of peace” that he had as he 
flew over the “opalescent waters” of Taiwan, quickly disappeared when he landed on “a 
military field alongside…camouflage-painted American-built planes of the Chinese 
Nationalist Air Force.” Almost immediately upon disembarkation, “we had made the 
acquaintance of Chinese police, bent on keeping Communist spies from this uneasy 
island.” On the island, inflation was rampant, military personnel were regular features of 
the landscape, and what little tourist infrastructure existed served primarily to keep 
travelers out of the island’s unstable interior.80 
As the epicenter of the Cold War shifted toward Asia and as U.S. policy toward 
the PRC became more concrete, the United States rapidly built up its alliances with its 
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Asian partners – Taiwan and British Hong Kong among them. In spite, or perhaps 
because of the fact that tourism to Taiwan and Hong Kong suffered from the 
precariousness of the Cold War, American travel to those destinations seemed to offer 
U.S. officials a useful weapon against the PRC. In a broad sense, mass travel – in both its 
motivating ideology and its physical presence – seemed to advance Washington’s 
objectives in the ongoing Cold War. Speaking to a gathering of travel agents in the midst 
of the Korean War, Truman’s chief of staff John Steelman established international 
tourism as a crucial distinguishing characteristic between the free and communist worlds. 
“Travel,” Steelman proclaimed, “is a privilege of the free, the prosperous, and the 
curious. And the Soviet world is determined both to prevent its citizens from seeing how 
the free world lives and from letting citizens of the free world see how the Soviets li e.”81 
In addition to inherent contradictions with Soviet totalitarianism, tourism, in the eyes of 
most U.S. officials, was the embodiment of middle-class values, in that it required 
expendable income, a flexible work schedule, and a cosmopolitan sense of adventure. To 
promote American tourism – or better yet, to be an American tourist – was to promote 
American values. In the course of the Cold War – which was as much about cultural and 
ideological conflict as it was about military, political, and economic struggle – tourists 
represented millions of individual arguments for the supremacy of the American way of 
life.  
As part of this emerging trend of linking tourism to U.S. international strategy, 
popular images of the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong – in travelogues and travel guides – 
were increasingly compatible with the Cold War, anticommunist consensus. This had not 
always been the case. From the 1930s through World War II, despite the presence of 
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strongly pro-GMD writings in Henry Luce’s Time and Life, among other periodicals, a 
large and influential contingent of travel writing on China came from political travelers 
such as Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, and Graham Peck – who all shared at least a latent 
sympathy for the communist cause.82 Graham Peck, discussing his experiences in China 
during World War II in his travelogue Two Kinds of Time, wrote a scathing critique of the 
GMD and conservative forces in the United States. Peck developed a liberal version of 
the American exceptionalism ethos, arguing that U.S. support for the Nationalis 
government – which far exceeded Soviet aid to the CCP – was to blame for rise of 
communism on the mainland. In the years before the establishment of the PRC, 
“Americans had an excellent opportunity to influence the unavoidable revolution into 
democratic channels, but did not bother to make enough effort.” The result, Peck 
maintained, was that “[n]o acceptable alternative to communism had been presented.” It 
was conservative policymakers, along with their corrupt, undemocratic, and ineffectiv  
Nationalist allies, who were responsible for the postwar situation in China.83 
A new strain of travel writing that emerged in the post-World War II era diverged 
quickly from the previous model, embracing the Cold War consensus and encouraging 
tourists to carry this same outlook when they traveled abroad. Most of these writers
shared Washington and the public’s concern over “losing” Asia to communism and 
worked to bring the region into the American consciousness. In addition to anti-PRC 
rhetoric – and indeed related to it – one of the dominant themes to come out of this 
literature was that Taiwan and Hong Kong were now the “true China.” The Communist 
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revolution in the PRC was somehow “un-Chinese,” leaving the regions of China that 
remained free of CCP domination to carry the “China” appellation.84 
James Michener epitomized this sort of politicized travel writing. Michener was a 
critic of Truman’s foreign policy, noting in Life magazine that Democratic policies had 
“stripped us of Asian friends and imperiled our national safety.” The result of this loss of 
security, Michener lamented, was that it was “all the more frightening for an American to 
travel in Asia today. Along the entire eastern seaboard [of the Asian continent] he 
American is utterly unwelcome.”85 His popular travelogue Voice of Asia detailed his tour 
of Asia just a year after the end of the Chinese civil war and he unapologetically provided 
the reader with his take on the importance of Asia in the ongoing battle with communism. 
Michener invoked the common image of the U.S. “special relationship” with China and 
greater Asia: “At the topmost level, we are contending for the friendship of men like 
Nehru, Sukarno, Liaquat Ali Khan and Chou En-lai. We have already lost the last named 
to Russia. We must not lose the others.” To accomplish this, Michener supported the 
expansion of cultural exchanges, the distribution of American books, and other efforts to 
form bonds with Asian youth.86  
This sense of urgency continued in Michener’s discussion of Taiwan, “the bright 
spot of Asia.” The maturity, enlightenment, and the development of the Nationalist 
stronghold merely underscored “the greatness of our loss [on the mainland].” Had the 
civil war turned out differently, “this might have been China today.”87 In Taiwan, 
Michener asserted, “the questions of international consequence come to focus.” The 
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island was “a symbol of a once free nation and a constant thorn in the flesh of the 
communists.” The conflict between the PRC and the United States was foremost in 
Michener’s mind and because Taiwan would likely be at the center of any globalwar, 
Michener demanded that Americans “know a great deal more about Formosa than they 
do now.”88  
Just as central to the Cold War, Hong Kong was “perched on a precarious island,” 
and Michener stressed the vulnerability of the British colony. Woven between 
discussions of Hong Kong’s famous tailor shops and dazzling harbors, Michener warned, 
“[i]f war erupts in Asia generally, communist troops could probably overrun the city in a 
few days.” Like he had with Taiwan, Michener depicted Hong Kong as a bastion of hope 
in a chaotic world. People from all over the world seeking liberties of various sorts saw 
Hong Kong as their “mecca.” These metaphorical pilgrims ranged from the American 
G.I. seeking rest and recreation, to the American, European, and Asian shoppers lured by
duty-free shopping, to the “[m]ore than a million freedom-loving Chinese from the 
mainland” who fled to Hong Kong in the years following the revolution.89 
 
VI 
As the Cold War took shape in Asia, U.S. officials, as they had done in regard to 
European and Caribbean tourism, began to look to Far East travel as a potential addition
to the American foreign policy arsenal. Local deficiencies, combined with international 
tensions, however, made suitcase diplomacy difficult in the region. But travel did not 
always follow the same pattern as the Cold War, nor did military, economic, and political 
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realities always resonate with travelers or the travel industry. Establishing a pattern that 
would continue for the next two decades, tourism developed both as a structured, 
government-controlled extension of containment and a non-official, casual, and apoliticl 
activity. 
On the one hand, for reasons of stimulating local economies and increasing 
cultural interaction, Washington policymakers worked with ECAFE and the tourism 
industry to streamline the process of international travel and encourage Asian nations to 
welcome American travelers. With the establishment of the PRC and the outbreak of the 
Korean War, moreover, travel to the region took on new importance as a way of building 
up relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong and undermining the new Communist regime. 
U.S. officials imagined tourists to be capsules of American culture, values, nd ideals, 
who could effectively but subtly disseminate pro-American propaganda while gradually 
chipping away the foundation of the communist world. Popular travel guides, as well, 
embraced this sort of purposeful travel and with so few Americans traveling to China, 
images and descriptions coming from these travel writings contributed significantly to 
Americans’ “knowledge” of the region. It is significant that the Pacific Area Travel 
Association (PATA) later named James Michener to its “Gallery of Legends” – alongside 
Thomas Cook, Juan Trippe, and Conrad Hilton – for his “outstanding literary 
contributions to greater awareness and appreciation of the Pacific Asia region.”90 
On the other hand, tourism emerged from World War II both as a seemingly 
endless source of revenue for private industry and a recreational luxury for middle-class 
Americans. For these reasons, the trajectory of tourism often clashed with U.S. objectives 
                                                




and the individuals involved – tourists, shipping and airline executives, and travel writers
– did not always make the most efficient agents of U.S. foreign policy. Tourism wa not, 
and never would be, entirely predictable, and U.S. officials had to sit back, recognizing 
that their chosen “ambassadors” were often no more than curious travelers, eager to 
sightsee, relax, and explore their exotic surroundings. 
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Ch. 2 – Filling the Void: Tourism and Cultural Exchange in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, 1952-1957 
 
The purpose of this Act is to strengthen the ties that unite us with other nations by 
demonstrating the cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the 
United States. 
 
-- From the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956 
 
The very fact that they are voluntary visitors with no government “axe to grind” is an 
argument in their favor.1 
 
-- Memorandum on the International Educational Exchange Program, 1956 
 
Finally, let us bear in mind that among the countries suffering under communist tyranny 
only China is fortunate enough to have its Taiwan, a bastion and rallying point where 
hope is being kept alive and preparations made for a better future.2 
 
-- U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of China, Karl L. Rankin, 1953 
 
 
In October 1954 Columbia University Chinese history professor Clarence Martin 
Wilbur arrived in Taiwan for a one-week stay. United States Information Service (USIS) 
and Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) officials, along with Taiwan’s 
Government Information Office, quickly became interested in Wilbur’s arrival. Wilbur 
had entered Taiwan in a “very critical frame of mind…prepared to find a situation that 
would confirm the worst reports about Taiwan that had been circulating in the United 
States.” Seeing any American traveler as a potential asset (or detriment) to America’s 
image overseas, U.S. officials were eager to change Wilbur’s mind. The urgency of this 
mission was heightened in Wilbur’s case since the professor planned to travel to 
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Southeast Asia following his visit to Taiwan and officials were concerned that he would 
take his “skepticism” with him.3  
Getting to work quickly, the Government Information Office arranged tours for 
Wilbur and provided opportunities for him “to be briefed by able and well-informed 
Chinese.” FOA officials escorted Wilbur on a tour to some of the agriculture and 
irrigation projects carried out by the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. The 
efforts seemed to pay off. Just before Wilbur left Taipei for Southeast Asia, he 
acknowledged “he had seen evidence of impressive improvement in many phases of life 
here.” During a brief stop in Hong Kong, moreover, where USIS officials and American 
correspondents “did their share in convincing him,” Wilbur developed an even more 
favorable opinion of the Nationalist government.4 
U.S. officials kept their eyes on the American professor and when he made his 
way back to Taiwan at the end of March 1955, USIS and Embassy staff were eager to 
debrief him. Not only had Wilbur maintained his rosy view of “Free China,” he had also 
made “ a consistent effort everywhere he went to enlighten the people with whom he 
came in contact.” He urged journalists and locals to visit Taiwan and “see for 
themselves.” U.S. officials were thrilled by his report. While officials acknowledged that 
it was near impossible to assess what kind of substantive impact Wilbur had on overseas 
Chinese and other Asians – not to mention the countless skeptical Americans he would 
engage after returning home – they were confident that this sort of people-to-people 
diplomacy could be a major asset to U.S. interests in the region. While favorable reports 
may have seemed propagandistic coming from an official representative of the United 
                                                
3 USIS Taipei to the State Department, “Visits of Dr. Martin Wilbur,” 20 April 1955, Records of U.S. 




States, American officials believed that private travelers such as Wilbur, with “no axe to 
grind,” could significantly alter perceptions of U.S. policy and strengthen the American 
position in the region.5 
Wilbur’s travels highlight a number of important elements of U.S. suitcase 
diplomacy during the first several years of Eisenhower’s presidency. The attention that 
U.S. and Taiwan officials heaped on Wilbur underscores the scarcity of non-official 
American visitors to Taiwan and most of the Far East in the early 1950s. An inadequate 
supply of hotel rooms, a shortage of airline and cruise line routes, and security concerns, 
meant that local governments and tourists alike were hesitant to make a serious 
commitment. Despite, or possibly because of this small number of tourists, U.S. officials 
recognized the importance of using American travelers as agents of foreign policy in the 
region. Wilbur’s non-official status, moreover, made him even more attractive to U.S. 
officials as it gave him an air of objectivity not possessed by USIS or Embassy staff.  
But to categorize Wilbur as a casual tourist, detached from Washington policy 
and “official business,” would go too far in the other direction. In fact, seven years afte  
his initial visit, Wilbur was back in Taiwan as part of the Fulbright Program’s Inter-
Country Exchange, producing a government-sponsored report on “Taiwan as an Example 
of Progress Under Freedom.”6 Instead, what Wilbur exemplified was the fluidity with 
which travel could move from recreational to purposeful and the eagerness with which 
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U.S. officials harnessed the efforts of official and non-official travelers alike to develop a 
comprehensive and effective brand of cultural diplomacy.  
As James Michener made clear in Voice of Asia, the gradual but definite decline 
of travel to the PRC opened up a new set of opportunities in travel to Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. To Michener, tourism to “Free China” could become an extension of containment 
and serve to disseminate American values throughout the region. While the nascent
tourism industries in Hong Kong and Taiwan advanced Washington’s objectives by 
establishing these destinations as “Free China,” recreational tourists in the region in the 
early 1950s were relatively uncommon. Washington officials, seeing this potential in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, thus worked to supplement privately-funded travel with 
government-sponsored cultural delegations. To this end, in the early years of the 
Eisenhower administration officials developed a substantial program of cultural 
diplomacy that served to boost the prestige of these U.S. allies, facilitate mutual 
understanding, and subtly undermine the validity and stability of the PRC. Similar to 
Truman’s incorporation of tourism into the Marshall Plan, Eisenhower’s cultural 
exchange program built on existing, but limited, tourism infrastructure and gave 
American travelers a central place in U.S. foreign relations. In this sense, Eisenhower’s 
use of travel policy in the early 1950s was not wholly negative; in addition to prohibiting 
or severely restricting travel to the PRC, his administration worked hard to encourage, 







The conclusion of the Chinese civil war and the establishment of the Nationalist 
government in Taiwan renewed hope that recreational tourism to “Free China” would 
approach the levels experienced in Europe and the Caribbean. To the contrary, this period 
of transition saw a decline in American tourism as travelers could no longer visit the 
mainland of China and the Nationalist government, for a variety of reasons, failed to 
develop a functioning tourist plant in Taiwan. Despite it being a “fashionable topic of 
conversation,” a thriving tourist industry in Taiwan was still “a distant dream.”7 Travel 
guides for the Far East – which were, not surprisingly, far more sparse than their 
European and Caribbean counterparts – offered more nuanced, but still reserved, 
assessments of Taiwan tourism. McKay’s 1953 guide, for example, opened: “Should your 
travels take you of necessity to Taiwan (Formosa), you will find it a lovely and 
unexciting little island of approximately two hundred and fifty by ninety miles.”8 
Few commercial airliners flew from the United States to Taiwan in the early 
1950s. Aside from the dilapidated condition of airstrips, many of the physical aircraft 
belonging to CNAC and CATC were, by that point, in the possession of the PRC. There 
was, as well, a substantial shortage of suitable hotel accommodations. Even the two 
nicest hotels – the Grand Hotel and the Friends of China Club – were not entirely up to 
the standards of American visitors. The Grand (which Ambassador Karl Rankin insisted 
was a “misnomer”), for example, was in an inconvenient location far from the centerof 
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Taipei and was “pretty dreary inside.”9 The only words of praise that McKay’s Guide 
could offer was that it had “charmingly pleasant personnel.”10 The Friends of China Club 
was in a more convenient part of the city, overlooking a park. But a National Geographic 
journalist staying there in February 1950 remembered mosquito infestations in the room 
and significant water shortages.11  
Moving beyond the superficial critiques, the two hotels were the only ones in the 
capital city of Taipei (which was the primary, if not exclusive, destinatio  of most 
American tourists in Taiwan) and both doubled as the only sources of first-class dining 
on the island. For these reasons, despite the relatively small number of incoming visitors, 
the available accommodations were simply inadequate.12 Highlighting this point, in a 
telegram to Secretary of State Dulles, Ambassador Rankin noted that an increase of one 
additional planeload of visitors in Taiwan would “produce [a] minor crisis.”13 The 
situation got even worse when travelers moved beyond Taipei. Traveling with his family 
around the island, Embassy official Joseph Yager noted that hotels were scarce in the 
outskirts of the country. Those that were available to tourists, moreover, attracted an 
undesirable clientele and maintained filthy, “Japanese-inspired” outhouses for their 
bathrooms.14 
Tourist attractions, as well, were sadly lacking. While Taiwan possessed a number 
of temples, shrines, and other historical landmarks, natural erosion, shoddy repair jobs, 
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and vandalism had despoiled their original grandeur. Sun Moon Lake, extolled for “its 
scenic beauties,” had no fishing, no swimming, and no significant attractions. The only 
memorable aspect of this scenic spot was the “genuine” performance by “some well-
trained aborigines who…will don their garb and start dancing as soon as they see you 
coming.” Those few attractions that gained the attention of Taiwan tourist officials, 
moreover, often suffered from “cheap commercialism” or “omnipresent (and not too 
flattering) portraits of President Chiang Kai-shek.”15 On top of all this, transportation to 
and from these attractions was an issue. McKay’s Guide noted the “endless beautiful 
spots” on the island, but warned that only travelers who “are not averse to discomfort” 
would be able to enjoy them.16   
For government representatives like Yager, travel around Taiwan was not as 
dreary as it appeared. His association with the Embassy enabled him to obtain gasoline, 
travel guidance, rooms at clean hostels, meals at private residences, and access to the 
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) club. Ambassador Rankin recalled that the 
Nationalist government, in fact, operated several guesthouses – which were “much better 
than the hotels” – for officially invited guests.17 But the average tourist, who would not 
receive this VIP treatment, could look forward to a burdensome vacation. Such a tourist, 
Yager concluded, would be better off spending his time and money in Hong Kong or 
Japan.18 
Infrastructure problems – unattractive landmarks, shoddy roads, inadequate hotel 
rooms, and insufficient runways and docks – were only the most tangible obstacles to a 
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thriving tourist market in Taiwan. American perceptions of the island as an unsafe and 
unstable nation also hindered the development of a large tourist market. The well-
publicized tensions between Taiwan and the PRC, coupled with the mainland’s overt 
bombardments of the offshore islands, led tourists to be understandably jittery when it 
came to traveling in the region. In late 1954, for example, a group of surgeons removed 
Taiwan from their Asian itinerary due to apprehensions over safety. One of the would-be 
travelers noted: “When I took a second look at the itinerary and thought about the 
chances of getting shot down while flying to Formosa I…decided to wait until thigs 
quieted down over there.” Encouraging the cancellation of the surgeon tour was a 
spokesman for Pan American Airways, who noted that the “tense political situation” in 
Taiwan made the tour inappropriate at the time.19 Pan Am was not alone in its hesitant 
approach toward Taiwan. Many other commercial air carriers, as well as APL, would not 
include the island on their itineraries until years after the hostilities in Korea ended.  
U.S. officials themselves offered mixed messages on the safety of Taiwan. 
Embassy officials tried to downplay the “unduly apprehensive” statements, notingthat 
while Pan Am did not make calls at Taiwan, “safe and comfortable service is…provided 
by several other airlines – American and otherwise.”20 It was, nonetheless, difficult for 
Washington officials in the 1950s to speak honestly of Taiwan as an entirely serene and 
safe tourist destination. In response to a 1955 Embassy report on Taiwan tourism that 
discussed the benefit that would arise from APL increasing its involvement in Taiwan, 
for example, one State Department official suggested that the International Cooperation 
Administration (ICA) or the State Department follow up on the suggestion. The idea was 
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shot down as “impractical,” however, lest a “war break out in the straits.”21 As late as 
1958, in fact, the State Department – in the same fashion as many private carriers – 
continued to caution private citizens against traveling to Taiwan due to political and 
military turmoil.22  
The sluggish development of recreational tourism in Taiwan was not simply the 
result of political and military unrest. The specific policies of the Nation list government, 
as well, deserve some of the blame. Nationalist President Jiang Jieshi purposef lly 
restricted the expansion of a tourist industry on the island. There was a general 
uneasiness in Taiwan over an increase in the number of foreign visitors. The frustration 
of the Nationalist government aimed most directly at the scores of American VIPs – 
congressmen, military brass, and cabinet officials – who, throughout the 1950s, regularly 
toured Taiwan’s military installations, government agencies, and infrastructure projects.23 
The itinerary for many official visits, moreover, included at least one mealor meeting 
with Jiang. Ambassador Rankin noted that Jiang preferred not to receive visitors on 
Sundays but pointed to the first three months of 1954, during which various official U.S. 
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delegations were in Taipei on ten different weekends. Each group, not surprisingly, 
expected to meet with the Generalissimo.24 While U.S. officials recognized that it was 
integral to the interests of the United States and Taiwan to have influential Americans 
witness and report on Taiwan’s progress firsthand, Taiwan officials and residents grew 
frustrated with these VIP American visitors, who demanded the time and resources f 
their Chinese hosts as they toured military installations and bases. Embassy officials 
estimated that the annual cost to Taiwan of these VIP visits was hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. A joke around the U.S. Embassy was that “more ammunition was expended in 
putting on displays for visiting Americans than would have been needed to repel a 
communist attack.”25 More seriously, one Taiwan editorial commented that the money 
spent entertaining these guests “could be more profitably engaged in other channels 
against the enemy.”26  
The culmination of this anti-American resentment came in May 1957 when tens 
of thousands of Chinese rioters destroyed several U.S. government buildings on the 
island. Though the immediate cause of the riots was the acquittal of an American soldier 
who had killed a Chinese man, U.S. and Nationalist officials agreed that the primary 
underlying cause was the “[a]nti-Americanism generated by the large numbers of 
Americans on Taiwan with obviously high living standards and privileges.”27 The 
palpable frustration toward American VIPs and relatively wealthy American residents 
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spilled over into a general resistance to build up the nation’s tourism industry. Taiwan’s 
economy was weak and its resources were spread thin as it was; a sudden boom in well-
off tourists seeking entertainment, lodging, and food seemed like more of a burden than a 
gift.  
Nationalist leaders, furthermore, consistently gave preference to national security 
over tourism promotion. While these priorities were understandable, officials often t ok 
them too far. One British businessman with tourism interests in Taiwan noted that the 
Nationalist government had, in 1957, taken over a recently completed hotel and 
converted it into an army rest center. Along these same lines, the army placed a series of 
“outdated anti-aircraft guns” in the vicinity of a civilian resort, allowing soldiers to 
acquire favorable rates and privileges as a matter of “national security.”28 More generally, 
Nationalist officials worried about the implications of dedicating large amounts of 
resources or time toward the development of a permanent tourism industry on the island. 
Long after officials in Washington had lost any genuine hope of restoring Nationalist 
control of the mainland, Jiang and other Nationalist officials pursued that goal. 
Propagandistic slogans – urging residents to overcome “national difficulties” – could be 
found throughout the island, underscoring the fact that “the Government is bent upon 
returning to the mainland.”29 To most Nationalist officials, Taiwan was merely a 
temporary location for the Chinese government; any serious effort to boost tourism n the 
island would both distract officials from more important issues and exude a sense of 
resignation. 
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Those American officials who had any interest in tourism to Taiwan were dubious 
that there would be any progress until Jiang enacted more conducive policies. Addressing 
the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist regime in stimulating foreign tourism, two U.S. 
Embassy reports in 1957 came to the same conclusion: though there was great potential 
in tourism – due to the island’s beauty, its convenient location between Hong Kong, the 
Philippines, and Japan, and its novelty to the well-traveled tourist – “government 
indifference” toward tourism made it unlikely that such potential would be realized. Only 
after Jiang reformed the nation’s outdated entry and exit procedures, revitaliz d he 
dilapidated tourist infrastructure, and embraced the island as the permanent home of the 
Nationalist regime, could Taiwan join the scores of other nations benefiting from stream  
of American tourists.30 
 
II 
Hong Kong’s recreational tourism industry was significantly stronger than 
Taiwan’s. In general, the British colony recovered quickly following the end of Japanese 
occupation in 1945. Civil government returned less than a year later and Hong Kong 
resumed its position as a great international entrepôt.31 Tourism, too, bounced back, aided 
by Hong Kong’s well-founded infrastructure and its reputation as a shopper’s paradise. 
During World War II the colony had served, as well, as a valued recreation desti ation 
for American servicemen. This trend continued throughout the 1950s, as U.S. 
commanders in the Far East saw frequent stops at Hong Kong as a means of boosting
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morale. By 1955, 10,000 U.S. sailors were visiting Hong Kong every month. Because of 
this steady flood of tourist traffic, travel guides, tour operators, currency xchange, and 
souvenir shops were fully established by the time recreational tourists began arriving in 
larger numbers.32  
Despite its solid footing, Hong Kong tourism faced early problems as well. Like 
Taiwan, Hong Kong suffered from its location and its precarious relationship wit  the 
PRC. While the establishment of the PRC did not directly or immediately threaten British 
rule in Hong Kong – due to Britain’s stepped up military defenses – Western officials 
still worried that the PRC would gradually destabilize the British colony by cutting off its 
water, food supply, and transportation services.33 This persistent pestering by the 
Communist regime was no doubt on the minds of inbound tourists. One 1955 New York 
Times article lauding the tourist possibilities in Hong Kong, nonetheless noted that it was
“not immune to the sea of ferment around it”; “someday,” the PRC would take control of 
the British colony.34  
For most of the 1950s bureaucratic deficiencies, as well, kept Hong Kong tourism 
somewhat static. Until 1957, when the local government established the Hong Kong 
Tourism Association (HKTA), there was no official mechanism to facilitate he 
promotion and expansion of tourism. Individual companies like Northwest Airlines, APL, 
and Philippine Air Lines, along with international and regional organizations like PATA, 
ASTA, and IUOTO, tangentially promoted tourism to Hong Kong; without a central 
travel agency, however, the colony could not reach its potential. Due in part to the lack of 
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organization and direct promotion, from 1952 to 1957 the total number of tourists to the 
colony consistently hovered around 50,000 – a respectable but not entirely impressive 
figure. Considering that after 1957 Hong Kong tourism increased by an average of more 
than 50,000 tourists annually, these earlier figures are noticeably meager.35 
Even if the local tourism industry could overcome these external and internal 
obstacles, some U.S. officials considered tourism to Hong Kong to be a political and 
strategic liability. Just as Jiang Jieshi worried about the impact of tourism on his 
perennial struggle with the Chinese Communists, so too did U.S. officials worry about 
the consequences of boosting tourism to a British colony bordering the mainland of 
China. Compounding these concerns was the fact that the views of British and Chinese 
officials were not always in line with Washington’s policies.  
This was especially true in terms of tourism’s economic impact. Ever since the 
CCP victory in the Chinese civil war, Hong Kong’s economy had been the focal point of 
Anglo-American disagreement. Most notably, any increase in U.S. monetary support for 
Hong Kong, or any influx of American dollars into the British colony, presented 
complications to Washington’s economic embargo against the PRC.36 To combat this, 
Washington officials gradually expanded the economic embargo to cover Hong Kong as 
well. In 1950 Congress had placed significant restrictions on the types of products that 
could be sold to Hong Kong and prohibited American merchants from buying or selling 
any item manufactured in the PRC – even if those items were located outside the PRC. 
                                                
35 “Visitor Totals Over a Decade of Growth,” Pacific Travel News, November 1962. 
36 This economic problem, moreover, was not isolated to Hong Kong. In the midst of the Korean War, 
Japan, for example, was becoming a legitimate economic power in the Far East. As Walter LaFeber has 
noted, the Korean War served Japan much in the sameway that the Marshall Plan served western Europe. 
Considering the increasing benefit that Japan secured from American presence in the region, U.S. 
policymakers wanted to ensure that the Japanese government was not, directly or indirectly, channeling 
money back to the PRC in the form of trade. Walter LaFeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations 
Throughout History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 294. 
 68 
 
Historian Nancy Bernkopf Tucker notes the absurdness of Washington’s strict policy on 
trade restrictions, noting that U.S. officials refused to allow even innocuous items into 
Hong Kong for fear of indirect benefit to the PRC. Businessmen selling dried ducks 
(whose eggs originated in the PRC) and large numbers of Patti Page albums ran into 
obstacles from U.S. officials.37 
Washington’s efforts, however, were not always completely successful. A 
National Security Council (NSC) assessment of the embargo, published almost 
simultaneously with Eisenhower’s entry to the White House, listed the thousands of tons 
of goods that, despite Washington-sponsored restrictions, made their way into the USSR 
and the PRC. Part of the problem was that various governments had different levels of 
commitment to the embargo; few were as steadfast as Washington. The government of 
Ceylon, for example, was not a member of the United Nations and it explicitly worked 
out broad trade agreements with the PRC. In one such agreement, Ceylon annually would 
purchase 80,000 tons of rice from the PRC and the PRC could use the resulting funds to 
purchase Ceylonese rubber or other products.38 Even close allies of the United States 
wavered in their support. Many were concerned that a tight economic embargo would 
provoke war. Also a concern – especially for nations like Great Britain, France, d 
Japan – was that continued trade restrictions would irreparably damage the Chinese 
economy and thus eliminate a crucial, future trading partner. This economic anxiety was 
particularly palpable in regard to Hong Kong, which had traditionally served as a base 
from which nations could trade with mainland China. 
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“Leakage” from Hong Kong also proved to be a problem. Smuggling, 
remittances, foreign exchange, and outright trade between Hong Kong and the PRC, 
meant that Washington’s policy of containment was not airtight. PRC officials, from the 
moment they came into power, saw relations with Hong Kong as a means of 
circumventing any Western attempt at economic strangulation. This indirect trade, along 
with the obvious tensions between the United States and Great Britain, would be the 
PRC’s keys to success. To this end, as CCP officials consolidated power in summer 
1950, Zhou Enlai ordered a “mass smuggling” campaign through Hong Kong and Macao 
as a means of countering the anticipated economic assault from the West.39 U.S. 
intelligence showed that between December 1950 and January 1951, Hong Kong’s 
exports to the PRC – “because of the fear of increasing restrictions…from Western 
countries” – increased by 45 percent.40 As late as 1953 Washington officials noted that 
while the embargo was placing “growing pressures” on the Chinese Communists, they 
estimated that 5,000 tons of goods a month entered from Hong Kong to Macao or the 
PRC.41 
Despite these difficulties, preventing American companies from unintentionally 
helping the PRC was fairly straightforward. Following China’s intervention in the Korean 
War in October 1950, the Commerce Department announced that all U.S. shipments to 
the PRC, Hong Kong, and Macao required validated export licenses. Commerce officials 
did not intend to issue any such licenses for trade with the PRC, and American trade wi h 
the latter two colonies required a “case-by-case” consideration by U.S. officials. This 
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extra burden made it quite difficult for Hong Kong to import from the United States any 
item that could potentially aid the PRC.42 The U.S. policy – combined with the PRC’s 
retaliatory reduction of purchases from Hong Kong – served both to strengthen the 
embargo on the PRC and cripple the Hong Kong economy. Within years of the 
embargo’s implementation, Hong Kong officials saw the disappearance of 50 percent of 
the exports and 25 percent of the imports that normally went through the colony. 
Between 1950 and 1955, trade between Hong Kong and the PRC, likewise, dropped 15 
percent.43 
The embargo question became more complicated, however, when it involved 
hundreds of thousands of relatively inexpensive transactions carried out by unsuspecting 
tourists. In this case, it was not a matter of the Commerce Department withholding 
licenses from a handful of U.S. exporters; instead, it involved overseeing the mundane 
activities of tens of thousands of American tourists legally visiting Hong Kong. In the 
early 1950s American tourism to Hong Kong was relatively light but the colony was still 
welcoming upwards of 18,000 American recreational tourists a year.44  
In late 1952, to deal with the steady flow of Americans scouring Hong Kong 
markets for bargains, the U.S. Treasury Department developed a complex system of 
Comprehensive Certificates of Origin (CCOs). Working with the Hong Kong Department 
of Commerce and Industry, U.S. officials distributed these documents to sanctioned Hong 
Kong shops. For a nominal fee (less than $1), shoppers purchased a CCO that would 
cover most of their purchases within a particular shop. Upon approval from the colonial 
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government (a process that usually took about a week), passengers could take their items 
home or the Hong Kong shop would ship the items to the United States.45 Common and 
popular items like brassware, jade, ceramics, wood furniture, and silk goods, fell into the 
Commerce Department’s “presumptive” category; unless a valid CCO demonstrated 
otherwise, U.S. Customs officials were to assume that such goods had PRC origins. Other 
souvenirs, such as binoculars, cameras, umbrellas, and watches, were “non-presumptiv ” 
and did not require any proof of origin.46 
On top of the economic complexities of Hong Kong tourism, the fact that Hong 
Kong lay within mainland China presented unique problems when dealing with tourism 
development and infrastructure. While the colony’s location, as one travel writer noted, 
allowed American tourists to “get an ersatz taste of China,” it also meant that U.S., 
British, and Chinese officials would have difficulty separating Hong Kong affairs from 
those of the PRC.47 In 1955, for example, shortly before tourism became the leading 
industry in the British colony, U.S. and British officials argued over air travel between 
Hong Kong and the PRC. While the issue of U.S. airlines traveling to the PRC had, for 
the most part, been settled when the State Department prohibited U.S. companies from 
doing business with the Chinese Communists, complications still remained. Most 
notably, officials of Hong Kong Airways, operated by Northwest Airlines, hoped to 
resume service between Hong Kong and Canton. Airline officials, furthermore, hop d to 
use Canton as the site of an “alternate airport” for the anticipated hordes of tourists 
visiting Hong Kong. State Department officials responded promptly that Hong Kong 
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Airways, since its operating company was based in the United States, could not provide 
service into the PRC without a proper license, “which would not now be granted.” If 
Hong Kong officials continued to push for landing rights in Canton, the State Department 
concluded that it would “have no recourse but to warn American nationals not to travel 
on Hong Kong Airways or any other airline where the possibility existed that the aircraft 
might land at a Chinese Communist airport.”48   
 
III 
In the early 1950s the conditions of recreational tourism in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong did little to inspire Washington officials. Applying frustratingly cyclica  logic, U.S. 
officials reasoned that without planeloads and shiploads of tourists headed over the 
Pacific, there could be little benefit in devoting millions of dollars toward tourism 
development. More generally, international and domestic changes resulted in less U.S. 
government support for recreational tourism. European economies – to which the Truman 
administration had directed the bulk of the country’s tourist dollars – were improving 
somewhat; the economic and strategic exigencies which had guaranteed tourism a c ucial 
spot in foreign aid programs, therefore, no longer held as much sway. Eisenhower’s 
brand of fiscal conservatism, moreover, reduced the likelihood that the federal 
government would continue to dedicate tax dollars toward the promotion of recreational 
tourism. Even though tourism was a relatively inexpensive way to spread American 
wealth, to some conservatives within the White House and Congress, it represented an 
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unnecessary expense that went beyond the appropriate parameters of government 
involvement.49  
It did not, however, go away entirely. Like Truman before him, Eisenhower 
recognized that tourism had the potential to be an effective conduit for cultural and 
economic exchange. The strongest influence on the Eisenhower administratio  in regard 
to travel was Clarence Randall, who served as a White House economic advisor. Upon 
entering the administration he had consistently promoted the reduction of trade barriers 
and the increased use of private investment to close the dollar gap and restore 
international economic stability. From there, it was not a far leap to suggest that tourism, 
too, might play a pivotal role in international economics. In an unofficial 1954 report on 
American foreign economic policy, Randall advocated the use of tourists in the general 
exchange of currency and he urged policymakers to take economic advantage of the 
voluntary movement of Americans around the world. Regardless of how Washington 
officials approached this activity, American travelers – due to improved transportation 
technologies and a noticeable curiosity to see these “strange places” – were going to 
continue touring abroad and spend money in the process. To Randall, it seemed illogical 
to let this opportunity pass.50 
Randall’s efforts did have some impact. In Eisenhower’s speech to Congress in 
May 1954 he called on policymakers to wean foreign nations off of direct aid and instead 
offer loans, private investment, trade, and tourism. While Eisenhower avoided the 
implication that the promotion of tourism overseas was primarily the responsibility of the 
U.S. government, he nonetheless urged Congress to take substantive, “helpful” actions. 
                                                
49 Endy, Cold War Holidays, 144-45. 
50 Clarence Randall, A Foreign Economic Policy for the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1954), 29-30. 
 74 
 
These included simplifying customs, passport, and currency procedures, and increasing 
duty-free limits from $500 to $1,000.51 Eisenhower also ensured that international 
tourism policy would maintain a permanent place on his administration’s agenda. In July 
1956, Eisenhower invited Randall to assume the role of Chairman of the Council on 
Foreign Economic Policy. The office, and the selection of Randall, signaled that 
Eisenhower was committed to using tourism as a means of international economic 
stimulus. Hitting the ground running, Randall set up meetings with government officials 
and representatives from the tourism industry to discuss how best to incorporate overseas 
travel into the nation’s foreign policy agenda.52  
On the whole, however, Eisenhower’s early efforts resulted in few dramatic 
changes in Washington’s tourism policy. Exemplifying this, by the end of 1955 the 
increase in the duty-free exemption, which initially had seemed destined to pass through 
Congress, became mired in a sea of protectionist opposition and failed to become law. 
Eisenhower’s rhetorical support for tourism promotion, nonetheless, established a climate 
within which tourism promotion could advance and in the last few years of this 
administration Eisenhower took a far more active role in this regard.53 
In these early years of the 1950s private organizations, more so than the 
Eisenhower administration, served as the driving force behind transpacific rereational 
tourism.54 Top among these private associations was the nascent Pacific Area Travel 
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Association (PATA).55 PATA was the brainchild of Lorrin Thurston, founder of the 
Honolulu Advertiser and chairman of the Hawaii Visitors Board, and William Mullahey, 
a former Pan American Airways executive. For years before the establishment of PATA, 
Thurston used his newspaper as a means of integrating Hawaii into the economic a d 
cultural orbit of the continental United States, frequently promoting American tourism to 
Hawaii and beyond. Mullahey, too, had been a long-time proponent of increased tourism 
to the Far East and Pacific and had been actively involved in the expansion of Pan Am’s 
Clipper routes in the 1930s.  
To the consternation of Thurston and Mullahey, the Far East of the early 1950s 
was not wholly conducive to a large-scale tourism industry. In January 1961 writers of 
PATA’s Pacific Travel News looked back nostalgically on these early years, noting the 
poor conditions that Thurston and Mullahey faced: 
 
Hawaii was still a territory, an overnight plane trip from the Mainland. There were no 
tourist air fares in the Pacific, no jets, only three luxury-class passenger steamships. And 
to the average person the great countries of the Pacific beyond Hawaii were relatively 
unknown and little traveled.56 
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Though Hawaii itself was still quite a trek for the average American tourist, the exotic 
American territory was rapidly becoming a prime destination for American travelers. 
From the pre-war peak of 31,000 tourists in 1941, Hawaii rebounded and welcomed 
41,000 tourists in 1948. Despite a significant labor strike that year that kept many cruise 
ships from docking, the tourist boom brought in an estimated $15 million in tourist 
expenditures.57 Thurston and Mullahey hoped to apply the same strategy that had brought 
success to Hawaii’s postwar tourism market to the rest of the Pacific and Far East region. 
While distance and general lack of interest, in the prewar years, had stunted these tourism 
industries, Thurston and Mullahey were confident that with new transportation 
technologies, combined with the postwar cosmopolitanism and affluence of many 
returning soldiers, travel to the region was likely to grow.  
Their efforts to expand tourism, however, ran into serious obstacles. Governments 
in the Far East – Taiwan’s Nationalist government being one of the most blatant 
examples – showed almost no interest in overhauling their nations’ antiquated travel 
procedures and encouraging the arrival of foreign visitors. Visa policies were confusing 
and worked only to frustrate and deter tourists. Hotels were lacking and those that did 
exist often failed to meet the expectations of would-be American travelers. Ha bors were 
too shallow to accommodate many cruise liners and runways were too short to handle 
large commercial planes. Most Americans, due to a lack of publicity, were also simply 
unaware that tourism in this region was possible. Finally, European and Caribbean 
destinations, which served as successful models for PATA’s founders, also played the 
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role of competitors, successfully drawing in travelers who may have otherwise head d 
the Far East.58  
To address these and other problems, PATA took shape in January 1952 as 
ninety-one delegates from thirteen nations and territories met in Honolulu. Thurston’s 
Hawaii Visitors Board sponsored the event. The first conference, though poorly attended 
and a bit erratic in structure, highlighted two aspects of PATA that would set it apart 
from other tourism associations. First, non-government delegations dominated the 
conference. Though government officials would come to play a larger part in PATAin 
later years, from its start it was airline and cruise line executives, hotel managers, travel 
agents, tour operators, and advertising firms that held the positions of power. This self-
proclaimed “quasi-government” status offered a stark contrast to travel organizatio s 
such as the IUOTO, the Inter-American Travel Congress, the European Travel 
Commission, and the Caribbean Travel Association, all of which developed a state-
centric infrastructure. 
Second, PATA consistently and almost exclusively looked to its east – namely the 
United States – for business. Thurston and Mullahey, along with other PATA officials, 
recognized that the U.S. – particularly the West Coast of the United States – would be the 
primary supplier of tourists to the Far East and Pacific regions and thus required the bulk 
of PATA’s attention. Underscoring this fact, California Governor Earl Warren delivered 
the keynote address at the first PATA conference. Likewise, Honolulu, the original 
location of PATA’s headquarters and the site for the first two conferences, seemed 
appropriate since it was located as a midpoint between the U.S. and the countries f the 
Far East and Pacific. But even Hawaii was too distant from the American market and in 
                                                
58 “PATA’s Phenomenal Growth – Nine Conferences in Review,” Pacific Travel News, January 1961. 
 78 
 
1953 PATA moved its offices to a permanent location in San Francisco.59 The 
importance of the American market to the future of PATA might also explain why 
officials issued invitations to Taiwan and Hong Kong, but not to the PRC. While PRC 
officials showed little interest in joining any international travel organizations, the 
IUOTO, for example, struggled with the question of PRC/Taiwan membership and 
delayed a decision until 1958. PATA’s immediate embrace of Taiwan and Hong Kong – 
along with a sizeable delegation of American airline, shipping, and touring companies – 
signaled that PATA could eventually become an effective vehicle of U.S. foreign policy 
in the Far East. 
The objectives of PATA in its early days, however, were largely disconnected 
from U.S. Cold War strategy. This was due in part to the sense of indifference emanating 
from Washington. In the early 1950s, the leading travel organizations were the American 
Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) and the IUOTO, both of which catered toward North 
American, European, and Caribbean tourism. To the extent that Washington officials 
were involved in tourism promotion, they worked within these select forums. For the firs 
half of the 1950s, on the other hand, official U.S. involvement in PATA was strikingly 
limited. As late as February 1956 Secretary of State Dulles suggested that Japan, not the 
U.S., should take the leading role both in PATA and in the general campaign to draw 
tourists to the Far East.60 Underscoring this, through the first half of the 1950s the U.S. 
delegation to PATA held the lowly “observer” status and it paid a mere $500 in annual 
dues to the association. Department of Commerce officials, believing that the U.S. – out 
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of all PATA members – had “the least to gain” from a boom in transpacific tourism, 
hesitated to increase support.61  
As suggested by the response coming from Washington, PATA’s early efforts 
were directed mainly at convincing governments and members of the tourism industry to 
take a more active interest in Far East and Pacific tourism and overhaul debilitating travel 
procedures. PATA delegates understood that European tourism – due largely to the 
efforts of the European Travel Commission – was far simpler, cheaper, and more 
comfortable than the Asian variety. If the Far East and Pacific governments wa ed any 
chance at pulling tourists away from Europe, they would have to reform their nations’ 
tourist policies and increase official support for the tourism industry. Signaling the 
changes that would be necessary, PATA delegates at the inaugural conference passed a 
resolution pledging to eliminate entry and exit visas and taxes, standardize the amounts of 
alcohol and perfume travelers could carry in and out of a country, and ease customs 
procedures.62  
These efforts to overhaul the region’s tourist policies had some early successes. 
Soon after the 1952 conference the Japanese and Philippines governments agreed to 
liberalize their entry and exit procedures, eliminating visa fees and extending visa 
validity to sixty days. In Indonesia – a country known for its notoriously frustrating red 
tape – government officials promised, before the end of 1953, to ease visa requirements, 
foreign exchange controls, and customs procedures.63 But on the whole, government 
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intransigence was the defining characteristic of the era. True facilitation of recreational 
tourism was contingent on more government cooperation, which was in short supply in 
PATA’s early days. 
  
IV 
Despite the fact that Washington officials consciously minimized their support for 
transpacific recreational tourism, the lack of a thriving industry in the Far East posed 
foreign relations problems. By 1953, following the death of Stalin and the end of the 
Korean War, the Cold War developed more as a protracted, ideological and cultural
struggle. With both the United States and the Soviet Union possessing substantial 
arsenals of atomic and hydrogen bombs, a traditional military war became dangerous to 
the point of obsolescence. The swelling tide of nationalism in the Third World, moreover, 
gave U.S. officials added incentive to bolster the cultural and ideological dimensions of 
containment. Recreational tourists were a part of this cultural offensive. Speaking on the 
150th anniversary of the Louisiana Purchase, Eisenhower urged the traveler – “whether 
bearing a commission from his Government or traveling by himself for pleasure or for 
business” – to carry himself as “a representative of the United States of America” and to 
portray the United States as “a peace-loving nation, living in the fear of God, but in the 
fear of God only.”64 By 1957 Eisenhower’s State Department formalized this entreaty, 
placing an official note on decorum in each U.S. passport:  
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As you travel abroad, the respect you show for foreign laws and customs, your courteous 
regard for other ways of life, and your speech and manner help to mold the reputation of 
our country. Thus, you represent us all in bringing assurance to the people you meet that 
the United States is a friendly nation and one dedicated to the search for world peace and 
to the promotion of the well-being and security of the community of nations.65 
 
The various efforts to bring the mass tourist directly into Washington’s foreign 
policy establishment was quite effective in areas like Western Europe, the Caribbean, 
Canada, and Mexico, all of which welcomed hundreds of thousands of American tourists 
a year. In regard to Hong Kong and Taiwan, which, in 1952, welcomed around 35,000 
and 5,000 tourists, respectively, this indirect approach to cultural diplomacy was not 
entirely appropriate.66 
The meagerness of Taiwan and Hong Kong’s recreational tourism industries did 
not, however, preclude U.S. officials from establishing cultural connections with “Free
China.” The Eisenhower administration, more so than any of his predecessors, elevated 
Washington’s commitment to government-sponsored cultural exchange, psychological 
warfare, and the dissemination of propaganda. The establishment of the United States 
Information Agency (USIA), which oversaw literature exchanges, the construction of 
American-themed exhibitions, and broadcasts of American radio shows throughout the 
world, epitomized this approach. Eisenhower’s prized People-to-People program – 
though it was officially detached from Washington – also maintained very close relations 
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with the State Department and advanced U.S. foreign policy objectives through cultural 
exchange. These new tools of cultural diplomacy gave the Eisenhower administration the 
ability to go on the “offensive” in its foreign policy in a way that was not entirely feasible 
with military, political, or economic endeavors. Less a means of diluting the tensions of 
the Cold War and more a means of combating communism with a new style of warfare, 
Eisenhower’s cultural diplomacy was uniquely flexible and allowed for a wide range of 
new actors to participate in U.S. foreign relations.67 As part of this effort, in the early 
1950s U.S. officials worked hard to engage Taiwan and Hong Kong – the two most 
prominent remaining outposts of “Free China” from the perspective of Washington and 
American travelers – in cultural diplomacy. In this way, despite the end of the Fulbright 
Program and other private exchanges with China in 1949-50, Washington continued its 
commitment to cultural diplomacy with the Nationalist government and the region as a 
whole. 
To some extent, the Eisenhower administration needed to develop from scratch its 
cultural exchange program in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The successful cultural programs 
that had existed in China during World War II and in the immediate postwar years – 
namely the Exchange of Technical and Cultural Leaders Program and the Fulbright 
Program – had both ceased and no comparable programs had taken their place.68 Instead, 
U.S. contacts in the region were mostly military or diplomatic in nature. A 1953 USIA-
sponsored survey of American presence in Taiwan revealed that the only large-sc le 
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exchange programs on the island were under the auspices of FOA and MAAG.69 Within 
five years of the Nationalist regime establishing itself in Taiwan, 570 American and 
Chinese scientists and technicians participated in FOA exchanges. Under MAAG 
sponsorship, over 1,000 Chinese in the armed forces had come to the United States for 
training.70 These U.S. exchange and aid programs, as Neil Jacoby notes, all worked 
toward maintaining “a huge military establishment.”71 
The overwhelming presence of military and political exchanges was not 
surprising. With the Chinese Communist victory in the civil war, the explosion of the first 
Soviet atomic weapon, and the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. policy toward the PRC 
became noticeably more aggressive and militant. Hong Kong and Taiwan, once see as 
peripheral to U.S. strategic interests, suddenly became central to Washington’s efforts to 
ostracize and smother the PRC. Taiwan became a military and political counterpoi  to 
the PRC and Jiang, despite his obvious failings, became a crucial Cold War ally. Hong 
Kong, similarly, became a passageway for spies, propaganda, and potential military
force, and its British associations meant that the colony figured prominently in 
discussions over NATO and other Cold War military alliances.  
As important as these developments were to the maintenance of “Free China,” 
many U.S. officials recognized that the near absence of cultural programs in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan posed serious problems. Successful Asian containment required a degree of 
“soft power” – specifically ideological and cultural initiatives – to complement political, 
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military, and economic tactics.72 Ambassador to Taiwan Karl Rankin – himself a 
hardliner and loyal supporter of the Nationalist regime – provided one of the most 
prominent voices on this issue. While he acknowledged that “technical and military 
assistance is badly needed in this country [Taiwan],” the “seeming lack of interest” on the 
part of the U.S. government in establishing cultural and educational exchange programs 
was concerning.73  
To rectify this gap in Sino-American relations, Rankin urged that “all the present 
resources of the State Department be used in those neglected fields [information media 
and the humanities] and that every possible effort be made…to strengthen the 
program.”74 The segments of Chinese who were not impressed by “how many tanks we 
give to the Republic of China or how much fertilizer we bring into the country,” Rankin 
reasoned, might instead be brought to the American side through softer, culturally-based 
exchanges.75 “[I]ntellectual Chinese,” who would benefit greatly from cultural exchange, 
were the future political, educational, and cultural leaders of “Free China.” When 
Taiwan’s military leaders had achieved their objective of retaking the mainland, Rankin 
anticipated it would be these civilians who would oversee the “new democratic society” 
in China.76 In Hong Kong, as well, U.S. officials recognized that the arrival of American 
cultural delegates could offset the substantial cultural and ideological offensive launched 
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by the PRC government. In the early 1950s especially, when it proved difficult, for 
logistical reasons, to bring PRC refugees from Hong Kong to the United Statesin th  




To meet these objectives, the Eisenhower administration developed a series of 
programs – under the broad umbrella of International Educational Exchange – aimed at 
promoting intercultural understanding while boosting the prestige of the United Stat s
and its overseas allies. Between 1949 and 1963, 21,000 Americans went overseas as part 
of these exchanges.78 The bulk of these Americans traveled as Fulbright scholars, but 
others traveled under the Lecturer and Research Scholar Program, the Teac r Program, 
the Foreign Specialist Program, and the Foreign Leader Program. In Taiwan, however, 
the Fulbright Program developed more slowly. It was not for lack of trying. Ambassador 
Rankin proposed reinitiating the program as early as 1953 and by the end of 1954 U.S. 
and Nationalist officials had approved the exchange. Washington officials looked 
forward to a partnership with the Nationalist government, expecting that a revived 
Fulbright program on the island would have a “healthy psychological effect” and woul  
demonstrate “long-range American interest in Free China.”79 Political and logistical 
problems, however, caused delays and it was not until 1957 that American and Chinese 
students began the two-way exchanges.  
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Instead, two of the most prominent and unique exchanges in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong were the Cultural Presentations and the American Specialists Programs. Both of 
these programs supplied grants to private individuals and groups for short visits 
overseas.80 Over the course of a few weeks to several months, the tours usually took 
participants to a number of locales in a particular region; it was not unusual to cover five 
or more countries in one tour. Having reached their destination, the participants – r ging 
from symphony orchestras to track and field coaches to legal experts – spent their days 
traveling, offering demonstrations and performances, meeting with Chinese officials, and 
conversing with local audiences. 
The Cultural Presentations Program – also known as the President’s Special 
International Program – began haphazardly, as Eisenhower requested a congressi al 
appropriation of $5 million for the President’s “emergency fund” in order to expand U.S. 
cultural activities. Specifically, Eisenhower hoped both to counteract the increased 
attention the Soviets were giving to cultural and educational exchange and to rectify th  
perception that American society was superficial and devoid of culture.81 The funds, 
which Congress approved in August 1954, went primarily toward the costs of 
participating in international trade fairs and sponsoring cultural delegations’ our  
overseas.82 
For the first two years of the program, officials worked on an ad hoc basis, 
sending delegates and exhibitions where they were needed at the time but without 
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establishing any long-term goals or strategy. In August 1956, through the International 
Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act, the program became per anent and 
it developed a more efficient infrastructure. Receiving an annual allotment of around $2.5 
million, the Cultural Presentations Program fell under the authority of the Stat 
Department, with Theodore Streibert of USIA acting as coordinator. In addition, an 
advisory panel – made up of representatives selected by the American Natio al Theater 
and Academy (ANTA) and the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) – provided suggestions 
and guidance to program officials.83 
The American Specialists Program had emerged a few years earlier, as part of the 
1948 Smith-Mundt Act, which laid much of the groundwork for U.S. cultural diplomacy 
and funded many of the exchanges of the 1950s and 1960s. Most of the other Smith-
Mundt programs (the Fulbright Program most notable among these) offered long-term, 
two-way exchanges between the United States, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.84 The American 
Specialists Program, on the other hand, offered a way for overseas posts to recruit 
“outstanding and prominent persons” for short-term, specific tasks. USIS staff, in 
conjunction with senior Embassy officers, made final selections of participants and 
supervised the program.85   
Not surprisingly, the two programs had a good deal of overlap. Any distinctions 
were largely a matter of semantics. Participants in the Cultural Presentations Program – 
mostly dance troupes, choirs, musicians, and artists – tended to be part of large 
delegations and they dedicated the bulk of their tours to performance. American 
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Specialists, on the other hand, often traveled alone and their tours centered on instructio  
and exhibition.86 In both programs, selection of participants usually derived from 
suggestions from overseas posts, universities, private organizations, or even by 
individuals interested in touring abroad. Delegates in both programs, moreover, 
traditionally filled a specific need for their host country.  
This utilitarian dimension of the visit was often readily apparent. David Dallin, 
for example, visited Taiwan at the request of Taipei’s Government Information Office to 
give academic lectures on Soviet affairs and contemporary Sino-Soviet relations. Robert 
Storey worked intimately with Taiwan’s legal experts to help develop an Academy of 
American Law. At other times, however, participants pursued a far more general, less 
immediate, cultural objective. Jay Archer, who invented the game of “biddy basket ll” 
for shorter and younger athletes, took his game on the road and successfully introduced 
the sport to youngsters in Taiwan. The Denver Jazz Band’s 1965 tour of Hong Kong was, 
according to U.S. officials, “a very successful one,” namely because the exc ange 
facilitated American contacts with Chinese youth. Similarly, the visits of “Twilight 
Zone” creator Rod Serling and actor Kirk Douglas to Hong Kong were notable because 
of the significant impact the men had on Chinese college students.87  
In this sense, the Cultural Presentations and American Specialists Programs 
operated as a continuation of the World War II-era Exchange of Technical and Cultural 
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Leaders Program, which sent engineers, biologists, weapons experts, and other specialist  
to the Republic of China to strengthen China’s economy, infrastructure, and fighting 
capacity. But unlike the earlier program, these postwar exchange programs favored 
specialists in the fields of education, literature, athletics, journalism, and art. Thus while 
the programs intended to bolster the strength and prestige of the governments of Taiwan 
and Hong Kong – toward the ultimate objective of winning the Cold War – they did so 
with an eye toward cultural development. 
 
VI 
The two programs remained remarkably small. The American Specialists Program 
sent a total of some 2,500 specialists abroad in its first fifteen years. The Cultural 
Presentations Program, comprising larger delegations, showcased only about a dozen 
tours a year. Taiwan and Hong Kong – which were usually on the same tour circuit for 
both programs – averaged a total of about six cultural delegations a year.88 U.S. officials, 
however, were not incredibly concerned about the programs’ small numbers. In fact,
because embassy and consulate officials oversaw every detail of the tours and exh usted 
significant resources to ensure their success, organizers preferred the minimalist 
approach. When three American Specialists were in Taiwan at the same time in 1959, for 
instance, local U.S. officials complained that their staff was stretched too thin.89 More 
substantively, officials correctly assumed that these tours – if placed in the right hands 
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and directed toward the right audience – could have a disproportionately significant 
impact.  
This meant, first and foremost, that the tours would target the hearts and minds of 
“friendly” audiences everywhere. This inclusive rhetoric was partly due to the 
Eisenhower administration’s conscious effort both to avoid the appearance of 
“propaganda” and ease anxieties of those in the Free World who feared the catastrophic 
implications of U.S.-USSR-PRC war. In contrast to Truman’s “Campaign of Truth,” 
which critics saw as too explicitly anticommunist, Eisenhower’s program set out to fight 
the Cold War by more subtle means. To this end, Eisenhower’s various information 
programs fell back on positive themes of cultural understanding and avoided provocative 
references to the Soviet Union, nuclear war, or East-West conflict.90 Despite this distinct, 
toned-down style, Eisenhower’s cultural programs sought to destabilize the communist 
world. Organizers of the Cultural Presentations Program, in fact, designed the tours to 
“refute communist propaganda by demonstrating clearly the United States’ dedication to 
peace, human well-being and spiritual values.”91  
In Asia, in particular, the anticommunist dimension of American cultural 
exchange was quite apparent. Exemplifying this, the programs in Taiwan and Hong Kong 
worked to weaken the PRC in a subtle, but persistent, manner. By establishing Taiwan 
and Hong Kong as cultural outposts of China, U.S. officials were not only ensuring 
mutual sympathy and understanding between the U.S. and “Free China”; they were, in a 
sense, further undermining the very legitimacy of the PRC. As almost every 
memorandum on the programs made clear, moreover, these exchanges would work to 
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boost the prestige of the United States, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, by “countering 
communist claims,” “projecting the superiority of the Free World,” and “refuting the 
widespread misconception…that the United States is materialistic and has no significant 
cultural interests or achievements.”92 Ambassador Rankin, a strong supporter of the 
program, noted that the increased understanding of American ideals was actually an 
“indirect aim” of the cultural exchanges; the “immediate practical purpose” of the 
cultural program was “to promote…the well-being of the population at large as a means
of strengthening the free world and thereby supporting our basic foreign policy.” From 
the start, Taiwan’s cultural exchange program was a “vital part of the total campaign to 
support Free China in its anti-Communist battle.”93 Hong Kong’s cultural exchange 
program, as it became larger in the 1960s, took on a greater role as a bulwark against the 
PRC. Beyond reorienting Hong Kong “toward the west,” the exchanges “help[ed] 
preserve Hong Kong’s continued existence as a free society on the rim of Communist 
China.”94  
Making this dimension of the program even clearer was the absence of any 
comparable exchanges with the PRC.95 In the mid-1950s, for example, Robert Breen 
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proposed taking his production of Porgy and Bess on tour to the PRC. In exchange for 
Breen’s production visiting the PRC, the Beijing Opera – which had already partaken in 
several international exchanges – would make a tour of the United States. Breen’s request 
was not entirely unexpected or inappropriate. Since 1954 the State Department had 
partially subsidized the play’s international tour, which included stops throughout South 
America, the Middle East, and Europe. Under private auspices, and with hesitant 
approval from the State Department, Breen also took his production to the Soviet Union 
and other nations behind the Iron Curtain. When he proposed a visit to the PRC, 
therefore, Breen likely expected a degree of support.96  
Breen’s proposal did, in fact, receive initial interest from some U.S. and PRC 
policymakers. Throughout summer 1955, as U.S., French, British, and Soviet officials 
were embedded in diplomatic talks in Geneva, Breen traveled through Europe, engaging 
in an intense campaign of private diplomacy. In Paris he met with Georges Soria, a 
French contact who had successfully negotiated Franco-Soviet cultural exchanges in the 
past. Soria helped Breen in his efforts to bring Porgy and Bess to Moscow and he was the 
first to suggest that a Sino-American exchange was a possibility. In Rome, ar d with 
Soria’s optimism, Breen took his proposal to USIA officials. Though he was not able to 
meet directly with Director Theodore Streibert, Breen later insisted that the USIA chief 
was quite interested in the proposal. Breen was more successful in his discussions with 
Chinese officials. In Brussels Breen met with Chang Chi-hsiang, the PRC vice-Minister 
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of Culture, and the two worked out a joint agreement on a cultural exchange. The July 
1955 agreement committed Breen to a ten-week, eight-city tour of Porgy and Bess that 
would begin in November.97 The proposed tour, however, soon fell apart. In August 
Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson resorted to the standard Washington line, 
noting that while the State Department “understands the cultural motivation behind your 
effort,” the tour could not proceed.98 
The destination of tours was not the only element over which U.S. officials 
exerted control. Program organizers also placed significant emphasis on selecti g the 
right kinds of audiences. The tours, which offered performances and exhibitions, had the
potential to reach huge crowds. During their twelve days in Taiwan, violinist Sylvia 
Rosenberg and pianist Seymour Bernstein came in contact with 10,000 people at clinics, 
concerts, and receptions. The Symphony of the Air played to a packed theater of over 
7,000 in Taipei. Olympic decathlon champion Robert Mathias, over the course of three 
clinics in Taiwan, attracted an audience of 35,000. The United States AAU track and 
field team held a meet in Hong Kong for over 2,500 aspiring athletes. Audiences for the 
1961 Joey Adams Variety Show tour, which offered eighty-one shows in eleven countries 
throughout the Far East, numbered 250,000 excluding the hundreds of thousands that 
listened and watched the performances on radio or television.99  
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Despite this ability to reach large audiences quite easily, the tours were, on the 
whole, a drain on the budget. Without a doubt, the programs were quite inexpensive for 
their accomplishments. Organizers boasted that the Joey Adams tour, which had 
entertained 250,000 Asians at a total cost of around $250,000, had cost the State 
Department a mere $1 for every spectator.100 But even with relatively low costs, the 
performances often produced deficits since they did not bring in a great deal of revenue. 
The bulk of the $2.5 million yearly budget for the Cultural Presentations Program went 
toward underwriting the deficits that the performances incurred.101 With revenue a 
consistent problem, organizers struggled to balance the practical need for income with the 
broader objectives of the programs. U.S. officials in Hong Kong, for example, 
complained that they were often unable to reach their “preferred target group” because of 
the prohibitive cost of tickets. The wealthier, more cosmopolitan individuals that chose to 
attend performances in Hong Kong were, moreover, usually the ones that already 
maintained positive impressions of the United States and thus did not require “in-person 
visits from top-ranking artists.”102  
Recognizing that budget shortfalls were inevitable, tour organizers shifted the 
focus of the program away from revenue and toward “the importance of the target.” 
Sometimes this required appealing to a “more sophisticated segment of foreign
audiences.” Organizers wanted the tours to “correct misconceptions” about American 
culture and society; to do this it was necessary to reach out to “cultural leaders, critics, 
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students, and individuals capable of shaping public opinion.”103 But more frequently 
organizers looked beyond urban centers and booked tours for more provincial areas. 
These poorer regions, previously left off tour itineraries due to lack of revenue potential, 
made their way into performance circuits. If the goal of the program was to win hearts 
and minds, the State Department could hardly afford to ignore large segments of the 
population that might not be able to pay the cost of admission. This approach applied, as 
well, to Chinese exchanges in the United States. One memorandum encouraged sending 
Chinese delegates to “areas of our country [the United States] which do not normally 
have contact with persons from China…[and] where the local newspapers carry little 
news of international significance.”104 Such priorities meant the program was almost 
always in the red. For example, the Symphony of the Air’s 1955 Asian tour – which 
traveled to seven cities in the Far East – resulted in a $200,000 deficit. The locales that 
produced the greatest costs and least revenues for this particular tour – Taiwan and Hong 
Kong were high on the list – were, nonetheless, “psychologically most important.”105 
As much as they worried about what sort of audiences would experience the 
American tours, U.S. officials were concerned with the participants themselves.106 
Program creators anticipated that participants, in the hours between performances or 
exhibitions, would practice personal diplomacy, engaging locals in discussions on U.S. 
politics and values or simply winning friends through warm banter and encouragement. 
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Organizers of the exchange programs encouraged this sort of purposeful dialogue; 
officials in the American Specialists Program went as far as dividing up potential 
participants into three categories – “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” – in order 
to ensure that the tours sufficiently evinced American ideals.107 Each participant served 
as a “living refutation of the lies and innuendos which circulate so persistently among the 
populace of many foreign lands.”108 To this end, officials targeted participants who they 
believed, after returning home, would present a “sympathetic but fair-minded appraisal,” 
thus boosting popular support for U.S. China policy. “Criterion number one” for all 
cultural delegates going to Taiwan and Hong Kong was their “qualifications as a 
prestige-building representative of his country.”109 
This extra attention was especially significant in regard to travelers to Taiwan. In 
the early 1950s Washington officials struggled to establish the Republic of China as a 
legitimate, friendly, and stable ally. Positive reports coming from American travelers 
advanced this objective, but Washington officials worried that critical reports, coming 
from individuals with first-hand knowledge of the region, could have disastrous 
consequences. The case of C. Martin Wilbur – discussed above – was emblematic of the 
critical mindset of many potential travelers to Taiwan and unless those travelers 
underwent a similar “conversion” process, U.S. and Nationalist officials preferred them 
to stay away. The 1952 visit of Supreme Court Justice William Douglas, for example, 
aroused attention and concern within Washington and Taipei. As both a vocal opponent 
of Washington’s China policy and an influential, well-published travel writer, U.S. and 
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Nationalist officials saw Douglas’s visit as potential liability. Douglas had aggravated 
members of Congress a year earlier, after returning from a trip along the Russia-China 
border, when he voiced his support for recognition of the PRC.110 As would be expected, 
Nationalist officials approached the visit with “a degree of coolness.” Underscoring this 
tentativeness, President Jiang, who normally made himself available for VIP visits, 
remained in the southern part of the country for the duration of Douglas’s trip. The visit, 
however, proceeded in a “friendly atmosphere” and, according to Taiwan’s China News, 
Douglas departed the nation “a convert.”111  
The cases of Wilbur and Douglas demonstrated the tentative means by which 
Washington officials incorporated travel into their Cold War policy. Aware of the impact 
that returning travelers could have on public opinion and policy, policymakers worked 
hard to ensure that such visits would comprise only positive experiences. This was far
easier to accomplish when Washington officials had some say in who would travel, what 
audiences they would encounter, and what message they would deliver. Thus, while the 
International Educational Exchange Program was not a foolproof means of advancing 
U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region, it was far less risky than relying on private 
tourists, traveling outside the auspices of the U.S. government. 
This ability to control the outcomes of the exchange programs came across quite 
clearly as Washington officials tried to use the tours as a function of U.S. race rel tions. 
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As numerous diplomatic historians have demonstrated, foreign peoples paid close 
attention to domestic racial tensions in the United States. U.S. officials, including those 
involved in the exchange programs, were very much aware of these international 
observers and used civil rights legislation, protests, and developments to manipulate 
foreign attitudes toward the United States. This spotlight became all the more significant 
in the 1950s and 1960s as the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a struggle 
over the loyalties of the Third World. While American race relations provided potential 
fodder for communist propaganda, they also gave U.S. officials an opportunity to 
showcase American tolerance.112  
Just as important as combating potential Soviet or Chinese propaganda, U.S. 
officials wanted to assure Asian allies – Hong Kong and Taiwan high on the list – that 
Washington’s vision of the future transcended racial lines. As historian Matthew Jones
argues, the Eisenhower administration saw the PRC as both a “red” and a “yellow” 
menace; in the context of rapidly changing world demographics, U.S. officials could not 
afford to quell the tide of Soviet communism if it meant sacrificing the loyalties of its 
Asian allies.113 Indeed, Asian concerns about Western imperialism and discrimination 
often defined the Asian political landscape more so than fears of communist influence. 
Highlighting this point, renowned travel writer James Michener, traveling throughout 
Asia in the early 1950s, noted that the first questions locals posed to him were always in 
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regard to American race relations. He recounted a recurring conversation he had with 
multiple Asians in which he discussed lynchings, specific cases of African Americans on 
trial, and the racial inconsistencies of the American justice system.114 For this reason, 
U.S. officials needed to tread carefully as they developed cultural exchanges in th  
region; these initiatives needed to highlight the values of equality and tolerance as much 
as they did anticommunism. As Peggy Von Eschen notes, it is no coincidence that the 
State Department’s cultural exchange tours began almost simultaneously with the 
opening of the 1955 Bandung Conference for non-aligned and non-white nations.115 
This race-consciousness was quite apparent in the U.S. tours to Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. Organizers of the American Specialists Program, fearful that the divisive issue of 
civil rights and race problems would undermine their objectives, included questions in 
post-tour debriefing interviews on the host people’s awareness of American racil 
problems.116 More directly, organizers symbolically chose artist Dong Kingman – the 
American-born son of Hong Kong immigrants – to be the first American to travel to Asia 
under the Cultural Presentations Program. In 1954 Kingman embarked on an Asian tour – 
including stops in Taiwan and Hong Kong – during which he offered art exhibitions and 
met with local artists. Throughout it all, U.S. officials made little effort t hide their 
anticipation that Kingman’s Chinese ancestry would help evince sympathy toward and 
garner support from host audiences.117 
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Kingman’s tour was indeed an undisputed success, but from the perspective of 
tour organizers, merely displaying a racially diverse panel of artists was not enough. Like 
all participants, non-white delegates needed to represent “some generally accepted 
cultural theme in American life.”118 For most of these participants, this meant 
highlighting the progress in integration and tolerance that had taken place in the United 
States since the end of World War II. To this end, the State Department and the ANTA 
looked for participants who had a history of both patriotism and moderation. In the 1950s 
and early 1960s Dizzy Gillespie, Marian Anderson, and Alvin Ailey – all of whom met 
these qualifications – embarked on Cultural Presentation tours throughout Asia.  
Marian Anderson was one of the most prominent American singers of the 1950s. 
Her landmark concert at the Metropolitan Opera launched to her celebrity status in the 
U.S. and abroad. Just as significantly, observers knew her as a political moderate who 
was reluctant to criticize publicly the treatment of African Americans.119 Indeed, during 
her Far East tour a reporter questioned the singer on the ongoing crisis in Little Rock and 
Anderson offered an optimistic response. She even left open the possibility of performing 
for Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, “if it could help at all.”120 Anderson was not, 
however, simply a passive messenger of Washington’s foreign policy agenda; her visit to 
India, for example, stirred latent racial turmoil in that country and led one citiz n to 
comment that Anderson’s arrival shed light on those “who still suffer disabilities for no 
other reason than that they belong to a particular caste.”121 But State Department 
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officials, as one African American newspaper noted, were likely not aware of these more 
nuanced ramifications of Anderson’s visit and instead saw her as a “goodwill 
ambassador” with a positive racial message.122 
Alvin Ailey, likewise, offered an appealing message on American race relations. 
Recognizing that most audience members were only aware of negative aspectsof U.S. 
race relations, Ailey hoped to offer a new perspective through both speeches and dance. 
Officials saw Ailey as a potential asset to U.S. interests abroad and in 1962 his dance 
group became the first African American dance ensemble to go abroad under the Cultural 
Presentations Program, traveling to twenty-five Asian cities during a three-month tour.123  
Even in private correspondence, U.S. officials recognized that non-white 
participants were potential assets to the program. A report on the American Specialists 
Program noted that the successful visit of track and field Olympian William Miller – 
which centered on preparing Taiwan’s athletes for the coming Olympic games in 
Melbourne – was all the more significant because of Miller’s views on race. Being “part 
Negro” and a “very well adjusted, broadminded member of his race,” Miller was able to 
“counteract some of the exaggeratedly unfavorable reports on race relations in the United 
States.”124 Similarly, a report by Robert Schnitzer of the ANTA supporting a second 
Asian tour for Tom Two Arrows (Thomas Dorsey) – an Onondaga dancer and musician – 
noted that while Stella Dorsey, Tom’s wife and manager, did not participate in her 
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husband’s performance, she added interest to the project “as living proof that successful 
mixed marriages are possible.”125 
In a broader sense, the fact that the United States was committing itself to a 
cultural exchange program with Taiwan and Hong Kong was an implicit sign that 
Washington officials held Asian culture in high esteem. In light of legitimate concerns of 
Asian nations that the United States was carrying out a distinctly Western and “white” 
form of containment, the cultural exchange programs worked to solidify Asian 
cooperation. Promoting racial harmony and integration through the cultural exchange 
program, to some extent, provided the foundation on which the U.S. and Asian 
governments could build a working relationship.126 
U.S. policymakers, nonetheless, saw race relations as a potential Achilles hea  for 
the American image. There was great concern that African American partici n s in 
particular would taint international perceptions of American race relations by 
highlighting this aspect of American society in an inappropriate or unflattering manner. 
Tour organizers were thus cautious to avoid artists and athletes who might use the tour as 
a platform from which to criticize U.S. civil rights policy. This effort to quiet crtain 
would-be spokesmen, moreover, was not a development that emerged only with the 
cultural exchange programs. Overseas travel and the civil rights movement both 
underwent booms in the post-World War II years and U.S. policymakers feared that 
critical activists, traveling privately around the world, would take their message to an 
international audience. To address this issue, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations 
seized passports from numerous notable African Americans who, in the course of their 
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international travels, regularly spoke out against American segregation, cruelty, and 
systemic racism. State Department officials harassed Josephine Baker, Paul Robeson, and 
William Patterson, among others, seizing their passports and limiting their ability to 
speak.127 
The International Educational Exchange Program, which intentionally gave 
participants a platform from which to speak and engage locals, made this dilemma 
surrounding race relations even more explicit. Officials struggled to find a balance 
between advertising racial tolerance and providing a free international forum  anti-
American criticism. Louis Armstrong, for one, was cause for headaches within
Washington. Though Armstrong worked with U.S. officials during his 1956 African tour, 
in the wake of the 1957 Little Rock crisis Armstrong’s public criticism of Eisenhower’s 
civil rights policy became more audible and provocative. He publicly challenged the 
segregationist policies in Arkansas, insisted that the U.S. did not offer a democratic 
alternative to the Soviet Union, and announced that he would not participate in 
government-sponsored tours until he saw substantive changes. As he continued to speak 
out against the administration’s civil rights policy, U.S. officials and numerous national 
newspapers intimated that Armstrong had “disqualified” himself as a goodwill 
ambassador.128  
With Eisenhower’s decision to integrate Little Rock High School by force, 
Armstrong warmed to the idea of reviving his State Department tours. Though U.S. 
officials were likely dubious about such a possibility due to Armstrong’s history as an
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outspoken critic of U.S. race relations, his popularity around the world made it 
impossible for the State Department to pass him by. In this particular case, the b nefit to 
U.S. foreign policy objectives that would be gained by sending “Ambassador Satch” 
overseas trumped any potential embarrassment he might cause on the civil rights front. In 
the end, Armstrong’s tours proved immensely successful from the perspective of both 
host audiences and U.S. officials. Tens of thousands of eager fans met Armstrong at 
every stop and Armstrong showed moderation and diplomacy when discussing his 
previous comments with American and foreign journalists.129 
The case of Katherine Dunham, a world-renowned dancer and actress, offered a 
different outcome. Dunham first came on the radar of tour organizers in 1955. The 
content of her performances, however, proved to be a sticking point. At the time, 
Dunham was most well known for Southland, a controversial ballet that depicted a 
beating and lynching and ended with “a feeling of unresolved hatred and racism.”130 The 
performance, which toured throughout South America and Europe, was not the sort of 
cultural exhibition that State Department officials hoped to promote. Making matters 
worse, several European communist newspapers, hoping to elicit more criticism of 
America’s history of racial violence, applauded the performance and regretted only that 
the staged lynching had not been more graphic.131 From this anecdotal evidence, U.S. 
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officials could easily connect the dots; Dunham’s performance would provide 
unnecessary fodder for communist propagandists. 
Also working against Dunham was the fact that she had, in 1956, attempted to 
take her dance troupe on tour in the PRC. CCP officials had approached Dunham when 
she was touring in Australia and the dancer hoped to fit a stop to the PRC into her 
upcoming tour to the Far East. Offering contrast to the Robert Breen case, Dunham did 
not seek out the assistance or advice of State Department officials and when word of the 
proposed trip leaked, the Department’s response was abrupt and explicit. According t  
Dunham, State Department officials insisted that if she went she would lose her passport 
and face a $10,000 fine for each member of her dance troupe. There is no direct mention, 
in State Department memoranda, that U.S. officials passed over Dunham due to her 
ideology or her agenda. Dunham insisted that the decision was simply a matter of rac: “I 
think it was because they would not want anything as attractive as a black company, as 
we were, to go.” The fact that she was kept out of the program, while her contemporaries 
such as Marian Anderson, Alvin Ailey, Jose Limon, and Duke Ellington participated 
extensively, however, implies that her racial politics and ideology served, at the least, as 
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Though U.S. officials clearly integrated the exchange programs into their 
containment strategy and selected audiences and participants with an eye toward 
domestic and international impact, they also worked to mute the political dimension of 
the programs. Following the precedent established in the 1920s and 1930s, Washington 
officials were hesitant to take the cultural exchange programs entirely out of private 
hands. As critics within Washington were quick to point out, “Governments are not very 
well qualified” to determine what sort of cultural exchange “would do America good or 
not.”133 Even State Department officials acknowledged they had “no special competence 
to judge performing arts or athletic abilities.”134 In practice, though the State Department 
and USIA administered and coordinated the Cultural Presentations Program, the private 
ANTA and AAU took care of most logistical matters and private sponsors covered some 
of the tour costs.135 
There was also a “voluntarist tradition” in U.S. cultural diplomacy that dated back 
to the country’s earliest exchanges.136 Part of this was due to genuine concerns about the 
First Amendment, which suggested at least a partial separation between private cultural 
initiatives and governmental control. While institutional and political changes in the post-
World World II era led Washington officials to take a more active and controlling role in 
cultural diplomacy, there was still a desire to give the appearance of a substntive public-
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private partnership.137 During the Eisenhower administration in particular, when the 
International Educational Exchange Program took shape, this objective was paramount. 
An introductory pamphlet explaining the exchange program noted that “the 
interdependence of Government and private activities in the promotion of educational 
exchange programs and the special competence of each make more effective th  efforts 
of both in promoting the national interest.”138 This harmonious, symbiotic relationship 
between the public and private sector – what historian Robert Griffith calls the “corporate 
commonwealth” – was thus just as much a part of Eisenhower’s cultural diplomacy as it 
was a part of his economic and political strategy.139  
Though motivations were likely different, host governments, too, were dubious of 
any cultural program in which Washington left its lasting imprimatur, givin  U.S. 
officials yet another reason to accentuate the non-official dimension of the programs. 
Highlighting this point, when famed theater director Edward Mangum traveled to Taiwan 
to test the waters for the Cultural Presentations Program with local Chinese officials, he 
consciously avoided calling the program by its other name – the President’s Special 
International Program. U.S. Embassy officials, who encouraged Mangum’s discretion, 
were concerned that the program’s links to Washington would chip away at its success 
and popularity.140 
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Beyond these explanations, U.S. officials seemed to prefer the non-official status
of these travelers and used that status to advance Washington’s foreign policy objectives. 
Most of the participants’ visits went off without a hitch, reducing the political rsks 
involved in this sort of diplomacy. Every now and then tour organizers complained about 
artists who spent only a couple of days in Taiwan or Hong Kong – as part of a regional 
tour – and gave “cursory attention” to their hosts.141 Other individuals used the tours as a 
springboard for their own career, undermining the cooperative spirit of the program. Most 
common were participants who spoke or acted in ways that offended local hosts or 
challenged U.S. foreign policy interests in the region. These cases, however, were the 
exception to the rule and most tours highlighted the effectiveness and decorum of these 
non-official travelers.142  
Cultural exchange participants were attractive to U.S. officials for logistical 
reasons. U.S. officials overseas, burdened by a flood of demanding American travelers, 
routinely complained about the additional hassles and pressures that these visitors 
produced. All visitors, including “cultural ambassadors” and private tourists, contributed 
                                                
141 American Consulate General Hong Kong to State Department, “Educational and Cultural Exchange,” 7 
August 1968, Box 317, JWFP. 
142 The tour of harmonica player Larry Logan, for example, frustrated U.S. officials. While his tour was 
well-received in Taiwan and Hong Kong, U.S. officials were concerned that he approached his tour for 
selfish reasons and, moreover, that Logan would come ff as a “brassy loud-mouthed American.” 
American Embassy Taipei to State Department, “Education l Exchange: Estimated Budget, Fiscal Year 
1958,” 25 June 1956, General Records of the Department of State, CDF511.933, Box 2238, NARA; USIS 
Hong Kong to the State Department, “Report on the Tour of American Specialist Larry Logan,” 20 
February 1961. Joey Adams and his wife, whose Far East tour received rave reviews, “violated all of our
[State Department’s] ‘don’ts’.” Adams and his wife spoke critically about the tourist facilities at some of 
the tour stops and he frequently ignored local custom  despite substantial briefing. Bauer to Boerner, “An 
Objective Appraisal of the Joey Adams Tour,” 3 April 1962, Box 53, JWFP. Finally, a Fulbright scholar, 
Frederic Grab, left his position in West Germany to participate in Moscow’s Youth Festival. He 
subsequently joined a group of American students who traveled to the PRC. According to State Departmen 
officials, Grab’s actions were “prejudicial to the b st interests of the Fulbright program.” U.S. officials 
consequently cut off Grab’s financial assistance and demanded his return to the United States. State 
Department to American Embassy Bonn, 26 September 1957, General Records of the Department of State, 
CDF511.933, Box 2238, NARA. 
 109 
 
to this “chronic trouble,” but most problematic were the scores of VIPs hoping to get an 
up-close look at the military, agricultural, and industrial developments in host 
countries.143 Going on the attack against the “general problem” of official visitors, 
Ambassador Rankin described an “American official of no very exalted rank [who] 
arrives at a foreign capital in a two million dollar aircraft with a retinue. He frequently 
expects a guard of honor, a motorcycle escort, and to be received and entertained by the 
head of state.”144 
Though increased visits by “importunate” American travelers posed problems in 
many U.S. embassies, the condition existed in an “acute form” in Taiwan. The 
explanation for this was largely a matter of tourist infrastructure. Officials visiting locales 
with a more solid basis for tourism, like France or the Caribbean, could be left on their 
own to seek out proper transportation, entertainment, dining, and accommodations. But 
through the early 1960s visiting officials in Taiwan were far more dependent on their 
hosts for their every need.145 In this context, non-official visitors, cultural delegates 
included, were less of a burden on Taiwan in part because U.S. and Chinese officials felt 
less obligation to guarantee VIP treatment for these sorts of travelers. As Taiwan built up 
its tourism infrastructure, moreover, U.S. officials turned more and more to non-official, 
non-VIP recreational tourists who would take advantage of commercial airplanes, tourist 
hotels, and limited hand-holding during their stay on the island.146 
 
                                                
143 Clough to Rankin, 2 August 1957, Entry #48, Box 2, NARA. 
144 Rankin, China Assignment, 286. 
145 Clough to Rankin, 2 August 1957, Entry #48, Box 2, NARA. 
146 See, for example, Dutton to Goodell, 29 March 1963, General Records of the Department of State, 
Subject Numeric File, Box 3235, NARA; State Department to American Embassy Taipei, “People-to-




The significant role that the State Department assigned these cultural exch nge 
participants underscored the breadth of the administration’s travel policy as well as the 
fluidity between political representatives and non-official travelers. Eisenhower 
consistently approached international affairs as a realm not limited to the p litical elite. If 
the United States was to win allies and spread goodwill around the world, it could not 
attach itself only to generals, diplomats, and information officers; “it must have t e active 
support of thousands of independent private groups…and millions of individual 
Americans.”147 
Included among these “millions,” no doubt, were countless American recreational 
tourists. Also among them were the cultural delegates who took part in these exchange 
programs. This latter group, on the surface, did not fit the traditional “tourist” mold. 
Though they technically were not U.S. government officials, the participants traveled 
under the auspices or with the support of the State Department and local residents no 
doubt associated them with Washington. The participants, moreover, were not like the 
average, faceless tourists, who sought out little interaction with local residents. Instead, 
these world-renowned singers, actors, and athletes performed and spoke to large 
audiences, intentionally engaging in “offstage” conversations with locals. Their objective 
was to stand out, not blend in, and they actively pursued a political agenda in which they 
tried to spread American ideas and values to their hosts. 
Despite these blatant differences from traditional tourists, from the perspective of 
Eisenhower officials – and in the context of Eisenhower’s “people-to-people diplomacy” 
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– there was little distinction between these exchange participants and recreational 
travelers who were, at the same time, spanning the globe in unprecedented numbers. For 
the first few years of the 1950s, in fact, these travelers, along with members of privately-
funded cultural exchanges, represented one of the most significant groups of tourists  
Taiwan and Hong Kong. Though cruise ships regularly made port at Hong Kong and the 
occasional commercial airliner made its way to the region, a lack of hotels, scarcity of 
tourist attractions, and a damaged infrastructure left would-be recreational tourists with 
little incentive to visit. Exchange programs, which offered more supervision, greater 
predictability, and a better chance at comfortable accommodations, helped fill the 
touristic void. 
But it was not merely the scarcity of recreational tourists that produced this 
blurring between different forms of travelers. As was demonstrated by Washington’s 
intense interest in the travels of Clarence Martin Wilbur, there was an active effort to 
merge the roles of “travelers” and “tourists,” of non-official and official delegations. 
Symbolizing this, the U.S. government had, by 1955, expanded the definition of “tourist” 
to include not only sightseers, but also any temporary traveler visiting a foreign country 
for a legitimate purpose.148 Eisenhower followed this up in a press conference on his 
“people-to-people” program, during which he placed educational exchanges alongide the 
“ordinary traveler.”149 In NSC 5607, which outlined Washington’s approach to East-West 
cultural exchanges, an increase in “private tourism” was among the sevente n proposal 
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points, lodged between a commitment to encourage the free flow of ideas and a pledge to 
promote technical and educational exchanges.150 
As non-official cultural delegations and private tourists began visiting the region 
in larger numbers, State Department officials latched on to them in order to supplement 
the nascent government-supported exchange program. Washington memoranda on 
exchanges constantly highlighted the visits of educators, musicologists, anthropologists, 
and museum curators – all traveling under private auspices.151 In 1956 U.S. officials 
boasted that there had been a “considerable increase in interest and…actual participation” 
of private universities and institutions in exchange programs with Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, implying that such private exchange bolstered the government-run program. 
Because of limited government funding, educational exchange officials depended heavily 
on the programs of the China Institute, the University of Michigan, and Cornell 
University. The Cultural Affairs Officer in Taiwan, for one, regularly consulted with 
these and other outside programs whenever a proposed exchange was beyond the means 
of the government program.152 By 1963, when private, recreational travel to Taiwan and 
Hong Kong was commonplace, Lucius Battle announced that the American Specialists 
Program was stepping up its efforts to recruit prominent Americans who would be 
vacationing abroad at their own expense. These “volunteers” presented a great 
opportunity to program officials who were faced with lofty goals and budget shortfalls. 
Tour organizers were not only open to the idea of merging their exchange program with 
                                                
150 NSC 5607, “East-West Exchanges,” 29 June 1956, DDRS. 
151 American Embassy Taipei to State Department, “Educational Exchange: Semiannual Report,” 18 
October 1956, General Records of the Department of S ate, CDF511.933, Box 2238, NARA. 
152 American Embassy Taipei to State Department, “Educational Exchange Annual Report,” 17 February 
1956, General Records of the Department of State, CDF511.933, Box 2237, NARA. 
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recreational tourism, they urged “active” support in “seeking [out] persons who can be of 
real help.”153 
Embassy officials, indeed, took an active effort to integrate these private travelers 
into their own exchange programs, noting that while U.S. officials lacked the staff 
necessary to interact with all these voluntary visitors, “even a minimum of guidance is 
rewarding.” They were convinced, moreover, that the “time and effort expended to utilize 
the services of voluntary visitors…is [frequently] more productive than the samamount 
of time and effort spent on government selected and connected visitors.” As had been the 
case in regard to government-sponsored delegates, U.S. officials saw voluntary visitors as 
“unofficial ambassadors,” who could share Western ideals and values with their hosts and 
return home with positive accounts of their trip. To capitalize on this asset, Embassy staff 
“attempt[ed] to do almost as thorough a job of planning for their visit as we do for our 
own grantees.” While these “non-program visitors” were “not an entirely satisfactory 
substitute” for those hand-selected by the State Department, they proved to be an ass t if 
“wisely handled” by local U.S. officials.154 
These “cultural ambassadors” were thus one part of a sweeping and multifaceted 
program of suitcase diplomacy that aimed to use all American travelers as agent of U.S. 
foreign policy. In the early 1950s, when recreational travelers in Taiwan and Ho g Kong 
were still a rarity, participants in exchange programs filled the touristic void. As 
recreational tourism in Taiwan and Hong Kong developed into legitimate and sizeable 
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Ch. 3 – Creating a Touristic Image: PATA, Private Industry, 
and the Promotion of Tourism to Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
1957-1961  
 
The main attitude of North Americans toward travel to this region is one of indifferenc , 
coupled with fear of war and communism.1 
 
-- The Future of Tourism in the Pacific and Far East, Commerce Department tourism 
survey, 1961 
 
There is no question but that almost every American…has firmly in his mind an image of 
what he will find in Hong Kong when his ship idles through the beautiful junk strewn 
harbor to tie up, or as his jet plane swoops down between the peaks onto one of the finest 
airfields in the Far East. 
 
-- F. Marvin Plake, Pacific Travel News, January 1961 
 
On July 29, 1959, a Qantas Airways Boeing 707 leaving from Sydney touched 
down at San Francisco International Airport after a flight of just less than fifteen hours. 
Following Qantas, other transpacific carriers promptly adopted jet technology. By the end 
of 1959 British Overseas Airway Corporation and Pan American were flying jets from 
the U.S. to Hong Kong and jet connections to Taiwan followed soon after. The Pacific 
Area Travel Association’s (PATA) executive director, F. Marvin Plake, happily referred 
to the event as “a turning point in modern tourism.”2 While commercial jets had been 
landing in Latin America and Europe for years, the consistent arrival of these sp edy 
commercial aircraft in the Far East and Pacific (at “tourist fare” prices) indeed ushered in 
a new era in American tourism to the region.  
The boom in transpacific travel was a small component of a general growth in 
mass tourism that reached unprecedented heights in the late 1950s. The number of 
                                                
1 Clement, The Future of Tourism in the Pacific and Far East, 17. 




Americans traveling abroad, which had hovered around the 1 million mark in the early 
years of the decade had, by 1959, reached 7,000,000. As stated by Pan Am’s New 
Horizons travel guide, “vacations are a very necessary part of modern life.”3 U.S. 
officials even got in on the act, becoming tourists themselves as they used new jet 
technology and improved tourist infrastructure in the course of their work. Despite it  
levity, it was no insignificant gesture that Travel magazine awarded Secretary of State 
Dulles and Vice President Nixon its annual “Mr. Travel” award during their tenures in 
office.4 
Continuing a pattern that emerged following World War II, however, the vast 
majority of the travelers stayed on the North American continent, visiting Caada and 
Mexico. Those who ventured overseas headed primarily to Europe and the Caribbean. 
Only a small percentage headed to Asia. Despite the relatively small numbers, tourism 
levels rose quickly, often at a faster pace than in other regions. Local travel boost rs in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong – who had done little to promote incoming tourism in years past 
– suddenly embraced inbound travelers and worked to make their stay comfortable. Hong 
Kong government and business leaders encouraged the rapid construction of luxury 
hotels, modernization of airport and cruise line facilities, and disseminated a widerray 
of promotional literature. In Taiwan, restaurants began printing menus in English, travel 
agencies printed colorful and accurate maps and guides, local craftsmen produced more 
                                                
3 Pan American World Airways, New Horizons: The Guide to World Travel (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1957), 5. 
4 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 107. 
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sellable handicrafts, and government agencies worked to improve roads, scenic 
attractions, and hotel accommodations.5 
Also significant, tourists and travel boosters played a crucial role in developing 
popular and official images of “China.” As Christina Klein notes, for the first time in 
American history tourism became a “prominent feature of the social and cultural 
landscape.”6 Saturday Review, Reader’s Digest, Look, Travel, Holiday, and PATA’s 
Pacific Travel News dedicated regular columns to travel writers, filled their pages with 
colorful advertisements, and increasingly “sold” the Pacific and Far East as exciting and 
feasible tourist destinations. Travel guides from Sydney Clark, Harvey Olson, and John 
Caldwell – all of which heralded the modern “tourist” and facilitated his vocation – 
became national bestsellers. Unlike older travel writing, which had focused on the
exoticism and elitism of overseas travel, the new guides, articles, and advertisem nts 
stressed how familiar and attainable tourism had become. These touristic images were all 
the more influential in regard to these East Asian destinations precisely because so few 
Americans would ever visit Taiwan or Hong Kong, let alone the PRC.7 
Private travel boosters and government officials ran into trouble, however, when 
trying to mesh this travel discourse with the overarching U.S. position in the Cold War. 
To the extent that they were successful, travel guides and official speeches sold Taiwan 
and Hong Kong as vital outposts of authentic Chinese culture and urged travelers to 
perceive these locales as more than mere tourist destinations. More often, however, 
tourist images of “China” seemed to clash with U.S. Cold War objectives. Tourist 
                                                
5 Sturm to Secretary of State, “Tourism on Taiwan,” 16 February 1959, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance 
Agencies, Entry #409, Box 240, NARA. 
6 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 103-04. 
7 Endy, Cold War Holidays. 
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“ambassadors” often placed a higher value on exploration, relaxation, and personal 
discovery than they did on the promotion and protection of U.S. foreign policy interests. 
To a greater extent than cultural exchange participants, recreational tourists approached 
overseas travel more as an escape from than an extension of international politics. Cold 
War concerns – threats from the PRC, political subversion, and renewed military 
hostilities – were not part of the idealized vision of China that most travelers maintained. 
To attract American tourists to these destinations, therefore, officials and travel boosters 
on both sides of the Pacific needed to downplay the Cold War in the course of developing 
travel relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
 
I 
Two distinct (and seemingly contradictory) developments explain the dramatic 
rise of American tourism to the Far East and Pacific in the late 1950s. First, travel 
promoters saw tourist potential in a region that was so utterly different than North 
America, Europe, and the Caribbean. American tourists were, in general, seeking out 
“new horizons” and while the majority of travelers still wound up going to traditional 
destinations, a remarkably large contingent now headed toward less recognizable locales. 
As Time explained, American travelers were “searching for some fresh identity with the 
elemental life and with the far past….search[ing] for remnants of ancient civilizations, for 
the humbling majesty of raw, rugged nature…a symbolic as well as genuine detachment 
from the rest of the world.”8  
Along these same lines, in an era when many in and out of the travel industry 
lamented the fact that traditional destinations were overpopulated with tourists, travel 
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agencies, hotels, and attractions, the Far East seemed to be an undiscovered and 
underdeveloped gem. Horace Sutton remarked that many of the hassles of tourism – 
artificially high prices for souvenirs, hotel fees, and tourist taxes – stayed way from East 
Asian destinations far longer than they did in Europe. The region’s “best advertisement,” 
Sutton concluded, “would be to maintain the purity which makes it today one of the last 
refuges for the traveler whose back arches at the prospect of being bilked, mil , taxed 
and tolled.”9 Another travel writer noted that Taiwan, in particular, had successfully 
developed the gimmick of “uncommercialized tourism.” It maintained few modern 
hotels, no nightclubs, and “the people still like Americans,” the combination of which led 
to a unique, rewarding tourist experience.10  
While there was, no doubt, a certain cachet associated with the less refined tourist 
experience, this aspect of East Asian tourism was nothing new. The exoticism, 
backwardness, and burden of the Orient had long characterized the region’s tourism 
industry; American tourists – if they could afford it – saw a trip to the Far East as the 
epitome of rugged exploration and discovery. The fact that there was a noticeable boom 
in tourism to the region in the late 1950s, therefore, points to a second explanation: the 
development and maturity of tourist infrastructure. It was not until comfort, familiarity, 
and modernization arrived on the scene that American tourists sought out these 
“alternative” vacations in large numbers. According to a 1958 survey of American travel 
agents, the three primary deterrents to tourism in the Far East were costs, distance, and 
                                                
9 Horace Sutton, “The Pacific Message,” Pacific Travel News, August 1961. 




poor accommodations.11 The increase of commercial airliners, airports, modern hotels, 
restaurants, highways, and entertainment venues – all anathema to the rugged tourist 
experience – addressed these obstacles head on and they served to draw foreign tourists 
to the region in unprecedented numbers. 
Epitomizing this willingness to seek out and embrace the “modern” and 
“familiar,” in the post-World War II period the “tourist” – historically the target of 
criticism and condescension – came into his own. Travel before the war had, no doubt, 
been the domain of the wealthy, but it also seemed to demand a sense of adventure, an 
open mind, and a willingness to get dirty. Being a recreational sightseer was not 
sufficient; every tourist needed to be simultaneously a risk-taker, a diplomat, and a 
discoverer. This grittiness – which was all the more applicable to the nontraditional 
destinations of the Far East – came through in popular travel guides and travelogues fr m 
Harry Franck and Owen Lattimore, as well as the articles and photographs in National 
Geographic magazine.12 Commenting on the old style of travel writing, famed travel 
guide writer Karl Baedeker noted that its purpose was “to keep the traveler t as great a 
distance as possible from the unpleasant, and often wholly invisible, tutelage of hired 
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servants and guides…to assist him in standing on his own feet, to render him 
independent, and to place him in a position from which he may receive his own 
impressions with clear eyes and a lively heart.”13 
Soon after the war had ended and international travel became attainable for 
middle-class Americans, travel writing and the negative connotations surrounding the 
“tourist” began to change. Offering a stark contrast to Baedeker’s style of self-sufficient 
travel, McKay’s Guide implored the American tourist to seek out U.S. officials when 
overseas for “even the most trivial information” and not to be “afraid to show your 
ignorance.”14 In this vein, instead of “off-the-beaten-path” narratives and efforts to 
reclaim the traveler-adventurer label of the nineteenth century, travel guid s from the 
1950s onward were filled with shopping tips, “can’t miss” attractions, and directories of 
Western-style hotels and restaurants.  
These new travel guides also placed less emphasis on the themes of authenticity, 
adventure, and difference that had been such staples of earlier travel writing. Finding the 
“real” China – regardless of the obvious flaws associated with that approach – was not 
the concern of most tourists in the 1950s and 1960s and most guides reflected and 
encouraged this viewpoint. Despite the resulting condemnation of these travel guides as 
superficial introductions to foreign countries that placed more importance on comfort and 
familiarity than true exploration (one recent critic retorted that theys ould, more 
accurately, be called tourist guides), these guides reflected, and in turn shaped, popular 
images of and popular activities in foreign destinations.15 
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Some self-conscious tourists, unwilling to throw themselves in the same category 
as the masses of other globetrotting Americans, clung to some nostalgic remnants of the 
adventuresome, “genuine” travel of earlier years. Advertisers and writers outinely used 
terms like “exotic,” “authentic,” and “Old China” to appeal to these “anti-tourists.” 
Despite this underlying concern about the ubiquitous loud, camera-toting American 
tourist, most travelers and travel writers eventually cast off these anxi ties. In regard to 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, a common approach among travel writers and advertisers wa  to 
acknowledge the vast differences and exotic adventures that tourists would encounter 
while vacationing, but primarily to focus on the level of modernization that had taken 
place in the region since the end of the war. Spokesmen for the Intercontinental Mandarin 
Hong Kong, for example, noted that the hotel was “an exciting blend of the Orient's 
colorful past and today's modern comfort” and that it was “modern with subtle Oriental 
influences.”16 Advertisements for Hong Kong’s President Hotel and the Mandarin both 
show small junks in Victoria Harbor, dwarfed by the massive and modern steel hotels on 
the coast.17 APL ran similar advertisements, highlighting the attractive contrasts of the
region: “Like the splendor of a President liner – graceful and majestic – towering over a 
busy swarm of junks and sampans. Or the deep, restful peace and satisfaction a President 
cruise brings after the problems of workaday life ashore.”18 One Pan Am brochure 
pointed to the “many strange and wondrous sights” that tourists could expect in the 
Orient, but assured them that Malaya and Hong Kong were “British Crown Colonies t  
                                                
16 Mandarin Hong Kong Hotel press release, 24 October 1963, Series II, Box 578, PAA.  
17 Advertisement, “The President,” Clipper, November-December 1963, in Series I, Box 90, PAA; 
Advertisement, “Hong Kong’s Newest Hotel: The Mandarin,” Series II, Box 578, PAA. 
18 Advertisement, “A Delightful Ocean? Ask any Pacific Navigator,” Pacific Travel News, July 1957. 
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be sure.”19 Another noted that Hong Kong was the “heir to the intrigue and glamour of 
Shanghai” but that this Oriental character was merely a “facade.”20 The willingness to 
embrace the modern while still clinging to symbolic vestiges of an idealistic past was, 
perhaps, best captured by a cartoon in PATA’s Pacific Travel News. Standing on their 
balcony in an extremely modern, high-rise hotel, a couple looks down on a scene of 
Asian peasants and traditional architecture. Without a note of irony, the couple remarks: 
“Isn’t the Pacific wonderful...it’s so primitive.” Alongside the cartoon, the editors of 
Pacific Travel News noted that while “[t]ravelers enjoy the foreign and unfamiliar by 
day…by night they want the comforts of home.”21 
 
II 
Regardless of which factor was dominant, the convergence of an abstract desire o 
experience the exotic Orient with the mundane, modern institutions needed to get tourists
to their destination and keep them happy, promised to usher in a new era in regional 
tourism. The numbers bore out such optimistic predictions. The increase in tourism to the 
region was dramatic, outdoing the pace of both the Caribbean and Europe. The numbers 
(excluding Hawaii) jumped from 350,000 in 1954 to 680,000 in 1958 to 1.2 million in 
1961 to 2.1 million in 1965. As would be expected, tourist expenditures rose by similarly 
exponential numbers. In 1956 travelers spent $45 million in the region. By 1958, total 
                                                
19 Pan American travel brochure, “People and Places of the Pan American World,” 1952, Series I, Box 53, 
PAA. 
20 “An Oasis in the South China Sea,” Clipperwise, Vol. II, no. 6 (June 1960), 5, in Series I, Box 88, PAA. 
21 PATA advertisement, Pacific Travel News, November 1966. 
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expenditures rose to $200 million. By 1964 the figures reached $439 million.22 The 
economic benefit of tourism was augmented further by the “multiplier effect,” a boon to 
the local economy by which the same tourist dollars changed hands again and again. 
Within twelve months of being spent, economists estimated that a tourist dollar changed 
hands between three and four times, meaning that the average tourist who spent $1,000 
on his vacation (excluding air or cruise fares) produced $3,000 of national income for the 
host country.23 Signaling the impact of tourist dollars on local economies, by 1966 four of 
the twenty-five PATA member destinations counted tourism as their number one 
“export” and half placed it in their top four “exports.”24 
Improvements in transportation and hotel facilities contributed significantly to 
this increase in tourism. Pan American Airways had first introduced transpacific flights in 
1937 but the journey was expensive and often took over a week to complete. The 
introduction of larger, faster planes dramatically changed the way that people cross d the 
Pacific and the 1950s and 1960s saw air travel become the new norm. In March 1953 Pan 
Am initiated daily flights from the West Coast to the Far East with five weekly flights to 
Tokyo and two to Manila. Between 1952 and 1958, the number of total weekly flights to 
the region increased from 36 to 102. In 1957 Pan Am alone was making twelve weekly 
                                                
22 “Soaring Visitor Totals Mark 1962 as Another Record Year for Pacific,” Pacific Travel News, November 
1962; “PATA’s First Annual Statistical Report: Visitors to PATA Member Destinations, 1952-1965,” 
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Clement, The Future of Tourism in the Pacific and Far East, 18-27. 
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flights to Hong Kong.25 By the early 1960s even Taiwan, which had been poorly served 
by international airlines in the past, had at least five international airlines landing daily.26  
With the increase in routes and, in 1953, the introduction of coach class on 
transpacific flights, it became far cheaper to fly. The price in 1953 for a one-way ticket 
from New York to Hong Kong was $599, which represented a $120 drop from pre-coach 
class pricing. By 1966, following an agreement by the International Air Transport 
Association to reduce economy transpacific fares by another 15 percent, the price was 
$470.27 With the rapid increase in consumer credit plans – such as Pan Am’s “Go Now, 
Pay Later” program – flying overseas became feasible for most middle-class budgets.  
As more and more international tourists poured into the Far East, industry insiders 
frantically built up accommodations to house the incoming guests. As would be seen, 
hotel growth consistently and frustratingly lagged behind the rise in tourism, but the 
proliferation of tourist hotels in the late 1950s and 1960s was, nonetheless, extraordinary. 
Between 1957 and 1966 hotel accommodations more than doubled, increasing from about 
48,000 to 110,000 rooms.28 Much of this development was the result of American 
businesses expanding their share of the international tourism market. Between 1958 and 
1959 Intercontinental Hotel Corporation (IHC), a subsidiary of Pan American Airways, 
for example, was working on projects – at various stages of completion and certainty – 
                                                
25 “Daily Service to the Orient,” ASTA Travel News, March 1953; “Pacific Area Travel Group Sets Parley,” 
Los Angeles Times, 4 February 1958; “The Pacific: 70 Million Square Miles of Travel-Land,” Pacific 
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26 George K. C. Yeh, “‘Formosa’ Was Well Named,” Washington Post and Times-Herald, 28 May 1961 
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Cut,” Pacific Travel News, May 1966. 
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for thirty-four overseas hotels. Hilton, between 1955 and 1966, opened seventeen new 
international hotels.29  
The dramatic rise in tourism and facilities was not distributed evenly throughout 
the region. Hawaii, Japan, and Hong Kong saw the majority of this boom; those three 
regions attracted roughly three times more tourists than the rest of the Pacific and Far 
East combined.30 As one tourism survey noted, Hong Kong was a “red-hot tourist 
attraction.” In 1958 the colony brought in over 100,000 international tourists (not 
including American servicemen) and $67 million in tourist expenditures.31 By 1968 the 
numbers had increased to 600,000 tourists spending roughly $360 million in tourist 
expenditures. Taking into account the “multiplier effect,” tourist spending was bringing 
in well over a billion dollars to the Hong Kong economy. Such figures were a testament 
to Hong Kong’s thriving shopping scene, but they also meant large budgetary windfalls; 
by the time tourists began showing up in large numbers Hong Kong was earning roughly 
30 percent of its governmental revenue from foreign tourists.32 For an economy like 
Hong Kong’s, which suffered from a significant balance-of-payments imbalance, the 
relatively effortless and constantly growing tourist income was remarkable. 
To some extent, the seemingly “overnight” tourist boom caught Hong Kong 
officials and industry insiders by surprise; the 1960s were marked by frequent bouts of 
hotel room and water shortages.33 Travel guides alerted tourists to the likelihood of water 
                                                
29 IHC, “Hotel Facilities,” 9 March 1959, Series II, Box 314, PAA; Annabel Jane Wharton, Building the 
Cold War: Hilton International Hotels and Modern Architecture (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2001), 203. 
30 Clement, The Future of Tourism in the Pacific and Far East, 3. 
31 Ibid., 95. 
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Future of Tourism in the Pacific and Far East, 27. 
33 For an example of criticism, see “More Bargains Than Beds,” Time, 30 May 1960. 
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rationing and advised using bottled or boiled water for drinking purposes. Gene Gleason 
noted that the price of speedy hotel construction was inadequate elevator service, 
undersized rooms, and insufficient staff.34 On the whole, however, tourist development in 
Hong Kong was smooth. Very much a leader in Far East tourism, Hong Kong hotel 
rooms increased from a mere 800 in 1958 to over 6,000 by the end of 1963. In 1961 
alone, three new luxury hotels – with a total of 2,000 rooms – were under construction.35 
The 900-room Hong Kong Hilton, which opened in April 1963, was the first of the Hilton 
chain in East Asia and the largest hotel outside of North America. The $15 million IHC 
Mandarin, with 650 all-balcony suites, rooftop swimming pool and garden, cocktail 
lounge, and views of “the world’s most exotic harbor,” opened that summer. The 
President Hotel, which promised a “rare combination of Oriental mystery and Western 
glamour and elegance,” opened its doors shortly thereafter.36 These first-class hotels 
proved immensely popular; the vast majority of tourists to Hong Kong, when given the 
option, stayed in the most expensive category of hotels. This preference was even more 
dramatic in the case of Americans (67 percent) and Canadians (75 percent).37  Though 
some tourists would likely have settled for lower quality hotels if there werno 
alternatives, the inclination toward luxury, especially when paired with the dramatic 
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increase in tourism throughout the late 1950s and 1960s, demonstrates the impact that 
high-class hotel development had on Hong Kong’s tourism industry.  
Though never in the same league as Hong Kong, more obscure destinations like 
Taiwan saw exponential increases as well. The conclusion of the Taiwan Straits Crises in 
1958 – which Embassy officials called a “definite deterrent to increased visits by 
foreigners” – restored a sense of calm to the region and travelers began to show mild 
interest.38 Receiving almost no recreational tourist traffic in the first several y rs of the 
1950s, by 1958 Taiwan was welcoming well over 20,000 visitors a year. The numbers 
continued to rise exponentially, rising from 44,000 in 1962, to 155,000 in 1966, and to 
300,000 in 1968.39 U.S. officials in Taipei who, only years earlier, had written off Taiwan 
as a backward, unappealing, and doomed tourist destination, began offering more positive 
(though far from glowing) assessments. The 1959 edition of McKay’s Guide, as well, 
recognized the changes, adding a section on Taiwan’s steady progress in education, 
public health, land reform projects, and tourist infrastructure.40  
Hotel construction, perhaps, best highlights Taiwan’s moderate but steady 
progress. As late as 1957, as discussed above, the Grand Hotel and the Friends of China 
Club remained the only first-class hotels in Taipei. Considering that the bulk of foreign 
visitors remained only in the capital city, Taiwan could handle just over a planeload of 
tourists at a time. By the last few years of the 1950s, however, the number of hotel rooms 
rose dramatically. Commencing this development boom, in 1956 the Grand Hotel 
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doubled its capacity by adding forty rooms and four cottage suites. Contrasting with the 
earlier designs of Taiwan hotel rooms, all these rooms were air-conditione and had 
private baths. Several other smaller hotels, likened to European pensions, also opened 
their doors that year. The “western-style” Kao-Hsiung and Tai-Chung Hotels p ned in 
early 1958 and the Railway Hotel, the Overseas Chinese Mansion, and the Hua Yuan 
Hotel all began welcoming guests the following year. From less than 200 rooms in 1957, 
accommodations rose to 375 in December 1960, to 760 at the end of 1961, and to 3,000 
by the end of 1966. A 1966 Pacific Travel News feature on Taiwan tourism showcased 
four luxury hotels and fourteen more modest venues in Taipei alone.41  
 
III 
The increase in tourist flows encouraged and reflected active participation from 
the governments of Taiwan and Hong Kong and private businesses. In 1957 Hong Kong 
saw the establishment of both the semi-governmental Hong Kong Tourist Association 
(HKTA) and the private Hong Kong Association of Travel Agents. HKTA, the larger and 
more influential of the two tourism agencies, quickly joined PATA and took on an active 
role. Though its budget was remarkably small (just $166,000 in 1959), it became a leader 
in tourism promotion, distributing posters, travel literature, and promotional films.42 In 
1959 it distributed over 500,000 pieces of promotional literature, the vast majority of 
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42 The relatively low budget of the HKTA was a source of praise and criticism from travel experts. On the
one hand, in 1959 the ratio between tourist expenditures in Hong Kong and the amount of money spent on 
tourism was about 530 to 1, by far the most impressiv  cost-benefit ratio in the region. On the other and, 
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which ended up in American periodicals such as S turday Review, Holiday, and the New 
Yorker. HKTA’s “A Million Lights Shall Glow” – a twenty-minute film highlighting the 
cultural, historical, and recreational facets of Hong Kong – won international recognition 
and received the best travel documentary award at the 1961 Cannes Film Festival.43 On 
the facilitation front, in 1961 the Hong Kong government modified the colony’s visa 
policy, allowing American visitors to acquire multiple-entry visas (good for any number 
of visits within twelve months) for the same $2 fee as a single-entry visa. By 1966 the 
colony allowed U.S. citizens to visit up to fourteen days without a visa.44  
More striking reforms came out of Taipei. Though Taiwan would never approach 
the level of Hong Kong tourism, the attitudinal and substantive change of the government 
was incredibly significant, especially when viewed alongside Jiang’s past intransigent 
view towards tourism development and the country’s dismal tourism industry. According 
to one government spokesman, “visitors are as welcome as the sun” and a member of 
Taiwan’s PATA delegation humorously noted that the infamous “head-hunters” of the 
island’s interior were “now entirely friendly, particularly so with tourists.”45 Changes 
seem to have begun in 1956 when, according to several government and private 
representatives, Jiang himself “decreed that the tourist industry should be developed.” 
The policy shift, which was part of a broader, “3-point” program in Taipei to move the 
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nation toward economic independence, signaled that the Nationalist regime finally 
recognized the economic and political benefits that foreign tourists could produce.46 
The new attitude of Nationalist officials produced substantive institutional 
changes. The government rapidly developed a multi-layered bureaucracy to failitate 
incoming tourism. In November 1956 Jiang’s government established the Taiwan 
Tourism Council (TTC), which became the nation’s official travel agency. The Council 
quickly became an active member in PATA and, despite objections from the PRC and the
Soviet Union, joined the IUOTO.47 The non-official Taiwan Visitors Association (TVA), 
consisting of travel agents, and representatives from airlines, hotels, and rest urants, 
followed shortly afterward. The TVA served as an advisory board of sorts for the 
government-run TTC and the Council, in turn, provided substantial subsidies to the 
private TVA.48 
Beyond establishing and supporting these new administrative bodies, the 
Nationalist government threw its support behind the island’s tourist infrastructure. In 
1957 the Nationalist government initiated a three-year plan to promote tourism 
development and hotel building. To this end, officials designated almost $287,000 toward 
the construction of tourist accommodations.49 The government further facilitated the 
development of first-class hotels by streamlining land sales, allowing selected building 
materials to be imported at lower customs duties, and offering five-year tax exemptions 
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to certain government-approved hotels.50 The results were significant; five new hotels – 
most with private bathrooms and air conditioning – opened in 1957.51 In a joint effort 
with the TTC and Taiwan’s Highway Bureau, the government spent $315,000 on road 
repairs in order to “attract tourists to scenic spots.” As part of its road improvement 
campaign, the government began construction on an East-West highway. This “Dragon 
Road,” which stretched 200 miles and linked the east and west coasts of Taiwan, offered
tourists easier access across the island.52 In total, between 1958 and 1962 the Nationalist 
regime committed around $5 million to various tourism projects.53 
Taiwan tourism officials, moreover, undertook a number of initiatives to attract 
foreign travelers. In mid-1956 Nationalist officials negotiated directly with APL – which 
still did not offer direct service to Taiwan – to organize an island-wide tour.54 Such 
activities continued over the next several years. In 1958 the TTC and the private China 
Travel Service organized a visit for 400 American tourists on board the SS Stattendam 
who were partaking in a “round-the-world” cruise. To ensure the visit’s success, th  TTC 
dredged the harbor to accommodate the large cruise liner, organized tours, set up a bazaar
at the pier, and streamlined entry and exit procedures for the passengers. More broadly,
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by the end of 1958 the TTC had pinpointed and began developing twenty scenic locations 
as tourist attractions.55  
Finally, the government gradually began to deal with the massive amount of red 
tape and bureaucracy encumbering Taiwan tourism. Tourists had difficulty acquiring 
visas, entry and exit procedures were complex and prohibitive, and security concerns 
prevented easy mobility throughout the island. By 1957, however, the TTC, along with 
outside institutions like PATA, the IUOTO, and U.S. travel boosters, had convinced the 
Taiwan government to reform these debilitating practices. Signaling these changes, in 
1957 Taiwan made “drastic relaxations” in its entry and exit procedures for it own 
Chinese residents. The new policy, which applied only to Chinese tourists traveling to or 
from nations with diplomatic relations with Taiwan, allowed tourists to acquire their 
travel permits with ease. More broadly, in 1959 Taiwan provided incoming tourists with 
Register of Currency cards, providing them with a 33 percent more favorable exchange 
rate. A year later, following a TVA-sponsored mission to Japan to explore ways to relax 
entry and exit requirements, the government instituted a less-burdensome customs 
declaration form and updated its antiquated travel laws to allow visitors to stay seventy-
two hours without a visa.56 In 1961, to show support for all these changes, Jiang 
established the Vice Ministry for Tourism, a position within the Ministry for 
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Communications that oversaw this sizable bureaucracy and coordinated the efforts of 
Taiwan’s public and private tourism agencies.57 
Taiwan’s progress on tourism was commendable, but critics continued to 
complain. The government, according to some observers, was not giving its “whole-
hearted support” to the industry and when officials did initiate reforms, they did so only 
after intense, incessant lobbying from the TVA and other tourism interest groups.58 The 
Nationalist government, moreover, consistently refused to place tourism interests above 
(often exaggerated) security concerns. Tourists, for example, still faced numero s 
restrictions on travel to the interior of the island.59 Taiwan’s new “72-hour” visa policy 
applied only to tourists from “friendly countries.” Along these same lines, the 
government refused to adopt PATA’s recommendation to eliminate visa requirements for 
any tourist staying less than thirty days, citing concerns about “internal security.”60 These 
security concerns led to significant restrictions on what items tourists could bring into the 
country; those wishing to carry a camera, for instance, had to fill out piles of paperwork 
and, even then, local police prohibited photographs in many areas.61 Travel writer John 
Caldwell, referencing the “security-conscious” officials at Taipei’s a rport, warned 
travelers: “immigration and customs formalities may not be as speedy as in Tokyo or 
Hong Kong.”62 
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Regardless of these persistent and legitimate critiques, the private American 
tourism industry was eager to capitalize on Taipei’s new attitude. Taipei’s efforts to 
highlight tourist attractions and make travel more accessible to tourists wa  especially 
important in a nation like Taiwan, which never ranked high on lists of tourists’ dream 
destinations.63 Tourism promoters in the United States and Taiwan had never believed 
that the island was a tourist magnet on its own. Embassy official Paul Sturm, for 
example, noted that Taiwan offered “little which would in itself merit a special trip to the 
area.” Put differently, Fodor’s guide noted that any tourist who expected to find the 
“gaiety and glamour” of Hong Kong and Japan “is in for a disappointment.”64 Because of 
the peripheral status of Taiwan in the eyes of American tourists and travel boosters, the 
new tourist policies, specifically the more liberal visa policy, were significa t 
achievements. The key to Taiwan’s success was its fortunate position in the Pacific 
Ocean, lying along the main air route between Japan, Hong Kong, and the Philippines. If 
the Nationalist government could make travel to Taiwan pleasant and simple, and if 
promoters could convince travelers of these changes, tourists were more likely to inc ude 
Taiwan on their Far East itinerary, even if it was not the primary purpose of th ir 
vacation. 
In a travel piece in the Washington Post, ROC Ambassador George Yeh worked 
toward this goal, highlighting the ease of travel to Taiwan. Because a visa was no longer 
necessary for a short stay, Yeh wrote, “all one needs to do…is to contact one’s airline or 
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travel agency.”65 PATA’s executive director F. Marvin Plake, as well, did his part, being 
on the scene to greet the first tourists to arrive under the new “72-hour” visa regul tion. 
As he and other tourism insiders had hoped, the first arrivals – Mr. and Mrs. E. C. 
Erickson of Stockton, California – had not planned on visiting Taiwan, but upon hearing 
of the policy change while in Hong Kong had decided to make a quick stop to the island 
on their way to Japan.66 American travel promoters expanded on this strategy, organizing 
potential visits to Taiwan around the new visa laws. Pacific Travel News offered up 
several itineraries for three-day tours. These seventy-two-hour “stopover” trips would be 
an easy sell to tourists due to Taiwan’s proximity to Japan, Hong Kong, and the 
Philippines and the fact that a visit to Taiwan could be included in a round-trip ticket for 
no extra cost. Three days, moreover, “gives time enough for a good sampling of Taiwan
as a bit of Old China”67 Taiwan travel agencies, as well, embraced this approach in their 
promotional literature; almost every advertisement for Taiwan noted that on most flight  
between Japan, Hong Kong, and the Philippines, a stopover to Taiwan would not cost 
anything extra.68 Travel writer Sydney Clark playfully disagreed with the new visa law: 
“Three days is barely enough time to see something of Taipei and then hustle down to 
Sun Moon Lake and perhaps the Taroko Gorge.”69 Clark’s mild criticism, nonetheless, 
underscored the ubiquity of the “3-day tour” in Taiwan tourism. In the year before the 
law went into effect, nearly 20,000 tourists visited Taiwan. Following the policy’s 
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implementation, tourism increased by 37 percent. Not surprisingly, moreover, these 
visitors stayed for an average of three days in order to avoid the hassle of getting a visa.70 
 
IV 
Christopher Endy, writing about American tourists to France in the 1950s and 
1960s, notes that the majority of travelers “refused to reduce their trips to Cold War-
themed vacations.”71 Escapism, adventure, and relaxation – more so than patriotic 
mission and political ideology – motivated Americans to travel abroad. To understand 
American perceptions of and relations with the outside world, historians must thus look 
beyond the Cold War. This desire to escape was present, as well, among the tourists and 
travel boosters in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The unique roles that these destinations played 
in Sino-American relations and, more broadly, East-West conflict, however, made this 
proclivity to “ditch” the Cold War far more difficult. 
The Cold War was apparent from the moment travel boosters considered 
promoting tourism industries in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The key to boosting tourism to 
those destinations was making them seem stable, alluring, and exciting. Such “spin” was, 
however, difficult to maintain. Because of their associations with the PRC, Taiwan nd 
Hong Kong both suffered from palpable concerns about safety. These concerns often 
were logical and justified. The Chinese Communist military had, in 1954 and 1958, 
shelled two of the small islands between Taiwan and the mainland. As the United States 
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beefed up its presence in the Taiwan Straits and the Eisenhower administratio  toyed 
with the idea of using nuclear weapons, a military conflict between the PRC and the 
United States seemed imminent. Even when the Communist regime was not bombing the 
offshore islands, the Chinese civil war (though technically over by 1949) remained a 
constant presence in Taiwan. Large, ominous photographs of Jiang Jieshi and the “ever-
present” Nationalist soldiers in the streets gave Taiwan the feel of a “big brother state,” 
while ubiquitous posters with irredentist messages drove home the lingering unease
between the Nationalist and Communist regimes.72  
In Hong Kong, as well, the Cold War could not hide. U.S., British, Nationalist, 
and Communist officials all saw the potential in using Hong Kong as a base for trade, 
travel, espionage, and propaganda. Because of this constant struggle by all sides to use 
Hong Kong to advance foreign policy interests, the colony quickly became a 
cosmopolitan “Cold War city.” While the constant interaction between Britons, 
Americans, and Chinese made Hong Kong “officially neutral in regard to all politics,” in 
practice such neutrality rarely prevailed. A 1956 clash in Hong Kong between 
Communists and pro-Nationalists, for instance, led to street riots and local offiials 
encouraged tourists to remain in their hotels. More than just the occasional outburst of 
conflict, looming over the British colony was the knowledge that the PRC could easily
swallow up Hong Kong at any moment.73 
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Tourists were not entirely turned off by the precariousness of Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. There was a certain cachet associated with risky and unpredictable tourism. The 
physical, cultural, and psychological proximity of Taiwan and Hong Kong to “Red 
China” infused those tourist destinations with a greater sense of importance and a degree 
of added excitement. Henry Lieberman wrote that the Hong Kong-PRC border was, in 
fact, one of the primary draws for American tourists.74 A HKTA survey backed this up, 
noting the first question asked by most incoming American tourists: “Where is th Red 
border and how far away is it?”75 To many incoming tourists, Hong Kong was a 
proverbial peephole on an isolated nation. Satiating these voyeuristic and thrill-seek ng 
tendencies, Hong Kong’s “Red China Border Tours,” which promised an up-close look at
the “forbidden” PRC became increasingly popular among foreign visitors.  
Travel writers, as well, fed into this fixation. One guide promised that a drive in 
Hong Kong’s New Territories offered a “good glimpse behind the Bamboo Curtain.”76 
Another directed tourists to gaze toward the “barbed-wire fence and a few Communist 
soldiers in mustard-color uniforms at the frontier station on the Kowloon-Canton 
railway.”77 By 1962, according to one Saturday Review article, the only “spice” 
remaining in the Portuguese colony of Macao was “the proximity of the Communist 
neighbors sitting on the far side of the West River with their patrol boats.”78 John 
Caldwell, with a note of sensationalism, informed his readers: “Taiwan is just 100 miles 
off the coast of Red China so that its air defenses must always be on the alert. As your 
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plane taxis down the runway, you may note constantly manned anti-aircraft batteries on 
both sides.”79 
But these allusions to danger and imminent war only went so far. The tense 
environment was, on the whole, a deterrent to the average tourist. For the same reasons 
that tourists and travel companies hesitated to set their sights on Taiwan and Hong Kong 
in the early 1950s, they continued to exhibit anxiety in the latter half of the decade. Both 
Taiwan and Hong Kong consistently ranked within the top four countries seen as 
“unsafe” by potential tourists. In 1958 Taiwan topped the list, with nearly 30 percent of 
tourists concerned about travel there. Likewise, of those tourists who felt that Hong Kong 
was a dangerous destination, 68 percent cited apprehensions over “communism,” “war 
danger,” and “Chinese danger.”80 
U.S. officials recognized that this perception would prove to be a major obstacle 
for tourism development, particularly in a location like Taiwan that had a poor reputation 
for drawing foreign tourists and had only a minimal tourist plant already in place. In a 
report from the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), a State Department 
agency that played a major role in providing technical assistance and financing for local 
tourism programs, officials noted that Taiwan would never achieve its full tourist 
potential as long as would-be visitors saw it as an “active war zone subject to possible 
immediate hostilities.” ICA, in fact, long considered Taiwan a low priority due to its 
precarious position on the world stage.81 
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Travel boosters on both sides of the Pacific, realizing that tourism worked best in 
a generally stable and peaceful environment, consequently downplayed Cold War 
tensions. Advertisements, articles, guides, and government reports embraced escapism 
more than gritty realism, recreation more than politics, and enjoyment more than mission. 
One article introducing would-be travelers to Taiwan read: “It is a big mistake to let 
front-page datelines keep Taiwan off an Asian itinerary. Nature knows nothing of politics 
and troubles, and the island’s beauty and its people’s charm have been untouched by the 
heat of international debates.”82 Caldwell, despite his frequent anticommunist diatribes, 
opened his Far East travel guide by telling readers: “The Far East shows little evidence of 
the war it has experienced. The hotels are good and getting better. The Grand Hotel in
supposedly isolated and war-threatened Taiwan…is one of the world’s best.” Despite the 
expectations of many tourists, he continued, Taiwan was not an “embattled island fortress 
where people live in dugouts while fearfully awaiting enemy attack.83 David Dodge, 
similarly, assured American travelers that “the guns aren’t booming at American 
rubbernecks. They never have boomed at American rubbernecks. The never will boom at 
American rubbernecks.”84 
Washington reports, as well, drove home this theme of stability. To discourage 
tourists from associating Hong Kong and Taiwan tourism with impending war, a 
Commerce Department tourism survey, carried out in cooperation with PATA, 
recommended highlighting the safety of travel to those destinations in any national 
advertising campaign. Going even further, the survey encouraged referring to Hong Kong 
as “The Crown Colony of Hong Kong” in order to “counteract the impression…that 
                                                
82 Florence Teets, “Tropical Taiwan, An Island for ‘Viewing’,” New York Times, 17 May 1959. 
83 Caldwell, Far East Travel Guide, 7, 116. 
84 Dodge, Poor Man’s Guide, 9-10. 
 142 
 
Hong Kong is in China.”85 Private industry came to these conclusions as well. Pan Am’s 
1951 New Horizons travel guide stated only that Hong Kong lay within southeast China, 
but the 1957 edition specified that its “correct designation is ‘Hong Kong, British Crown 
Colony’…not China [italics in original].” Don Briggs, who worked closely with HKTA 
and PATA in the development of his travel guide, included “Don’t Say Hong Kong, 
CHINA” in his long list of inappropriate behavior for tourists.86 Attempting to protect 
Taiwan from similar associations with the PRC and general instability, U.S. officials 
encouraged the Nationalist government to employ the Hamilton Wright public relations 
firm (which it soon did) in order to develop and distribute stories on the economic and 
political stability of Taiwan.87 
The travel discourse did not, however, entirely hide the ongoing controversy and 
conflict between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the PRC. In regard to Taiwan, most guides 
included a brief history of the island and obligatory remarks about the “fall” of mainland 
China. The manner in which these writings “sold” Taiwan, however, centered on the 
physical beauty and recreational activities that Taiwan offered. American journalist and 
Taiwan resident Barbara Hoard, for example, applauded the “phenomenal” results of 
Taiwan’s tourism promotion campaign and pointed tourists toward the island’s Buddhist 
temples, tranquil lakes, and national parks.88 Even George Yeh, Taiwan’s Ambassador to 
the United States, failed to mention the PRC once in his opinion piece extolling the 
virtues of Taiwan tourism. Instead, he highlighted the island’s “[n]umerous scenic spots 
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and tourist attractions” and boasted that at least five international airlines maintained 
regular service into Taipei.89 Even the terminology of most travel guides and articles 
sidestepped the divisiveness of the Cold War. Few traveler writers used the term 
“Formosa” – the Dutch name for the island preferred by the China Lobby and used in 
much of Washington’s official documentation – relying instead on the less provocative, 
Chinese-approved “Taiwan.” 
More dramatically, one of the trends in advertising and writing was to discuss 
Taiwan or Hong Kong barely at all. APL advertisements, which appeared in all the 
leading travel magazines in the 1950s and 1960s, showed photographs of laidback 
passengers enjoying sun-drenched decks, fine dining, and cruise activities. One APL 
advertisement for a transpacific cruise announced: “So Much To 
See…Enjoy…Remember!” The illustrations in the advertisement, however, depicte a 
buffet dinner, sunbathing vacationers, a side-view of the luxurious Pre ident Cleveland, 
and only a small image of the Japanese coast.90 Even APL’s slogan throughout the period 
– “All this fun…and the Orient too!” – demonstrated the priorities of many American 
tourists. Along these same lines, many travel guides included as much discussion on the 
means of travel as they did the destination itself. Explaining why he so admired Taiwan, 
Sydney Clark, in his All the Best series, highlighted the Civil Air Transport (CAT) 
aircraft that brought him to the island. While acknowledging that the aircraft epresented 
the tenacity and freedom of the Chinese people, he also dedicated many lines to the attire 
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of the attractive stewardesses on board the plane.91 Ships and planes became destinations 
in themselves and Taiwan and Hong Kong faded to the background. 
The campaign in Washington and the private tourism industry to downplay the 
Cold War in the public space was part of a broader effort to rebuild the image of the Far 
East and Pacific. More than just a means of maximizing profits in an unstable tourist 
environment, “image creation” – through architecture, advertisements, travel guid s, and 
articles – served as a primary means of creating “knowledge” of Asia. The infusion of 
these images in popular culture, moreover, meant that despite the relatively small nu ber 
of Americans who actually visited the region, knowledge of the Far East was quite 
widespread.  
This aspect of tourism was not entirely unique. Throughout the 1950s Americans 
demonstrated a heightened interest in Asia, a trend that materialized in numerous popular 
culture venues. Christina Klein has looked to the works of James Michener, Broadway 
musicals such as The King and I and South Pacific, and films like The World of Suzy 
Wong and Love is a Many-Splendored Thing, all of which earned accolades and 
widespread popular appeal. Tourists, as well, contributed to such awareness. Referencing 
American tourism in postwar France, Christopher Endy notes that outside of immigrants 
coming to the United States, “tourist impressions” served as one of the primary ways that 
Americans “knew” foreign countries.92  
These imaginings and images were not necessarily accurate. As seen above, some 
images, in fact, explicitly eschewed objectivity and developed false reprs ntations of the 
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Far East.93 Popular depictions of Hong Kong, in particular, developed layers of romantic, 
exotic imagery that masked the true character of the British colony. As one scholar notes, 
even as Americans began visiting Hong Kong in larger numbers by the late 1950s, the 
city “served more as an imaginary landscape than actual topography.”94 Humorist Art 
Buchwald underscored this disconnect between image and reality, joking that most 
tourists to Hong Kong were traveling 18,000 miles either to buy a cheap suit or meet 
Suzie Wong, a reference to the 1960 film that followed the romance of a young 
Englishman and a Hong Kong prostitute.95  
Regardless of their objectivity, Americans depended on these popular visions of 
Asia as they developed their own attitudes toward the region. This was especially true in 
locales like Taiwan and Hong Kong, with which few Americans were familir and to 
which fewer Americans actually traveled.96 Travel guides and reading material in general 
regularly depicted Hong Kong, for example, as a romantic Eastern port, a peephole on the 
PRC, and a bastion of democracy and freedom. A 1966 HKTA report noted that roughly 
half of all American tourists to Hong Kong used a travel guide in the course of th ir 
vacation. Eighty-three percent said they acquired their knowledge of the British colony 
from “general reading.”97 These popular perceptions, moreover, had some impact on 
official U.S. policy. While there was no “one-to one” relationship between popular 
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images and foreign policy decisions, the images, in order to be effective, had to fit into a 
general discourse with which most Americans sympathized and understood. U.S. 
policymakers, no less than the average American traveler, recognized these popular
images as at least part of the “true” China. In other words, these depictions formed a 
portion of the “cultural space,” within which foreign policies were developed, executed, 
and challenged.98 
Very much at the center of this “image building” project was PATA. PATA, 
which by the late 1950s was emerging as the chief institutional driving force behind 
tourism to the region, rapidly and dramatically expanded its influence. Membership grew 
from 80 member delegations in 1953, to 500 in 1962, to 800 in 1966.99 With its growing 
influence – and an enlarged budget to match – PATA stepped up its promotion campaign 
to “sell” the Pacific to travelers. Its advertising budget of $8,000 in 1955 jumped to 
$92,000 in 1958, to $140,000 in 1959, and to $187,000 by 1961. Maintaining focus on 
the North American tourist market, PATA directed its advertising campaign at U.S. and 
Canadian periodicals, hoping to offset the overwhelming dominance of North American, 
European, and Caribbean tourism in the public space. Advertising campaigns like 
“Discover the Festive, Fabled, Fascinating Pacific,” “Explore the Wonderful World of the 
Pacific,” and “Discover the Pacific,” adorned the pages of Holiday, Saturday Review, 
Sunset, Esquire, National Geographic, Atlantic, New Yorker, and most large city papers. 
“Total impressions” – a phrase that PATA executives developed in reference to the 
number of times that advertisements were printed – jumped from 8 million in 1959 to 32 
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million in 1962.100 Though it is difficult to determine the impact of these direct 
advertising campaigns, the fact that PATA, by the beginning of the 1960s, was annually 
receiving about 14,000 direct inquiries from readers (three times greater th n the average 
inquiry level for travel advertising), signaled that the organization’s promoti nal 
campaign was having an effect.101  
Beyond advertisements, PATA supplied photographs and brief news stories to 
numerous periodicals, keeping readers up to date on new developments in Far East and 
Pacific tourism. In 1958 PATA distributed seventy-seven travel stories to 550 travel
editors. PATA executives estimated that 22 million North Americans regularly read about 
the Pacific because of PATA’s publicity department.102 PATA, moreover, worked with 
well-established travel writers and major movie studios to acclimate the average 
American to Far East travel. Teaming up with Eugene Fodor, Sydney Clark, and John 
Caldwell, PATA officials urged writers to produce more travel guides for destinations in 
the Far East and Pacific. 
Even with the increasing success in exposing potential tourists to the Far East and 
Pacific, PATA executives struggled to find suitable outlets for promotional and 
informational material. A solution emerged in 1957, when PATA established Pacific 
Travel News – a trade magazine that detailed the activities of PATA and offered news 
articles, tour suggestions, travel information, and advertisements for travel agents and 
other travel insiders. Pacific Travel News proved very successful and circulation rose 
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from 5,000 for its initial release in 1957 to nearly 8,000 two years later.103 Unlike 
Holiday and Travel, Pacific Travel News was not meant for the average tourist, but its 
advertisements, tour suggestions, and advertising campaigns made their way into travel 
agencies across the country and littered the travel sections of popular periodicals. The 
magazine, moreover, allowed PATA to expand its collaboration with top-level talentin 
the travel industry. In 1957 PATA teamed up with MGM studios and launched a “Win a 
Pacific Island” contest in conjunction with MGM’s film “The Little Hut.” 
Advertisements for the contest, which became a regular feature in Pac fic Travel News, 
resulted in a “barrage of publicity” as PATA received 50,000 entry forms.104 In August 
1960 John Caldwell, the popular travel writer, produced two tourism articles exclusively 
for Pacific Travel News, detailing “off-the-track” tourist sites in Southeast Asia and 
alerting tourists to “common pitfalls” they might encounter. But overall, Caldwel  
portrayed a “romantic Asia” to which American travelers – “bored with Europe” – could 
travel with ease and enjoyment.105  
Though PATA rarely made it explicit in its advertising and promotional literature, 
its portrayal of the Far East and Pacific in the 1950s and 1960s worked to overturn the 
image of the region as unstable, unsafe, and unready for tourists. The popularity of these 
images shows that, despite efforts by government officials and some within the travel 
industry to establish a Cold War script for American tourists, many travelers r fused to 
become active Cold Warriors. Cultural historians, looking at American domestic life 
during the two decades following World War II, have argued that Americans often 
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refused to integrate the Cold War into domestic, popular culture. Just as Disney movies, 
soap operas, and John Wayne films enjoyed far more popularity in the 1950s than did 
explicitly Cold War-themed entertainment such as The Red Menace (1949), I Married a 
Communist (1949), and I Led Three Lives (1952), so too did travel advertising and 




This argument, however, only goes so far. While government officials, writers, 
advertisers, and industry insiders took great care to build up Taiwan and Hong Kong as 
safe and recreational destinations detached from the troublesome realities of th  p st-
World War II environment, they simultaneously gave “purpose” to tourism by placing it 
squarely within the context of the international politics, the Cold War, and Sino-
American conflict. Examining post-World War II middlebrow culture and popular 
attitudes toward Asia, Christina Klein notes that the Cold War “made Asia important to 
the United States in ways that it had not been before.”107 International travel, a significant 
part of the cultural landscape of the 1950s and 1960s, seemingly allowed Americans to 
place themselves (either physically or vicariously) in the center of world affairs.108 
McKay’s Guide, for instance, reminded readers that “every…traveler is an ambassador of 
good will.”109 White House official Clarence Randall, writing the introduction to a 
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government report on tourism, similarly wrote that travel was a “unique instrument of 
friendly, peaceful communication among the nations and the peoples of the earth.110  
Several of the most influential “producers of knowledge” on Asia – travel writers 
and industry insiders among them – were, moreover, those individuals with a Cold War 
outlook that resembled attitudes in Washington. Embracing the “purposeful” approach to 
tourism, these individuals saw travel not merely as a means of forging cultural 
connections, but also as a way of strengthening U.S. containment policy. James Mich ner 
had demonstrated this fusion of “tourist guide” and Cold Warrior literature in Voice of 
Asia and, as recreational tourism to the Far East rose in tandem with Sino-American 
tensions, this genre gained influence. 
John Caldwell, for instance, saw tourism as a blend of recreation and purposeful, 
anticommunist behavior. Increased American travel to the region, Caldwell noted, was a 
leading explanation for improved perceptions of the United States; in the early 1950s – 
before the American tourism boom and before President Eisenhower made his succesful 
1959 tour through Asia – “American-baiting was a common sport” and local residents 
generally had more sympathy with Beijing than they did Washington. AfterEis nhower’s 
trip, Caldwell noted the increased affection directed at Americans. Referencing I dia, 
Caldwell wrote that while the nation “still is a neutral…she is neutral on ‘our side’.”111  
Caldwell, moreover, linked American tourists to the Far East with the military and 
political treaties that bound the U.S. to the region, and urged visitors to recognize their 
potential impact.112 Tourists, themselves, could advance or cripple the cause of 
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international freedom through their actions. Caldwell urged them to avoid stereotypical 
American behavior – drunkenness, over-tipping, inappropriate dress, and ethnocentrism – 
which tended to make American travelers quite conspicuous and gave credence to 
stereotypes of arrogance and ignorance. This simple modification of behavior, he 
insisted, would deprive the “communist world” of propagandistic fodder.113 
The relevance of the American tourist was even more pronounced in areas like 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, in which the U.S.-PRC rivalry was readily apparent. Taiwan, 
Caldwell insisted, “is more than a place.” The notion that Taiwan was more Chinese than 
the PRC – a perception derived both from U.S. restrictions that cut off Americans from 
the mainland and from the growing belief that communism, instability, and hostility were 
not genuine Chinese traits – came through in Caldwell’s travel guide. Taiwan was “the 
[italics in original] China recognized by the United States and the more vigorously anti-
communist countries of the world.” In this sense, Taiwan “is anathema to the Communist 
world, denounced, threatened, and coveted.”114 Referencing Hong Kong, Caldwell 
detailed the history behind the Comprehensive Certificates of Origin (CCOs), explaining 
that purchase restrictions were in place because of the continuing U.S.-PRC conflict. 
After citing some past cases of “trading with the enemy,” Caldwell railed against those 
tourists who would try to circumvent the U.S. Customs policies: “As far as I am 
personally concerned, it is a matter of patriotism and of being a law-abiding citizen.”115  
Numerous other travel writers, as well, routinely invoked the East-West conflict 
in their discussions of tourism to the region. In Fodor’s Guide, Doris L. Rich called Hong 
Kong the “West Berlin of Asia” and noted that its “political future [was] threatened by 
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the Communist colossus which borders it.” Sydney Clark similarly referred to Taiwan as 
the “welcoming world of Free China,” and optimistically predicted that the “Communist 
rebellion” was merely a “temporary phase.” Robert S. Kane’s Asia A to Z travel guide 
noted that without the establishment of the Bamboo Curtain, Hong Kong would still be a 
relatively unimportant “tiny British colony.”116 
Taiwan’s own travel literature also scattered subtle and not-so-subtle attacks on 
the PRC around idyllic descriptions of Taiwan’s landmarks and attractions. Such political 
polemics were to be expected, considering that travel services in Taiwan were more 
closely associated with the national government than were comparable agencies in the 
United States. According to a TVA brochure, Taiwan’s capital of Taipei exuded “th  
pulse of the nation, the determination of the Chinese people to maintain their freedom, 
even though the great mainland is at present in the hands of the Communists.” Taiwan, 
furthermore, was “a demonstration of democracy in action, a prosperous pocketsize 
China, the achievement of free men who have a will to work – not industrial progress at 
the price of human slavery.”117 
Such Cold War imagery was not limited to travel literature. The Hamilton Wright 
Organization – a leading public relations firm that had gained prominence in the early 
twentieth century for turning Egypt’s pyramids into tourist attractions – worked on 
Taiwan’s behalf to produce a variety of promotional materials, including short films, 
photographs, and press releases. While the company promised that these “publicity 
campaigns” stayed “entirely clear of politics and ‘political propaganda’,” its objectives 
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were, nonetheless, to boost mutual understanding as well as foreign investment – both of 
which were strong “antidote[s] to communism.” Epitomizing the approach of the 
publicity firm, the tagline for one film on Taiwan, “Majestic Island,” read: “The story of 
a tiny part of China, the island of Taiwan, where Chinese tradition, expressed in love of 
home and country, still prevails free from Communist domination.”118 
Hamilton Wright, moreover, worked closely with Taiwan and U.S. officials in the 
promotion and development of a Taiwan tourism industry. Wright, for instance, was 
regularly in touch with ICA officials and had, at their request, added specific scene  to 
his 1958 documentary, “Fortress Formosa,” in order to depict Taiwan in a manner that 
better reflected U.S. interests. Wright seemed unfazed by the propagandistic aspects of 
his work, standing behind his films “even if we have to turn the place into a ‘Hollywood’ 
to create news.”119 In testimony before Congress, Wright fully acknowledged that his 
promotional material worked to “arouse public opinion in the United States . . . and to 
create a sympathetic understanding of Free China that would have dramatic imp ct on 
members of the United Nations and prevent the seating of Red China.”120  
Wright’s “productions” made significant inroads into the mainstream media. 
Universal-International Pictures distributed “Majestic Island” and other Hollywood 
studios such as Warner Brothers and Twentieth Century Fox routinely worked with the 
publicity firm. Writing to Assistant Secretary of Commerce Henry Kearns in May 1959, 
Wright boasted that his company had six “featurettes” currently showing in theaters 
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across the country. “Fortress Formosa,” for example, showed for seven weeks at N w 
York’s Radio City Music Hall. Hundreds of television stations ran Wright’s “short 
subjects.” The leading wire services, moreover, regularly distributed stories and 
photographs to leading media outlets. Hamilton Wright photographs and articles, 
consequently, appeared regularly in the travel columns of the New York Times, 
Washington Post, Life, and Time.121  
The luxury hotel, often the most explicit symbol of tourism’s presence, in itself 
also contributed to the political dialogue and shaped the Cold War consensus. On the one 
hand, these hotels served as a means of escape. In volatile or uncomfortable settings,
luxury hotels often served as the only source of refuge, familiarity, and leisure. As 
Annabel Jane Wharton writes, the Hilton hotel – in its various manifestations around the 
world – was literally “a little America.” Its manicured lawns, swimming pools, air-
conditioning, telephones, and familiar American delicacies, all combined to radiate “the 
new and powerful presence of the United States.” Advertisements, and the architcture 
itself, served to depict tourist hotels as dramatic examples of Western familiarity in the 
midst of an “alien territory.”122 Along these lines, Fortune magazine labeled the IHC 
Mandarin one of several “imperturbable oases in a clamorous world.”123 Similarly, 
commenting on a stay at Taiwan’s Grand Hotel, one travel writer noted that while the 
“Reds still shell the offshore islands…on Taiwan it’s as quiet as a butterfly in flight.”124  
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On the other hand, the men behind these hotels intended their structures to go 
beyond “insulation”; they built them to be bulwarks of American democracy and visible 
icons of U.S. containment. Conrad Hilton, in many ways the personification of the 
postwar travel boom, made this connection explicit: “An integral part of my dream was to 
show countries most exposed to Communism the other side of the coin – the fruits of the 
free world.”125 Similarly, in a letter to Henry Kearns encouraging government support in 
financing Hilton hotels overseas, executive vice president John Houser noted that 
“private American business…with appropriate help and guidance…is so important to the 
development of a peaceful and prosperous world.”126  
The same was true with commercial airlines. According to Pan American 
President Juan Trippe, the dramatic reduction in air travel costs in the post-World War II 
era was, in itself, a symbol of democracy, freeing most Americans from the “high walls 
of an economic jail.” But more than just contributing to the democratization of the 
country, airlines played a crucial role in the ongoing fight against communism. For the 
United States to be the leader of the free world, Trippe insisted that Americans needed to 
“know and understand foreign lands.” The very “survival of the free world,” in fact, was 
linked to increased commercial air routes across the Atlantic and Pacific and a 
commensurate increase in foreign travel.127 
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Writing in 1961 on the status of Hong Kong tourism, PATA executive director F. 
Marvin Plake commented: “almost every American…has firmly in his mind an image of 
what he will find in Hong Kong when his ship idles through the beautiful junk strewn 
harbor to tie up, or as his jet plane swoops down between the peaks onto one of the finest 
airfields in the Far East.”128 Due in large part to the efforts of PATA, Plake’s assessment 
was on point. With the rapid construction of hotels, expansion of air routes, and active 
involvement of local governments, tourism to the Far East grew at exponential rates. Still, 
relatively few Americans ever made it as far as Hong Kong’s harbors or airstrips, let 
alone the more obscure destination of Taiwan. The image of the Far East as a tourist
mecca, however, was readily available to tourists and armchair travelers alike. The 
creation and dissemination of these heterogeneous images throughout the American 
public space gave travelers and travel boosters a great deal of influence over popular 
opinion and, in turn, foreign relations. 
 The position of these touristic images in the context of the Cold War, however, 
was never standard. On the one hand, the purposefully politicized language and images of 
Caldwell, Hilton, Wright, and Trippe clearly complemented the Cold War rhetoric of top-
level officials in Washington. These individuals sought to use their positions within the 
travel industry to integrate tourists fully into international affairs and make them active 
agents of containment. On the other hand, the sense that the PRC was a true threat and 
that Taiwan and Hong Kong could, at any moment, fall behind the Bamboo Curtain, was 
tempered by depictions of calm landscapes, scenic beauty, and modern skylines. With 
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Americans understandably scared of nuclear war and communist takeover, it often prved 
easier and more effective to downplay the Cold War. Travelers, travel boosters and, in
turn, government officials, often seemed more interested in Taiwan and Hong Kong as 
“stepping stones” on tourist itineraries of the Far East than they did as bases for anti-PRC 
activity.  
The two sets of images were not wholly incompatible. The common link was that 
both presented Taiwan and Hong Kong as the true China. In the former group, authors, 
film producers, and architects made explicit arguments linking Taiwan and Ho g Kong to 
the cause of freedom, the steady sabotage of the PRC, and the success of the United 
States in the Cold War. In this manner, individual tourists traveling to “Free China” 
actively played a positive role in the ongoing Cold War. The latter group of images never 
designated tourists as vital actors in the Cold War, nor did it muddy Taiwan and Hong 
Kong tourism with references to warfare, East-West struggle, and containment. 
Nevertheless, merely by establishing Hong Kong and Taiwan as legitimate tourist 
destinations and showcasing their “Chinese-ness,” these images reinforced the idea that 
Taiwan and Hong Kong were as close to China as American tourists would get and that 
those destinations could, if need be, serve as culinary, aesthetic, and cultural substitutes 
for the real thing. 
Titles of travel articles on Taiwan and Hong Kong – which included “The Pieces 
of China that Border the Pacific,” “China in a Gray Flannel Suit, ” and “The Miniature 
Republic of China” – all point to this urge to find ersatz Chinas.129 A Department of 
Commerce tourism survey, likewise, recognized that “Chinese atmosphere” was a unique 
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and marketable asset in both Taiwan and Hong Kong, and it encouraged local businesses, 
guides, and travel agents to exploit it fully. The average tourist, the report noted, “does 
not know the real difference between what is Taiwanese, what is Chinese, and what is 
aboriginese. Experience seems to indicate, however, that tourists react favorably and are 
attracted to things Chinese, and these should be emphasized.” It encouraged future hotel 
construction to be “distinctly Chinese [italics in original] in architecture and design.”130 
Travel boosters should go further, “subsidizing traditional Chinese events, continuing to 
feature Chinese operas in promotional materials, and encouraging travel agents to 
schedule Chinese meals…for groups of tourists.” If tourists were seeking out “China,” 
Taiwan and Hong Kong travel officials were not about to disappoint them.131  
This effort to Sinicize these outposts of “Free China,” however, went only so far. 
Such characterizations often had more to do with maximizing tourist interest and dollars
than they did providing a means by which Taiwan or Hong Kong could actually 
counteract or undermine the PRC’s influence in the region. In Hong Kong in particular, 
because of the colony’s geographic proximity to the PRC, officials and travel promoters 
had to walk a fine line between highlighting the “Chinese-ness” of Hong Kong and 
implying that Hong Kong and the PRC were one and the same. To this end, the strategy 
of travel boosters was not intended to go so far as depicting Hong Kong as a bulwark 
against, or even an alternative to, the PRC. In fact, as discussed above, the trend in most 
travel guides was to use careful language to distinguish British Hong Kong from 
mainland China. The seemingly contradictory advice of highlighting Chinese attributes of 
Hong Kong while simultaneously distancing Hong Kong from China underscored that 
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travel boosters conceptualized Taiwan and Hong Kong’s relationships with the PRC in 
terms that appealed to tourists. Tourists had vague, romanticized, and likely inaccurate 
conceptions of a “Chinese” vacation and Taiwan and Hong Kong seemed to fit the bill. 
The only thing that would disrupt the exotic voyage, however, would be the potential 
“war danger” coming from the PRC.  
The ambiguity surrounding the image of tourism to Taiwan and Hong Kong again 
highlights the limitations of the Cold War in explaining the foreign relations of the post-
World War II period. While tensions with the PRC and the ongoing efforts of 
Washington to contain communism clearly reflected and influenced travelers’ 
perceptions and much of the travel discourse, those factors alone do not tell the whole 
story. Other motivations – outside the realm of Cold War – shaped public awareness, 
attitudes, and actions toward Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
 160 
 
Ch. 4 – Washington Takes a Leading Role: Tourism Policy and 
its Place in Cold War Containment, 1958-1961 
 
The friendly tourist, his camera slung over his shoulder and his travelers’ checks in his 
pocket, meets the people of other nations face to face. With acquaintance comes 
understanding. With understanding comes peace. More power to the tourist, the unofficial 
ambassador for us all.1 
 
-- Secretary of Commerce, Sinclair Weeks, February 1958 
 
I hold the strong conviction that tourism has deep significance for the peoples of the 
modern world, and that the benefits of travel can contribute to the cause of peace through 
improvement not only in terms of economic advancement but with respect to our 
political, cultural, and social relationships as well.2 
 
-- Clarence B. Randall, Report to the President of the United States, 1958 
 
Something happens to the spending habits of all tourists when they reach Hong Kong. 
Wallets fly open, purse-strings snap and money gushes forth in a golden shower. 
 
-- Gene Gleason, Hong Kong (1963) 
 
 
In Washington, just as had been the case in Hong Kong and Taipei, the dramatic 
rise of tourism to the Far East caught the attention of policymakers. While U.S. 
administrations since the end of World War II had incorporated tourism – to varying 
degrees – into their general foreign policy strategies, such efforts had been directed, for 
the most part, at Europe and the Caribbean. By the late 1950s, with Hong Kong, Japan, 
the Philippines, and Hawaii successfully challenging many European and Caribbean 
destinations in terms of the tourist market share, U.S. politicians and administration 
officials began directing more resources toward transpacific travel. 
This effort took several forms, many of which fit nicely within Washington’s 
Cold War arsenal. First and foremost, U.S. officials saw tourism to the Far East as n 
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economic strategy that would infuse local economies with stable U.S. currency. Just as
U.S. officials saw foreign aid as a useful means of strengthening foreign economies and 
fending off communism, so too did they see tourism as an economic bulwark. In regard 
to Taiwan and Hong Kong, the cultural and political repercussions of tourism played a 
part in Washington’s strategy as well. Bringing American tourists to these “alternative” 
Chinese destinations helped reinforce their legitimacy vis-à-vis the PRC and cemented 
transpacific sympathies and allegiance. 
There was a limit, however, to Washington’s incorporation of tourism into its 
containment policy or even policymakers’ ability or willingness to control the 
development and direction of international travel. The unwieldiness of tourism as a 
foreign policy tool emerged, in part, from the fact that U.S. and foreign leaders were 
hesitant, and often outright opposed, to co-opt or restrict travel for reasons of economic, 
strategic, or political self-interest. The recreational connotation surrounding tourism and 
the fact that American – and increasingly international – tourists embraced the activity as 
a vital component of modern life, made it very difficult for national governments to fit 
tourism neatly into their general foreign policy strategies. At times, thi  meant merely 
that American tourism, and the policies that encouraged it, failed to advance U.S. Cold 
War strategy in the Far East. But such discrepancies between travel, travel policy, and 
U.S. Cold War objectives, also meant that tourism could produce unexpected results that 







Paralleling the dramatic rise in Hong Kong and Taiwan governmental support for 
tourism, the U.S. government began to take a more proactive position on travel to the Far 
East and worked to incorporate tourism into its general foreign policy. Contributing to 
this was the fact that in the latter half of the 1950s, Americans, more than any other 
nationality, dominated the wave of transpacific travelers. American tourism to the Far 
East and Pacific grew at more than double the rate of tourism to Europe. Americans, 
moreover, made up roughly half of all tourists to Taiwan and around 35 percent of tourist 
traffic to Hong Kong. As of 1962, in the region as a whole (excluding Hawaii), 
Americans made up over 40 percent of all tourists and contributed more than half of all 
tourist expenditures.3 By comparison, while the actual number of American tourists to 
Europe was significantly higher, there were few European nations in which American 
tourists comprised more than 10 percent of total visitors.4 The numbers gave U.S. 
officials more incentive to influence the nature of transpacific tourism and plced 
additional responsibility on Washington to take a leading role in promoting, facilitating, 
and expanding tourism to the region.  
Within the Eisenhower administration, it was Clarence Randall, a member of the 
White House foreign economic policy team, who took the lead in shaping Washington’s 
approach to tourism as a function of U.S. foreign policy. Randall had experience in the 
                                                
3 “The Pacific: 70 Million Square Miles of Travel-Land,” Pacific Travel News, February 1958; Plake, 
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Wilkins, “Tourism: What is to Come,” New York Times, 13 December 1959. 
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field. Since the early years of the Eisenhower administration he had been a consistent 
voice for expanding the use of international travel. Though his early efforts never 
amounted to substantive reform, he received a boost in 1957 when New York Senator 
Jacob Javits included a brief and vague reference to a travel report in that year’s Mutual 
Security Act.  
The task of carrying out the report – which came with little funding – fell on 
Randall’s shoulders. In this capacity, Randall was to act as both a lobbyist and point man 
for international travelers. Though tourism circulated billions of dollars a year and was 
second only to war in producing international exchanges and interactions, its grouping of 
disparate actors – private airline and shipping companies, advertising agencies, fore gn 
governments, international travel associations, and individual tourists – made it difficult 
to formulate a coherent strategy for simplifying and expanding international rave . 
Compounding this disarray, numerous U.S. agencies – State, Commerce, Treasury, ICA, 
and USIA – all had various interests in and suggestions for overseas travel policy. 
Randall worked to consolidate, publicize, and pursue the agendas and strategies of these 
diverse and disconnected actors, many of whom were struggling to get their voices heard.  
The final report, which Randall presented to Eisenhower in April 1958, provided 
a comprehensive outline of tourism’s place in U.S. foreign policy and, more or less, 
dictated the administration’s policy in this regard.5 The integration of tourism into foreign 
policy was not an exact science but Randall saw benefits to be gained in severalareas of 
international relations. First and foremost, tourism was to be a powerful vehicle for 
economic exchange. By 1957 American tourists as a whole were spending almost $2 
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billion outside of the United States. This money had a similar effect as foreign aid; 
tourism, however, served as a voluntary, fun, and seemingly limitless way of distribut ng 
U.S. currency overseas. Extolling this theme, a popular slogan within the Eisenhower 
administration became, “vacations not donations.”6   
Tourism boosted the U.S. domestic economy as well. By the late 1950s, roughly 
one-sixth of the money that American tourists spent on their vacations went to American 
companies like Pan Am, APL, Hilton, and American Express. Even money that did not 
go directly to American companies often made its way back to the United States; with the 
influx of U.S. tourist dollars, foreign nations had far more purchasing power, providing 
new customers for American manufacturers and farmers. In an informational 
advertisement, Pan Am played up this point, noting that “tourist dollars spent abroad” 
filled millions of Americans’ paychecks at home. Taking this theme to the pointof 
hyperbole, the advertisement concluded, “all [italics in original] tourist dollars come back 
to the U.S.A.”7 
Beyond the economic potential of international travel, Randall pointed to the 
cultural and political ramifications of tourism. On the cultural front, Randall noted that 
tourism – more so than any form of communications media – had the ability to enrich the 
lives of both traveler and host. Building on the successes of the International Educational 
Exchange and People-to-People programs, Randall noted that recreational tourists c ld 
reach components of the world that military bases, economic aid programs, and political 
summits could not touch. As improving international opinion of the United States became 
more central to U.S. Cold War strategy, policymakers turned to charming yet effective 
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forms of soft power such as tourism. In addition to strengthening bonds at the grassroots 
level, Randall also hoped that increased overseas tourism would bolster Washington’s 
political friendships with critical governments. Referencing Germany, Japan, and, 
notably, the USSR, Randall argued that tourism could serve the cause of world peace: 
“Prejudices will soften, and it will become clear that no man at heart reallywishes to 
destroy his fellow man.”8 
Eisenhower immediately embraced Randall’s report and urged cabinet officials 
and Congress to continue this work.9 Following the release of the report, Assistant 
Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs Henry Kearns establi hed the 
Interdepartmental Travel Policy Committee. The Committee – including members from 
Commerce, State, Treasury, Agriculture, USIA, ICA, the Export-Import Bank, the 
Development Loan Fund, and numerous industry insiders – primarily addressed the 
recommendations of Randall’s report and attempted to bring them to fruition. Commerce 
officials, for example, soon ran with the ideas of raising the duty-free limit for returning 
American tourists to $1,000, lowering the costs of passport fees, and extending the 
validity of U.S. passports.10 
Congress, too, had moderate success on this front. In 1958 the Senate and the 
House both presented bills to raise the duty-free limit to $1,000 and both bills received 
strong support from the White House.11 The move to encourage more spending overseas, 
however, once again came up short. Despite minor setbacks, policymakers – led most 
                                                
8 Randall, “Report to the President of the United States: International Travel,” 17 April 1958, General 
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noticeably by Senator Jacob Javits, who served as Randall’s congressional liaison 
throughout the tenure of the travel study – made strides on the facilitation front. 
Eisenhower soon signed into law legislation allowing tourist literature to be imported to 
the United States without tariffs and extending the length of passport validity from two to 
three years.12 
One of the primary obstacles to outbound tourism, from the perspective of 
government travel boosters, was the shortage of suitable hotel rooms overseas. Randall 
included a lengthy discussion of hotel shortages – “one of the most formidable barriers to 
international travel” – in his report.13 In other memoranda on the subject, officials 
depicted hotel construction not only as a means of stimulating foreign investment and 
attracting more U.S. tourist dollars; the growth of American hotels overseas would also 
“add dignity and prestige” to the host country in question.14 
Recognition of the hotel shortage problem was not, however, anything new in the 
late 1950s. PATA, for one, had argued since its inception that hotel development was the
key to a successful tourism industry in the region. Going back even further, Conrad 
Hilton recalled State and Commerce officials approaching him shortly after the nd of 
World War II, suggesting that overseas hotel development could prove beneficial in 
stimulating American travel and trade. Juan Trippe, as well, met with Commerce and 
Export-Import Banks officials in 1956 to discuss government assistance in financing the 
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Intercontinental Hotel Corporation (IHC). At the time, however, congressional opposition 
hindered any broad-based policy of government support.15 
Randall and Kearns succeeded in reversing the trend and moved the Eisenhower 
administration toward more active participation in overseas hotel development. Working 
closely with private businessmen, Washington officials leveraged U.S. lending 
institutions – such as the Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan Fund – to 
provide more loans for overseas hotel projects. Kearns was in regular contact with John 
Houser of Hilton International and Juan Trippe and seemed willing to offer the hotel 
companies as much assistance as possible. As a sign of the rapid progress, at a 1959 
subcommittee meeting on hotel financing, a representative of the Export-Import Bank 
noted it was currently reviewing nineteen loan applications from IHC and would be 
moving forward with them shortly.16 
Randall’s report also urged U.S. officials to expand their involvement in 
international tourism associations, a recommendation that U.S. officials acted on quickly. 
Predating the release of Randall’s report by a few years, the United Stat s delegation to 
PATA – represented by Commerce officials – became an active member (as opposed to 
merely an observer). But Randall, concerned that U.S. officials still did “not exercise 
sufficient initiative in these organizations,” wanted to make sure Washington maintained 
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and strengthened its esteemed position in these forums.17 Foreign delegates were usually 
more than happy to oblige. Randall’s report proved extremely popular overseas – 
especially in areas likely to benefit from an increase in American tourism – and the 
Eisenhower administration sent copies to hundreds of posts around the world. There was, 
moreover, a notable bump in Washington’s involvement in PATA following the release 
of the White House report. Officials within the State and Commerce Departments 
regularly sent instructions to PATA’s U.S. delegation with draft speeches and policy 
objectives. By the end of the 1950s the U.S. delegation comprised by far the largest and 
strongest influence in the organization.18 
 
II 
As demonstrated by the central role played by Clarence Randall and the 
Department of Commerce, in the late 1950s the biggest change that developed in U.S. 
tourism policy toward the Far East was that it developed an economic basis. Despite 
some modest efforts to integrate recreational tourism into the agenda of the Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), for the first ten years following the end 
of World War II American tourism to the region never amounted to a major financial 
stimulus, especially when compared to travel to western Europe or Latin America. That 
changed dramatically as ships, planes, and hordes of tourists traversed the Pacific Ocean 
in search of East Asian destinations. Numerous Far Eastern economies suffered from 
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either significant balance-of-payments deficits or heavy dependency on U.S. foreign aid. 
Because of these economic vulnerabilities, and the fact that the region had not yet 
enjoyed the massive influx of tourist dollars that had already blessed European and Latin 
American economies, such an economic benefit seemed all the more important.  
Hong Kong’s economy, in particular, was poised to benefit greatly from 
American tourism. For one, of all the emerging tourist destinations in the Far East and 
Pacific, Hong Kong suffered from the heaviest trade imbalance with the Unitd States; 
the 1958 figures placed the deficit at $268 million.19 At the same time, Hong Kong 
consistently ranked alongside Hawaii as the leading recipient of tourist expenditur s in 
the Far East and Pacific. As of the late 1950s the average American was spending $800 
during his trip to Hong Kong, of which $700 was designated for purchases to be taken 
home (as opposed to hotels, transportation, entertainment, or food). With this trend only 
increasing, Hong Kong could theoretically erode a sizable portion of its trade imbalance 
by simply bringing in more American tourists.20 
Aside from closing Hong Kong’s dollar gap and stabilizing the local economy, 
Commerce officials saw tourism as a means of eliminating, or at least minimizing, 
competition from Hong Kong’s manufacturing sector. By the late 1950s Hong Kong had 
developed an impressive textile industry that employed nearly half of the colony’s 
industrial workers. As American importers eagerly purchased the cheaper goods, the 
stage was set for a clash between Hong Kong manufacturers and the 2.5 million 
Americans in the U.S. textile industry. London officials, equally concerned about the 
flood of cheap textiles entering the British market and damaging the economy of 
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Lancashire, had only recently convinced Hong Kong manufacturers to place voluntary 
restrictions on their exports. Following suit, the Commerce Department and American 
union leaders started to discuss trade restrictions of their own and there was strong 
pressure on the Eisenhower administration to take a firm stand against Hong Kong trade 
practices. 
Though the British colony had, for the most part, been an economic ally of the 
U.S., offering lukewarm support and cooperation in enforcing the economic embargo 
against the PRC, the conflict over textile exports and rumblings of further trade 
restrictions – which seemed to be less about Cold War security concerns and more about 
domestic political pressure – brought latent tensions to the surface.21 Reaction was swift 
and fierce from Hong Kong. Industrialists, manufacturers, and colony officials 
preemptively rejected any additional export restrictions and denied assertion  that Hong 
Kong textiles seriously undermined the American industry. Invoking U.S. containment 
policy, one editorial noted that Hong Kong had already suffered a great deal by 
“faithfully observing the trade embargo.” Hong Kong’s garment industry, the aricle 
continued, provided subtle support for Washington’s Cold War strategy, serving as an 
incredible attractant for PRC refugees who comprised a significant portion of Hong Kong 
factory workers.22 One Hong Kong resident went as far as linking the Chinese refugee 
workers to the survival of the free world: “These mill workers are in their own way the 
hard core of Chinese resistance to the blandishments and brutalities of Communism.” 
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This crucial line of defense, he warned, “ought not to be weakened now by any monetary 
or commercial considerations.”23  
But monetary and commercial considerations were certainly on the minds of U.S. 
officials. In early 1959 Henry Kearns was traveling throughout Asia, attending both the 
ECAFE meeting in Bangkok and PATA’s conference in Singapore. In light of the 
ongoing trade dispute, Kearns made a stop in Hong Kong as well. But Kearns’s intere t 
went beyond U.S.-Hong Kong trade. As was already apparent by the late 1950s, Hong 
Kong was an incredibly appealing tourist destination for American travelers and Kearns – 
serving as point man for the U.S. delegations in PATA and IUOTO – had been one of the 
administration’s most dedicated proponents of expanding Far East tourism. To Kearns, 
the tourism issue seemed to offer a partial resolution to the conflict over textiles. If Hong 
Kong diversified its export economy in a way that placed more focus and invested more 
resources into tourism, there would likely be less pressure on American textile
manufacturers, who felt they were being undermined by foreign competition.24 T  this 
end, while in Hong Kong Kearns held several meetings with different representativ s of 
the garment industry to discuss the growing trade dispute. He met, as well, with HKTA 
executives and other members of Hong Kong’s tourism industry.25 
In a second trip to Hong Kong in November 1959, Kearns again fused the two 
industries. In the months before he left Washington Kearns met with representatives from 
                                                
23 Y. B. Low, “Restriction of Hong Kong Exports,” South China Morning Post, 17 February 1959, in 
General Records of the Department of Commerce, Entry #176, Box 4, NARA. 
24 British officials were not oblivious to this aspect of tourism. At the 1962 PATA conference, H.D.M. 
Barton of Jardine Matheson noted that tourism – aside from bringing in hundreds of millions of dollars a 
year – “seems to be the only important trade in which we can indulge without making ourselves thoroughly 
unpopular.” Barton quoted in “Conference Charts Goals for Booming Tourist Industry,” Pacific Travel 
News, February 1962. 
25 Address by Henry Kearns to the Committee on Trade and Trade Developments, Economic Commission 
for Asia and the Far East, 6 February 1959, General Records of the Department of Commerce, Entry #176, 
Box 4, NARA. 
 172 
 
IHC, who briefed the Assistant Secretary of Commerce on the progress of hotels 
throughout Asia as well as their potential impact on the U.S. and international economy. 
On his trip he planned to put “additional pressure” on local governments to support IHC 
projects.26 Invoking the dramatic increase in American tourism to Hong Kong over the 
past few years, while trying to downplay the likelihood of U.S. trade restrictions, Kearns 
announced to Hong Kong reporters that Washington’s goal was “the expansion, not the 
contraction, of U.S. economic relations with Hong Kong.”27  
Kearns’s proposal to substitute tourism for textiles was not just a matter of 
reconciling U.S.-Hong Kong relations with domestic labor concerns. At a more basic 
level, Kearns was urging Hong Kong manufacturers to recognize the emerging realities in 
their economy. Tourism, not textile production, was the future of the colony, and Hong 
Kong workers and government officials needed to embrace that industry. The tourism 
trade, which Kearns noted had “very important income producing possibilities,” would 
benefit Hong Kong as well.28 He made sure to point out that the potential income to be 
gained from the “American tourist traveling abroad…is potentially greate  than that of 
direct exports to the United States.” The numbers, in fact, already supported Kearns’s 
argument. By 1958, tourism had become Hong Kong’s largest “export.” In terms of total 
impact on Hong Kong’s government revenue, tourism accounted for $67 million (29 
percent) while cotton (Hong Kong’s single largest export) earned just over half of that 
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figure.29 Focusing specifically on the United States, American travelers provided Hong 
Kong with $33 million a year while all other Hong Kong exports to the U.S. brought in a 
combined $36 million. 
 
III 
Offering a stark contrast to Washington’s travel policy toward Hong Kong, U.S. 
officials never anticipated Taiwan tourism to be a major revenue booster. Despite 
extraordinary gains in tourist numbers in the years after 1957, expenditures remained 
paltry. Each of the 26,000 international visitors who traveled to Taiwan between 1958 
and 1959, for example, spent an average of only $50 over the length of their stay, totaling 
just over $1 million in tourist expenditures for the year. Even taking into account the 
turnover of tourist dollars, the money generated from international tourism accounted for 
well under 1 percent of Taiwan’s national income.30 Thus, while Taiwan, like Hong 
Kong, suffered from a significant balance-of-payments deficit in the post-World War II 
period, it was direct foreign military and economic assistance, not tourism, that offered 
the best solution. 
Though tourism never allowed Taiwan to close its dollar gap or dramatically 
diversify its economy, U.S. officials nonetheless saw a place for it in Washington’s 
foreign economic policy. As opposed to using tourism to help wean Taiwan off foreign 
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assistance, U.S. officials worked to integrate Taiwan’s tourism development into 
Washington’s technical assistance and foreign aid programs.31 The most dramatic 
example of Washington’s effort in this regard was the development and completion of a 
Pacific and Far East tourism survey, a joint effort between the U.S. Commerce 
Department and PATA that would become one of the major government contributions to 
mass travel.32  
The need for a comprehensive survey of the tourism potential of the region had 
been on the minds of travel promoters for some time. Members of PATA frequently 
voiced concern that they were approaching the problem of tourism development with 
blinders on, unaware of what work needed to be done and how it could be accomplished. 
PATA delegates, at their 1956 conference, had first announced “a clear and urgent need” 
for an independent survey on the region’s tourist potential. Two years later, delegates 
unanimously approved a resolution on the project.33 In both its scope and its intended 
impact, the proposed survey was unprecedented. PATA had produced a handful of 
research and statistics bulletins beginning in 1954, but they did not offer any 
comprehensive conclusions about tourism in the region nor did they offer a grand 
strategy for future action. Similarly, some European travel associations had carried out 
small-scale, regional tourism surveys, but the reports did not dramatically alter 
government or private tourism policies toward the region. 
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With unanimous support for the survey within PATA, funding became the major 
obstacle. While the association’s budget had risen substantially throughout the 1950s, in 
1957 PATA was still a relatively poor organization. Its budget that year, for example, 
was only $60,000, almost all of which was dedicated to publicity. Airline and shipping 
companies, moreover, were “bearing the chief burden” of private advertising for the 
region and thus could not afford to spend any more money until the Far East became 
more of a tourist magnet.34 Considering that a preliminary report by the Stanford 
Research Institute placed the total cost of a tourist survey at nearly $250,000, PATA 
officials were justified in their budget jitters.35  
To fund the survey PATA officials turned to Washington and U.S. officials 
quickly warmed to the idea. Most U.S. travel officials pointed to the practicality of the 
survey. For years, they had complained that the lack of statistics on tourism to the Pacific 
and the Far East was one of the primary reasons that those regions lagged so far behind 
Europe and the Caribbean. With the falling prices of air and cruise fares, officials were 
sure that Americans could afford the trip across the Pacific. In what was by then a 
commonly cited statistic, a travel consultant for the Commerce Department noted that 
since Americans were, at that time, spending $1500 on a trip to Europe, and because the 
cost of a trip to the Far East was under $1000, there was “no financial barrier to a 
vacation in the Pacific area.”36 But without accurate data, it was impossible to track 
trends, assess the ebb and flow of tourist traffic, and document the economic benefitsof 
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tourism to specific destinations. The survey seemed especially important in locales like 
Taiwan, where the local tourism industry was significantly underdeveloped. While
officials were yet to be convinced that the survey could actually solve the problems of 
Taiwan tourism, it would, at the least, bring official attention to those problems and, in 
the process, publicize tourism on the island.37 
Beyond its use in compiling statistics, the survey became a sizable component of 
Washington’s technical assistance program. Since 1955 the ICA, which eventually 
funded the survey, had been looking to fund regional projects that would address 
economic or institutional development in Asia.38 The proposed survey project filled that 
need. By providing host governments with the technical know-how to formulate long-
range plans for tourism development, the survey supplemented Taiwan’s economic and 
industrial growth.39 Members of the Interdepartmental Travel Policy Committee agreed, 
calling the proposed survey the “most important recent development” in Washington’s 
technical assistance program.40 
Underscoring this dimension of the survey, ICA drew funds for the survey from 
the President’s Special Fund for Asian Economic Development, a fund that first emerged 
in the 1954 Mutual Security Act. Ten of the seventeen countries covered by the proposed 
survey were, in fact, already receiving assistance under the Mutual Security program and 
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U.S. officials saw the project as a means of expanding such aid.41 The other countries and 
territories, including Hong Kong, New Zealand, Australia, Tahiti, Singapore, New 
Caledonia, and Fiji, were not part of the “Arc of Free Asia,” as described in discuss ons 
surrounding the Mutual Security Act, and thus were not receiving technical assistance 
from the United States. Policymakers justified this inconsistency, however, pointing to 
the regional, interconnected framework of Far East and Pacific tourism. Because the 
average American traveler visited several countries in the region in the courseof a ingle 
vacation, the “aid-receiving countries would receive very little benefit fromthe survey 
unless an integrated project including most of the countries of the region were 
completed.”42 
The presence of non-foreign aid nations in the survey was, however, a sticking 
point for many U.S. policymakers. It seemed illogical for the U.S. to subsidize tourism 
development in “relatively wealthy” locales like Australia or Hong Kong. Other 
individuals voiced criticism over what they saw as governmental favoritism toward the 
foreign tourism industry. To them, the survey was merely another sign that Washington 
officials were subsidizing one-way travel from the U.S. at the expense of those whose 
livelihood depended on the domestic tourism market.43 More generally, tourism still 
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invoked a connotation of recreation and luxury. Despite the overwhelming evidence that 
international travel could stabilize and stimulate foreign economies, many officials were 
hesitant to place tourism on the same level as agricultural, industrial, and trade 
development.44 As late as March 1958, ICA officials were still debating whether it was 
even appropriate for their agency to pursue the issue tourism development.45 
Concerns about the survey, however, failed to halt its momentum. In June 1958 
ICA transferred $150,000 to the Commerce Department.46 Commerce – which served as 
the U.S. liaison with PATA – proceeded to negotiate a contract with Checchi and 
Company, a private economic consulting firm that would actually produce the tourism 
survey. Following a preliminary stage of data-gathering, Checchi completed an “attitude 
survey” of 1,500 “upper-income respondents” in U.S. and Canadian cities to determine 
the interest of North Americans in visiting the Far East and Pacific. Respondents 
explained their reasons for traveling to the region, ranked their destinations of preference, 
and assessed their primary concerns. Fieldwork followed, spanning from January 1959 to 
May 1960 and covering seventeen countries and territories in three phases. The 
Commerce Department published the completed survey in 1961 and PATA officials 
presented the results at the following year’s conference.47 
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Following the completion of the Commerce survey, and indeed in an effort to 
carry out its recommendations, ICA worked to improve substantively Taiwan’s touri m 
potential. The decision on the part of ICA to move forward with substantive development 
projects was significant. As mentioned above, there was noticeable hesitation among ICA 
officials to get too deeply involved in tourism development and many saw the survey as 
an end in itself. Director James Smith lowered expectations early on; he announced that 
ICA participation in the survey “would not imply any commitment…in carrying out 
survey recommendations.”48 
Despite these caveats, in 1961 ICA dedicated around $1 million to Taiwan for 
various projects of tourism promotion. The bulk of this, roughly $925,000 was part of a 
counterpart loan to fund the construction of the new National Palace Museum in Taipei. 
U.S. Ambassador Everett Drumright, ICA, and a special committee established by the 
Nationalist government, led the campaign to secure the loan for the museum. The Palace 
Museum addressed the lack of manmade, enticing tourist attractions in Taiwan. The 
collection of nearly 250,000 pieces of priceless Chinese art, which remained mostly 
hidden in caves near Taichung, could serve as a unique and substantial means of 
attracting foreign travelers.49 Based on coverage in travel guides and advertisements, it 
seemed to do the trick. The Palace collection became a focal point on tourist itineraries; 
within a few months of opening, three out of four tourists to the island visited the 
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museum. Countless advertisements and every travel guide in the 1960s, moreover, urged 
travelers to make a visit. McKay’s Guide noted that the artwork was “worth a trip to 
Taiwan in itself.” A TTC advertisement, listing the reasons that American travelers 
should visit Taiwan, heralded the collection, “Asia’s greatest collection of arttre sures.” 
Pacific Travel News raved that there were now “243,639 reasons to visit Taiwan.”50  
The remainder of the ICA funds went toward various organizational and 
promotional matters that would be required to facilitate “the movement and handling of 
tourists.”51 In 1961, for example, officials provided a $65,000 loan to the Taiwan 
Handicraft Promotion Center (THPC), a nascent organization that promoted the Taiwan 
souvenir and handicraft industry. The THPC worked closely with the Taipei Retail Store 
and brought truckloads of souvenirs to cruise and air passengers arriving in Taiwan. In 
“Operation Kungsholm,” named for the Swedish American Line ship that docked at 
Keelung, the Retail Store brought in about $2,000 in one day.52  
The ICA funding was, in the end, quite puny, especially when compared to 
military and political aid. By the early 1960s, however, these latter sources of aid were 
drying up quickly.53 Taiwan officials hoped their intensified tourist program would attract 
more Americans to the island and saw ICA development loans as means of 
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supplementing other forms of U.S. financial support. On top of this, U.S. officials 
predicted that as recreational tourism to Taiwan increased, it would offer enormous 
economic opportunities for the island nation. The minor successes of the THPC, for 
instance, gave U.S. and Taiwan officials confidence that tourism would dramaticlly 
boost Taiwan’s domestic economy. Citing figures from the Commerce Department 
survey, moreover, U.S. officials pointed out that drawing in American travelers – th ough 
reputable attractions like the National Palace Museum – had the potential to bring in 
“sizable foreign exchange earnings.” If Taiwan boosted its tourism industry, the 
government could bring in about $425 million (multiplier-effect taken into account) in 
annual national revenue.54  
While the anticipated economic gains for Taiwan were respectable and not wholly
unrealistic, they were still a distant goal. Recognizing that it would many years before 
tourism revenue ever comprised more than a small fraction of the Taiwan economy, U.S. 
involvement with Taiwan tourism did “not address a priority activity directly concerned 
with economic development.”55 More significant from the perspective of Washington 
officials were the political and cultural benefits that tourism promotion seemed to offer. 
Embassy officials in Taiwan “repeatedly emphasized” that the willingness of the 
Nationalist government to dedicate funding to “cultural and sociological (as contrasted to 
military) purposes” fit nicely with the 1958 Jiang-Dulles Communiqué, which worked to 
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renounce the use of force in “liberating” mainland China.56 More importantly, tourism 
development served as a reaffirmation of the cultural legitimacy of Taiwan and 
“boost[ed] the world-wide prestige of [the] GRC [Nationalist Government].”57  
This cultural-political approach to Taiwan tourism applied equally to Hong Kong. 
Officials hoped to use Hong Kong as a  “show window” for American visitors in order to 
counteract the successful propaganda coming from the PRC and as a portal through 
which American values and styles could creep behind the Bamboo Curtain.58 These 
efforts to build up “Free China” as a counterpoint to the PRC gained even more traction 
in the 1960s as Mao’s regime moved from its Great Leap Forward to Cultural 
Revolution, both of which heightened tensions between Washington and Beijing and 
renewed fears about the future of Taiwan and Hong Kong. Just as policymakers had 
approached American cultural exchange participants largely in terms of their impact on 
the “hearts and minds” of their hosts as well as Americans, they saw the increase of 
recreational tourists in Taiwan and Hong Kong as a passive and non-propagandistic 
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As suggested by the economic, cultural, and political benefits of recreational 
travel, tourism to the region offered clear possibilities in the realm of direct containment 
of the Communist regime. Surprisingly, however, explicit efforts to integrate F r East 
tourism into Cold War strategy maintained a low priority. Washington’s interest in 
promoting tourism to Hong Kong, for example, seemed to be centered more on the 
emerging trade dispute issue – which only tangentially related to the Sino-American 
conflict – than it did in undermining the PRC or shaping Hong Kong into an “alternative” 
China. It is worth noting, as well, that neither Clarence Randall’s report nor the 
Commerce Department’s survey located international travel within the context f Cold 
War containment. Randall, in fact, saw his report as an extension of his previous work 
within the Eisenhower administration, through which he sought an across-the-board 
reduction in the trade and travel restrictions that were curtailing the free flow of goods 
and ideas. It is quite telling that the Randall report concluded with a recommendation to 
use tourism as a means of lessening U.S.-Soviet tensions.59 
Nonetheless, in 1958 the Eisenhower administration – in an effort to establish 
tourism as a bulwark against PRC diplomatic recognition – forwarded a resolution in he 
IUOTO to limit membership only to those nations currently belonging to the UN, a move 
that would have effectively disqualified the PRC, North Korea, North Vietnam, East 
Germany, and Outer Mongolia. U.S. policymakers made clear that “keeping the 
unrecognized Communist regimes…out of international organizations is a foreign policy 
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matter to which great importance is attached by the President and Secretary Dulles.”60 
Concurrently, U.S. representatives pushed for admission of Taiwan – already an ctive 
member of PATA – to the IUOTO. While the move to bring Taiwan into the international 
body succeeded, U.S. representatives failed to get any support for the proposal t  ban the 
PRC and other communist nations.61 
The botched effort was not immediately significant. None of the communist 
nations had shown any interest in joining the IUOTO and thus the failed resolution was 
somewhat of a moot point. But State Department officials were concerned that these 
nations, especially those in Asia, might make moves to enter these forums in the future. 
To prevent such a development from arising, the State Department provided detailed 
instructions to U.S. delegates. Should a proposal come forward, the Department proposed 
an aggressive statement announcing that it was “unthinkable” that an organization lke 
the IUOTO, with its inherent commitment to the objectives of the United Nations, would 
“even consider an application from a regime which departs drastically from normally 
accepted standards of international conduct.”62 
More than anything else, the State Department’s failed resolution highlighted that 
there was little support for efforts by U.S. or foreign officials to use tourism a  a form of 
containment. Within the IUOTO, many foreign delegations insisted that the forum should 
remain non-political and therefore should not apply foreign policy considerations to 
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membership qualifications.63 Even from Washington’s perspective, much of this effort to 
integrate tourism fully into Cold War strategy was, in the end, largely symbolic. Despite 
rhetoric to the contrary, most officials recognized that that tourism was not, 
quintessentially, a “free world” activity. While one could argue that the PRChad a 
negligible record on tourism, IUOTO members included the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia – both of which had sizeable tourism industries. In the 1950s and 1960s even 
Taiwan, despite its position on the U.S. side of the Bamboo Curtain, could hardly be 
called free and democratic. U.S. officials, moreover, seemed to be annoyed with the 
Nationalist government’s obsession with communism and national security in its 
development of a tourism industry and feared that the Taiwan delegation would bring this 
baggage into the international tourism forums. Worse yet, Taiwan’s recalcitrant position 
likely would be tied back to the United States, weakening Washington’s position in the 
arena of international travel.  
This was not as large a concern within PATA. As mentioned above, the U.S. 
played a more dominant role in that body and PATA delegates demonstrated a consistent 
– though perhaps muted – respect for Washington’s Cold War strategy. The IUOTO was 
a different matter. The IUOTO was centered in Europe – both physically and culturally – 
and while the U.S. continued to serve as the major supplier and receiver of transatlantic 
tourists, it never achieved a commensurate leadership role in the organization. Such a 
position gave the U.S. less opportunity to use tourism as a weapon of containment and 
meant that U.S. officials could not afford any additional drama from the Taiwan 
delegation. Joseph Rand, assistant to Clarence Randall, pointed out that the top priority of 
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IUOTO delegates was the advancement of tourism and they were “intolerant” toward 
political matters such as PRC membership.64 Even when meeting with IUOTO delegates 
from “iron curtain countries,” Rand found that discussions were “apolitical” and 
“confined…to tourism.”65 Taking a cue from these conversations, Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce Henry Kearns was certain that a “continuation of the ‘China Position’ 
[denying the PRC membership in the IUOTO] into another year will bring co siderable 
embarrassment to the United States Delegation and will probably result in a decline in 
United States influence.”66 
Washington’s ambivalent approach toward PRC membership highlighted that 
U.S. tourism policy often diverged from strategic and political objectives of the Cold 
War. Beyond concerns that a hard line anti-PRC position could sap U.S. influence on 
international tourism, the proliferation of tourism itself added complexities to 
Washington’s containment policy. Most broadly, Washington’s approach toward Taiwan 
and Hong Kong tourism implied that U.S. officials accepted the permanence of the 
Nationalist government in Taiwan and the seclusion of Western influence on the 
mainland in Hong Kong. While Nationalist officials were always hesitant to undertake 
any long-term development in Taiwan because of its implications on the Chinese civil 
war, U.S. officials were explicitly establishing Taiwan as the economic, military, and 
cultural home of China. 
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More specifically, tourism and tourism revenue continued to complicate 
Washington’s embargo policy. Tourism, no doubt, worked to strengthen the Hong Kong 
economy. This, in turn, made the British colony less vulnerable to PRC subversion. 
When combined with the dramatic increase in tourism, moreover, Washington-sponsored 
purchase restrictions – though technically detrimental to Hong Kong – actually worked to 
diversify Hong Kong’s domestic economy. In 1950 only 25 percent of Hong Kong 
exports originated in the colony but by 1962 – due to the continuing inability of colony 
officials to trade actively with neighboring China or sell PRC-made goods to other 
nations – around 70 percent were manufactured locally.67 Beyond diversification, tourism 
contributed to a third of Hong Kong’s non-trade foreign exchange and made the colony 
an economic dynamo. Taken in sum, the economic vitality in Hong Kong was of great 
value to the PRC; the idea of undermining the economy of Hong Kong by invasion or 
absorption seemed counterproductive. Recognizing this symbiotic relationship, 
Washington officials – despite significant concerns about the long-term prospects of the 
British colony – consistently believed that the economic and strategic benefits of Hong 
Kong made a PRC attack unlikely.68 
These same economic figures that protected Hong Kong from PRC attack also, 
when viewed from a different perspective, underscored the significant holes in 
Washington’s economic containment policy. The influx of tourists to a destination that 
maintained such proximity (physical, economic, cultural, and political) to the PRC,
threatened to provide unanticipated and undesirable benefits to the Communist regime. 
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This would have been true for any vacation destination that bordered the PRC, but Hong 
Kong was even more of a liability because of its reputation as a “shopper’s paradise.” 
Every travel brochure and article included an almost obligatory reference to th  “24-hour 
suit shops” and the “duty-free bargains.” Art Buchwald remarked that the tourist received 
his first fitting by his hotel’s bell captain.69 Shopping, indeed, was the most popular 
activity for tourists in Hong Kong with two-thirds of expenditures going to such 
purchases. According to a 1966 HKTA survey, over 60 percent of tourists admitted to 
doing nothing on their vacation aside from shopping and eating in hotel restaurants.70 
These figures meant significant expenditures; by the early 1960s American tourists in 
Hong Kong were annually spending approximately $30 million on visible purchases 
alone.71  
While the Comprehensive Certificate of Origin (CCO) system – which aimed to 
keep U.S. dollars out of the PRC economy by requiring that American consumers prove 
overseas purchases did not originate in the PRC – was firmly in place by the time that 
Hong Kong experienced its late 1950s tourism boom, the dramatic increase in tourism 
and tourist dollars made it increasingly difficult for U.S. officials to apply embargo 
policies in an effective way. The CCO process was burdensome. Travel writer Gene 
Gleason referred to the system as a “recurrent pain in the neck” for American tourists. 
Some confused Hong Kong shop owners gave up on the CCOs altogether, focusing 
exclusively on non-American shoppers.72  
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U.S. officials and private travel boosters worried that American tourists would 
follow suit, either violating purchase restrictions or choosing to bypass Hong K 
entirely. To remedy this, the private tourism industry, along with Hong Kong and U.S. 
officials, worked together to acclimate American tourists to the complex set of
restrictions. Eve Meyers, a regular contributor to Pacific Travel News toured Hong Kong 
shops and provided details to travel agents on which shops were conducive to American 
shoppers. Referring to one promising shop, Meyers noted that American tourists could 
“go wild as certificates of origin are issued on everything sold there.”73 In discussions 
with Hong Kong tourism officials, Kearns urged organizations like the HKTA to further 
their efforts to make the whole certificate process easier for touris s to comply with and 
understand.74 Moving forward with this request, HKTA issued a free pamphlet, “What 
U.S. Citizens (and Visitors to the United States) Must Know About Buying Chinese-Type 
Goods in Hong Kong,” which attempted to explain the CCO process.75 HKTA, moreover, 
offered its support to any local business willing to comply with the new policies. “An 
extremely attractive membership seal,” provided by HKTA to cooperative local 
businesses, allowed tourists to shop with confidence.76 HKTA’s involvement discouraged 
tourists, as much as possible, from visiting non-sanctioned shops, many of which sold 
bogus certificates or convinced naïve shoppers that such documentation was 
unnecessary.77  
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More than adding paperwork and confusion to the tourism process, the CCO 
system was not entirely effective. Hefty purchases by large American companies were 
easy enough to track. In May 1963, for example, the Hong Kong Hilton, which had 
opened only a month earlier, faced scrutiny from Washington officials over $100,000 
worth of Chinese screens, tapestries, scroll paintings, bronze statues, and other interior 
decorations – all of which had origins on the mainland of China. Unable to keep the 
decorations on display and unable to sell them back to the PRC (which would have 
consequently violated the Trading With the Enemy Act), Hilton executives transfered 
the items to various warehouses in Hong Kong. To fill the empty wall space, hotel 
executives looked to local Chinese artisans, “with respectable ideological background,” 
to create replacements.78  
But for smaller purchases and for less conspicuous consumers, there were ways to 
get around the purchase and import restrictions. Customs agents were unlikely to prss 
“average-looking” tourists on their purchases or written declarations. J. D. Chen, a Ho g 
Kong art dealer, boasted that casual tourists had regularly served as “unwitting agents” to 
deliver restricted goods to the United States without interference from U.S. Customs 
officials.79 Time magazine noted that British and Italian art dealers often purchased 
Chinese antiquities in Hong Kong, shipped them to Europe, and then exported them to 
the United States, all without CCOs.80 A light-hearted article in the Washington Post and 
Times-Herald approvingly relayed stories about numerous casual violations of the ban. 
“Congressional, Cabinet and Pentagon wives” had for years been purchasing Chinese 
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antiques smuggled out of the PRC into Hong Kong. Other female shoppers – including 
one “well-known woman member of Congress” – bypassed Customs agents by sending
their purchases to friends or storage units outside the United States.81 American tourists, 
moreover, soon found that while it was quite difficult to purchase antiques and other 
Chinese handicrafts in Hong Kong, such acquisitions were simpler in Taiwan, Singapore, 
or Thailand. These other locales, which often accompanied Hong Kong on the itineraries 
of American tourists, did not set off the sort of red flags to U.S. Customs officials as did 
Hong Kong. Alerting travelers to this apparent loophole, travel writer David Dodge 
noted: “It’s all in the way you handle the shipment.”82 In general, it seemed that the 
Treasury Department was far more concerned about large American companies doi g 
business with the PRC, or Hong Kong firms with close ties to the PRC, than it was with 
individual tourists. To some extent, this approach was logical. On an individual basis, 
tourists were spending a relatively small amount of money overseas; U.S. officials thus 
did not see them as a major threat to the embargo. When taken as a whole, however, 
tourists represented a monumental economic force and their position within the economic 
embargo would have serious consequences. 
More significant than the occasional circumvention of customs regulations, 
Washington’s general policy of embargo – when applied to tourism – failed to achieve its 
intended objectives, namely keeping U.S. dollars out of the PRC. While customs 
restrictions were relatively effective in controlling what souvenirs American tourists 
could purchase in Hong Kong, there were never any efforts to restrict the tourists 
themselves. To the contrary, U.S. officials and private travel boosters worked to increase 
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the flow of American tourists and dollars into the colony. But certain tourist purchases, 
outside the jurisdiction of CCO regulations, infused the colony with U.S. dollars that 
often made their way across the border into the PRC. Around one-third of the food and 
one-quarter of the water used in hotels, restaurants, and establishments throughout the 
colony, originated in the PRC.83 Throughout the 1960s Hong Kong and PRC officials, in 
fact, worked out an assortment of detailed agreements by which the PRC would provide 
Hong Kong with around 10 billion gallons of water every year for an annual cost of about 
$1.7 million.84  
The sum of all these purchases and trade amounted to large sums of money. 
Beijing was earning nearly $200 million a year through food and textile sales to Hong 
Kong. By the early 1960s 40 percent of the convertible foreign exchange earned annually 
by the PRC (between $400 and $500 million) and $200 million in yearly remittances 
came from Hong Kong alone.85 This substantial revenue underscores that economic 
containment was never as airtight as Washington officials anticipated and hope . 
Considering that officials in Eisenhower’s Council on Foreign Economic Policy justified 
the economic embargo by pointing to the resulting loss of foreign currency in the PRC, 
this backchannel of monetary exchange was certainly relevant.86  
Though American tourism was not the sole factor in this backchannel, it was, 
nonetheless, part of the formula. Demonstrating this on a small scale, the PRC 
                                                
83 Seymour Topping, “What Goes in Hong Kong? Everything,” New York Times, 11 April 1965; Rhodes, 
“Global Trade: Hong Kong Hilton to Stop Buying Red Goods,” Washington Post and Times-Herald, 10 
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New York Times, 26 May 1963; Seymour Topping, “Unperturbed Hong Kong,” New York Times, 4 July 
1964; Topping, “What Goes in Hong Kong? Everything,” New York Times, 11 April 1965. 
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government, working to weaken the embargo through cooperation with Communist 
banks in Hong Kong, hoarded U.S. $50 and $100 bills, which were simpler to use in 
foreign purchases and overseas government operations. Recognizing that U.S. tourists 
were partly responsible for the increase in large currency denominations in Hong Kong, 
the U.S. Navy began issuing the pay of Seventh Fleet sailors (who frequented Hong Kong 
for leisure) in smaller bills.87 
 
V 
Just as touristic images of Taiwan and Hong Kong simultaneously embraced, 
rejected, and ignored the Cold War, so too did American tourism and U.S. tourism policy 
work in ways that both facilitated and challenged U.S. foreign policy and, more 
specifically, Cold War strategy. No matter the destination, U.S. officials con idered 
tourists to be potential agents of foreign policy and hoped that their travels would be 
conducive with national interests. The inclusion of Taiwan and Hong Kong – both of 
which figured prominently in Washington’s policy of containment toward the PRC – on 
one’s itinerary, moreover, gave tourists even less opportunity to ditch the Cold War.  
Washington policymakers, tourists, and private travel boosters all recognized the 
potential economic, cultural, and strategic benefits of American tourism to the Far East. 
The “overnight” boom in tourism to Hong Kong and Taiwan held out promise to ease 
balance-of payments problems, revitalize their domestic economy, and supplement U.S. 
aid programs. Hong Kong and Taiwan, moreover, served as bastions of capitalism, 
freedom, and democracy. The mere arrival of tourists to these destinations seemed to 
reinforce the legitimacy of “Free China” and served as a subtle, yet effec ive attack on the 
                                                
87 Topping, “What Goes in Hong Kong? Everything,” New York Times, 11 April 1965. 
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political and cultural integrity of the PRC. Through tourism associations, moreover, 
Washington officials could strengthen their case for marginalizing the PRC – a strategy 
they pursued simultaneously in the United Nations and other international bodies. 
But tourism to these Cold War outposts did not always work the way that U.S. 
officials hand in mind. At the top-level, the Eisenhower administration’s efforts t  
integrate tourism into Cold War containment policy often seemed more symbolic than 
genuine and officials often approached Taiwan and Hong Kong on their own terms, 
disconnected from the PRC and the ongoing Soviet-Sino-American conflict. Attempts to 
build up Taiwan and Hong Kong as crucial bulwarks against Chinese communism, 
moreover, were not entirely compatible with efforts to attract tourists to the region. The 
administration often found that their objectives in the region could be served better by 
downplaying or suppressing Cold War considerations. On top of all this, even though the 
tourism boom undoubtedly had a positive economic impact on the stability of Hong 
Kong, it also had the unfortunate consequence of bolstering the PRC’s economy.  
Government intentions aside, most tourists saw Taiwan and Hong Kong simply as 
“Chinese” locales and seemed oblivious to their vacation destinations’ strategic posit ons 
vis-à-vis the PRC. As late as 1964, 30 percent of Americans were not even aware that  
communist regime controlled the mainland of China and, of those “knowledgeable” 
individuals, only 60 percent knew of the existence of “the other” China on Taiwan. These 
statistics, especially when placed alongside the growing popularity of travel to Taiwan 
and Hong Kong in the public sphere, further underscore the disconnect between popular 
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perceptions of the Far East and official Cold War policy.88 Thus, while Washington 
officials may have considered it a high priority to make Taiwan or Hong Kong “the 
Chinese alternative to Communism,” American tourists and travel boosters did not 
necessarily approach these destinations in this manner.89 
                                                
88 Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, The American Public’s View of U.S. Policy Toward 
China: A Report Prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 
1964), 5, 10. 
89 For official discussion of this objective regarding Taiwan, see NSC Progress Report, “U.S. Policy 
Toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China, NSC 5503” 3 July 1957, DDRS. 
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Ch. 5 – Behind the Bamboo Curtain: The Right to Travel to the 
People’s Republic of China, 1956-1961 
 
But somehow it is strange to hear the State Department say / 
you are living in the free world, in the free world you must stay 
 
-- Phil Ochs, “Ballad of William Worthy” (1963) 
 
It is unfortunate that we in the United States have so little opportunity to hear and learn of 
the developments in the People’s Republic of China. My experience in this country has 
been an inspiring one which I will share with as many fellow Americans as I can reach.1 
 
-- Lorraine Nowacki, member of an American student delegation to the PRC, 1957 
 
Whether it will be possible to devise any effective safeguard against a gradual erosion of 
all travel restrictions, I rather doubt. However, it looks very much as if we will make the 
attempt.2 
 
-- Ralph Clough, Director of Office of Chinese Affairs, 1957 
 
As the Eisenhower administration worked to promote tourism to Taiwan and 
Hong Kong, it made efforts to restrain similar developments in the PRC. Travel policy 
toward “Free China” developed alongside and should thus be seen in the same context as 
travel policy toward the mainland. In an abstract sense, American travelers s ldom drew 
direct or consequential distinctions between travel to Taiwan or Hong Kong and travel to 
the PRC. In practice, individuals demonstrated this “right to travel” ideology throug  
protests against travel bans, persistent efforts to establish travel exchanges with 
Communist China, and bold violations of travel restrictions.  
The American public – in both its overwhelming opposition to travel bans and its 
effort to open the PRC, like the rest of the world, to American tourism – was not entirely 
                                                
1 “Young Americans’ Impressions of China,” (All-China Youth Federation, 1958), in Notebooks: Moscow 
and China, Box 4, Folder 3, Sally Belfrage Papers, Wagner Archives, Tamiment Library, New York, New 
York (hereafter SBP). 
2 Clough to Johnson, 18 July 1957, General Records of the Department of State, Entry #48, Box 3, NARA. 
 197 
 
at odds with the Eisenhower administration. Government officials often exhibited a d sire 
to loosen travel restrictions and engage the Chinese in a variant of suitcase d plomacy. In 
part, this was a modest effort to feel out the Communists and test the waters of U.S.-PRC 
cooperation. Because travel served simultaneously as an extension of U.S. Cold War 
politics and an apolitical representation of middle-class curiosity, leisure, and mobility, it 
gave Washington officials the ability to push Sino-American relations in a direction that 
was impossible with traditional forms of diplomacy. There was also, no doubt, a belief 
that moderate, unrequited travel initiatives had the potential to embarrass the PRC and 
thus advance the objectives of containment. Hovering over all of this was the lingering 
sense that travel and travel policy were somehow outside the political realm. While 
Eisenhower officials clearly recognized that they could use travel – or the restriction of 
travel – as an effective means of containment, there was a noticeable hesitancy to go too 
far with this sort of strategic and political manipulation. By the late 1950s overseas 
tourism had become a staple of middle-class living and any government that imposed 
unwavering restrictions on such an activity seemed anachronistic and totalitarian.  
In this context, U.S. policymakers began discussing the idea of re-establishing 
American travel connections with the PRC almost immediately upon severing those very 
contacts. Because individuals outside of direct government control played such a 
significant role in travel, however, a systematic, well-organized approach t  travel policy 
was not always possible. This policy of liberalization, while useful in small, controlled 
doses, was not a force that could be turned on and off at will. Once it had begun it was 
difficult to reverse course. When policymakers attempted to hold their ground and use 
travel as an explicit extension of containment, they found that such efforts were easily 
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undone. The result was a travel policy – liberalized passport controls, increasingly 
frequent “exceptions” to travel bans, and relatively light punishments for travel violations 
– that often ran contrary to military, political, and economic policy in the region. 
 
I 
In 1953, following the conclusion of the Korean War and as Washington officials 
began to doubt the effectiveness of the U.S. embargo on the PRC, the Eisenhower 
administration undertook modest efforts to test the waters of improved Sino-American 
relations. In particular, on the economic and cultural front – travel policy included – 
Eisenhower was not firmly set on strict and punitive containment. As early as April, 
Eisenhower was voicing concerns that the U.S. embargo against the PRC was not 
achieving its intended objectives, and he urged his administration to scale down trade 
restrictions on China. The hope was both to improve relations with American allies – 
most of whom were critical of Washington’s economic warfare – and to use the carrot, as 
opposed to the stick, to drive a wedge between the PRC and the Soviet Union.3 .S. 
officials argued, moreover, that it was not logical to maintain economic pressure on the 
PRC when the U.S. was pursuing normalized economic relations with Soviet satellites in 
eastern Europe.4 
                                                
3 Zhang, Economic Cold War, 124-28. 
4 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the State Department gradually lifted bans on travel to eastern European 
nations behind the Iron Curtain. As of 1952, the Department banned travel to Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the USSR. At the 1955 Geneva Conference, Secretary of 
State Dulles announced that the United States was lifting restrictions on travel to the USSR, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. Bans on Hungary returned in 1956, only to be removed 
permanently in April 1960. In November 1957, in theaftermath of the State Department’s proposal for a 
newsmen exchange with the PRC, the State Department began easing its restrictions on travel to Bulgaria 
and Albania, allowing “selected” individuals to make the trip. In May 1959 the Department dropped all 
bans on travel to Bulgaria and in March 1967 it did the same for Albania. After that point, the only 
remaining bans on U.S. passports were for the PRC, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba. Drew 
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The first Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1954-55, however, made these initial moves 
toward liberalization seem naïve and potentially dangerous; the administration soon 
reasserted its faith in strict economic warfare. But efforts to reduce the “China 
differential” remained a top priority for several key officials within the administration. 
Clarence Randall, who led the administration’s campaign for travel facilitation, saw 
efforts to restrict American trade as “appalling” and he actively pursued hrinking the 
embargo.5 Randall’s attitudes toward trade with the PRC, especially when viewed 
alongside his dogged efforts to boost international tourism, highlight a significant aspect 
of Washington’s travel policy. The administration’s encouragement of tourism to Taiwan 
and Hong Kong emerge less as a means of containing and undermining the PRC and 
more as a component of general efforts to stimulate international exchange, reduce trade 
and travel barriers, and promote international stability.  
Randall’s influence on Eisenhower was substantial, demonstrated in part by the 
fact that Randall gained the ire of “die-hards” like Walter Robertson and Henry Luce, 
who both believed that the path toward liberalization was “utter madness.” Eisenhower, 
indeed, sympathized with Randall’s approach to China policy. In reference to a reduction 
in the China embargo, CIA director Allen Dulles was sure he had “heard the Boss say 
that twenty times”6 Despite significant support within the White House for an easing of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Middleton, “U.S. Frees Travel to East Europe as Spur to Amity,” New York Times, 1 November 1955; AP, 
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5 Randall, CFEP Journal, 19 July 1956, Vol. 1, Box 6, CBR. 
6 Randall, CFEP Journal, 22 June 1957, Vol. 5, Box 7, CBR; Randall, CFEP Journal, 4 February 1957, Vol.
3, Box 6, CBR; Zhang, Economic Cold War, 127-28. 
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Sino-American trade relations, the Eisenhower years saw a resurrection of the “China 
differential.”  
There was, however, no commensurate revival of strict travel prohibitions. Once 
liberalization of travel policy began, it largely moved beyond the control of Washington 
policymakers and officials found it impossible to return to pure containment. In this way, 
while the revival of the Trading With the Enemy Act in 1950 and the placement of 
“permanent” prohibitory stamps on U.S. passports in 1952, signaled a complementary 
relationship between containment and Sino-American travel policy, U.S. officials never 
accepted the travel ban as a permanent staple of U.S. China policy nor did they demand 
consistency in its application as they did with issues like economic embargo, non-
recognition, and alliance with the ROC. From the start officials were ext aordinarily 
flexible with the ban and open to significant modification and liberalization. Within only 
a few years of the conclusion of the Korean War – as U.S. and Chinese officials eng ged 
in diplomatic talks in Geneva – Washington officials embarked on a precarious path 
toward liberalizing travel policy toward the PRC.  
Prior to the August 1955 Geneva Talks, the U.S. ban on travel to the PRC had 
been largely academic; PRC officials had given no indication that they would accept 
American visitors even if the State Department had given the go-ahead.7 In August 1956, 
however, PRC officials reversed course and offered visas to American reporters from 
                                                
7 The only exception to this was the case of William Jack Ranallo, a United Nations employee who worked 
with Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. In 1954 Ranallo served as Hammarskjöld’s guard, valet, and 
secretary during the Secretary General’s visit to the PRC. The State Department validated Ranallo’s 
passport but insisted that such a move did not set a precedent for future American travel. Robertson to 
Dulles, “Policy Concerning Travel of Americans to Cmmunist China,” 18 February 1957, General 
Records of the Department of State, Entry #48, Box 3, NARA. 
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fifteen news agencies.8 The invitation was part of an attempt by the Chinese to breathe 
new life into the listless Sino-American talks by increasing the pressur  of public opinion 
on Washington officials.9 Although Secretary of State Dulles would not alert the 
American public of the fact until February 1957, PRC officials at the time also implied 
that the invitations (were they to be accepted) would expedite the release of several 
American airmen who had been in Chinese custody since the Korean War.10  
U.S. officials rejected the offer. In public, Eisenhower officials pointed to several 
related explanations for the decision. Most generally, the United States did not recogniz  
the PRC as a legitimate nation. Though the Korean War had produced a cease-fire in July 
1953, a state of quasi-war still existed between the U.S. and PRC, reinforcing the distrust
and hostility between the two nations. Because of the years of political and military 
clashes, the United States had no diplomatic presence in China and could not, therefore, 
guarantee the protection of visiting journalists. As evidence of the danger posed to 
visiting Americans, Eisenhower and Dulles consistently pointed to the handful of 
American prisoners held “unjustly” in Chinese prisons.  
                                                
8 The invitation was not a total surprise. Two months earlier officials at the American Consulate in Hong 
Kong had received word from French newsmen that there was a good chance the Chinese would be issuing 
invitations to American journalists. Other European news agencies in the area, however, insisted that no 
such invitations would be issued until progress had been made at the Geneva talks. Shortly thereafter, 
Henry Lieberman of the New York Times insisted that the Beijing government had contacted R uters 
regarding the forthcoming invitations and he was convinced that the information was accurate. Lieberman 
had been in touch with Kung Peng, Director of the Information Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and Lieberman was sure that the Chinese were committed to the proposal. Everett Drumright to 
McConaughy, 22 June 1956, General Records of the Department of State, Entry #48, Box 2, NARA; 
Drumright to McConaughy, 17 July 1956, General Records of the Department of State, Entry #48, Box 3, 
NARA. 
9 Yafeng Xia, “From Antagonists to Adversaries: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949-1972,” PhD 
diss. (University of Maryland, College Park, 2003), 156-57. 
10 American officials first learned of these prisoners in November 1954 when Beijing Radio broadcast that 
the Chinese were detaining thirteen Americans accused of espionage. Eleven were Air Force men, led by 
Colonel John Knox Arnold, who had been on a leaflet-dropping mission over North Korea when they were 
shot down by Chinese forces. The other two men were CIA agents Richard Fecteau and John Downey who 
had been involved in covert activities in North Korea and the PRC when they were ambushed and captured 
by Chinese troops. For an overview of these cases, see Ted Gup, The Book of Honor: The Secret Lives and 
Deaths of CIA Operatives (New York: Anchor Books, 2001).  
 202 
 
The prisoner issue was, in fact, the explanation that was most tangible to the 
American people and the administration made it front and center in every public debate
over the journalist exchange. It was also the dominant justification in official 
correspondence and memoranda.11 The prisoner issue took on renewed significance after 
Dulles announced, in February 1957, that the Chinese had offered to release the prisoners 
if Eisenhower agreed to send the American journalists. Instead of taking the offer as an 
added incentive to send the newsmen to China, Eisenhower and Dulles insisted that such 
a move would give the PRC undeserved recognition and prestige and that the PRC’s quid 
pro quo bordered on “blackmail.”12  
Despite the way it appeared in the media, the decision to prevent the newsmen 
from traveling to the PRC was not a knee-jerk Cold War reaction. In a broad sense, the 
military, economic, and political standoff between the United States and the PRC did not 
necessarily translate to a denial of travel connections between the two nations. To this 
end, while Eisenhower and Dulles, in public statements and official policy, voiced 
unwavering disapproval for the newsmen trip, behind closed doors they expressed far 
more nuance. A year before the Chinese offer Dulles pondered whether the State 
Department actually had the authority to deny Americans access to the PRC, and he 
                                                
11 For examples, see Drumright to McConaughy, 7 March 1956, General Records of the Department of 
State, Entry #46, Box 15, NARA; McCardle to Dulles, 14 August 1956, General Records of the 
Department of State, Entry #48, Box 2, NARA; Sebald to Dulles, “Ambassador Johnson’s Views on 
Possible Travel of American Correspondents to Communist China,” 17 August 1956, General Records of 
the Department of State, Entry #48, Box 2, NARA; memorandum of conversation on “U.S. Policy on Visits 
of Correspondents and Others to Communist China,” 2 January 1957, General Records of the Department 
of State, Entry #48, Box 2, NARA. 
12 Press conference of 5 February 1957, John Foster Dulles Papers, Speeches, Statements, Press 
Conferences, etc, Box 353, John Foster Dulles Papers, MC016, JFD. 
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acknowledged his discomfort with the “legal basis for denying passports valid for travel 
to Communist China.”13 
 
II 
When Dulles temporarily put aside his uneasiness with travel prohibitions and 
rejected the Chinese invitation, his concerns were voiced (though more loudly) by large 
segments of the American population. Liberal groups such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), along with American journalists, were the most vocal in 
expressing their outrage over the State Department’s actions. The Writers Guild of 
America called the ban “censorship” and the American Committee for Cultural Freedom 
linked the travel restrictions to totalitarianism.14 Despite this strong, public opposition, 
the issue remained under the radar of most Americans until a handful of travelers 
intentionally violated the ban.  
There was no cohesive, organized effort to undermine the State Department’s 
travel restrictions, but the various individuals who did travel in violation of the 
Department’s ban all shared frustration – to differing degrees – with Washington’s 
policy. Though these individuals literally circumvented U.S. travel prohibitions, their 
actions also made sense in the context of U.S. postwar travel policy. As demonstrated 
through the work with PATA, Randall’s travel report, and congressional initiatives to 
facilitate tourism, governments around the world – the United States included – worked 
extremely hard in the years following the Second World War to break down the barriers 
of international travel. Individual travelers and travel promoters reflected and encouraged 
                                                
13 Dulles, “Memorandum for Mr. Phleger,” 11 July 1955, Series 8, Box 12, JFD. 
14 Thomas Pryor, “Writers Protest China Travel Ban,” New York Times, 2 April 1957; “China Ban 
Assailed,” New York Times, 11 January 1957. 
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this liberalization policy, developing a firm belief that all Americans should be able to 
travel overseas unobstructed. Violation of the State Department’s travel ban – though 
certainly earning the resentment of U.S. officials – was merely an extreme variant of this 
growing trend. 
One of the earliest violators of the travel ban was William Worthy, a young free-
lance correspondent, who wrote regularly for the Baltimore Af o-American and the 
NAACP’s Crisis. On Christmas Eve 1956, shortly after the Chinese invited American 
journalists to visit the country, Worthy entered the PRC for forty-one days on a Chinese 
visa. He arrived by plane in Hong Kong and quickly boarded a train to Canton. Two days 
after Worthy’s arrival, correspondent Edmund Stevens and photographer Phillip 
Harrington – both of Look magazine – reached China. The arrival of the three men 
created a media sensation. Worthy, Stevens, and Harrington were the first three newsmen 
to defy the administration’s travel ban and, in that capacity, transformed the travel issue 
from one of abstraction to one of immediate and tangible significance.15 
Stevens and Harrington, who arrived shortly after Worthy, never intended for 
their trip to take on the significance it did. While the men cannot be taken entirely at their 
word, they later claimed that their visit to the PRC was an accident. Leaving Moscow on 
a skiing trip in late December, the men wound up in the PRC shortly thereafter. The 
publication, a few months following their return, of a seventeen-page news special in 
Look that chronicled – in photographs and text – Stevens and Harrington’s trip, seemed to 
                                                
15 The national media offered extensive coverage of the trips of Worthy, Stevens, and Harrington. For 
examples, see Wilmot Hersher, “Reporter Defies China-Visit Ban,” Washington Post and Times-Herald, 25 
December 1956; Warren Unna, “U.S. Reporters in Red China Called Aid to Freeing Americans,” 
Washington Post and Times-Herald, 30 March 1957; and C.P. Trussell, “Newsman Cites Pressure by 
U.S.,” New York Times, 30 March 1957.  
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undermine the “accidental tourist” excuse.16 Nonetheless, from the moment they left the 
PRC the men were extremely cooperative with U.S. officials and eager to put the incident 
behind them. Roderic O’Connor, of the State Department Bureau of Security and 
Consular Affairs, was confident that after the present passport debacle had been resolved, 
neither Stevens nor Harrington would ever again pose problems for the State 
Department.17 
Worthy, who was not associated with the Look newsmen, entered the PRC 
knowingly and with the explicit intention of challenging the administration’s travel ban. 
According to the editor of the Afro-American, who publicly acknowledged sponsoring 
Worthy’s trip, Worthy had begun planning his visit to the PRC in late 1954. The trip to 
China was to be the culmination of successful run of journalistic tourism that took 
Worthy to Bandung in April 1955, to the USSR in July 1955, and throughout Africa in 
September 1956. In addition to close collaboration with the Afro-American, Worthy had 
been in contact with the ACLU and the organization intended Worthy’s visit to test the 
tenacity of the U.S. government in upholding its travel ban.18 Aside from the legal 
challenge, Worthy insisted that his visit would be useful in disseminating news from 
                                                
16 Edmund Stevens with photographs by Phillip Harringto , “Inside Red China,” Look, 16 April 1957. 
17 O’Connor to Thompson, 23 July 1957, General Records f the Department of State, Entry #48, Box 3, 
NARA. 
18 Worthy made no effort to hide his association with the ACLU. He spoke of his cooperation with the 
organization in several speeches he delivered following his return to the U.S. Aylward to McConaughy, no 
date, General Records of the Department of State, Entry #48, Box, 2, NARA. 
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behind the Bamboo Curtain and possibly in securing the release of the American 
prisoners still lingering in Chinese jails.19 
Because of its “purposeful” nature, Worthy’s visit, in particular, produced a 
torrent of media coverage and subsequent vitriol from Washington. In addition to regular 
front-page stories documenting his visit, Worthy’s own reports appeared in the Afro-
American, the New York Post, and CBS news.20 There was, moreover, extensive positive 
coverage in the African American press. In an effort to tie Worthy’s actions o the 
broader civil rights struggles, the Atlanta Daily World, for example, criticized the State 
Department for taking such an immediate and hostile interest in Worthy’s trip while 
Washington officials maintained such a “hands off policy” when it came to enforcing 
school desegregation.” The New York Amsterdam News insisted that Worthy’s reports 
were “restrained and circumspect,” noting that Worthy “will not offend the U.S. 
government insofar as content is concerned.”21 Worthy, himself, had an extensive 
background of reporting on African American issues overseas, often suggesting tha  the 
socialist model might offer more freedoms for racial minorities.22 He produced reports on 
black expatriates living in the Soviet Union, interviewed “died-in-the-wool [sic]
                                                
19 Worthy continued to pursue to the prisoner issue following his return to the United States. in preparation 
for a newspaper article. He corresponded frequently wi h family members of the imprisoned men, inquiring 
about their attitudes toward the situation. Worthy also interviewed State and Defense Department officials 
on the issue and informed them that he had secured “a large number of…complaints” from family members 
regarding Washington’s handling of the prisoner affair. See Osborn to Jones, “Interview with William 
Worthy,” 22 August 1957, General Records of the Department of State, Entry #48, Box 2, NARA; 
memorandum of conversation, “Activities of William Worthy,” 15 April 1957, General Records of the 
Department of State, Entry #48, Box 2, NARA. 
20 According to William Paely of CBS, the network consistently rejected cooperation with Worthy, refusing 
to make any sort of contractual arrangement with him or provide him equipment for his trip. However, 
when Worthy informed CBS that he was broadcasting at a certain time from the PRC, CBS opted to pick 
up and rebroadcast his story. Memorandum of conversation, 4 January 1957, General Records of the 
Department of State, Entry #48, Box 2, NARA. 
21 “Covering Washington,” Atlanta Daily World, 5 January 1957; Marguerite Cartwright, “Back Newsman 
Who Crashed Iron Curtain,” New York Amsterdam News, 5 January 1957. 
22 Jinx Coleman Broussard and Skye Chance Cooley, “William Worthy: The Man and the Mission,” 
Journalism Studies 10 no. 3 (June 2009), 390-91. 
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Southerner” Senator Allen Ellender while both men were visiting Moscow, reported from 
the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, and chastised the apartheid system of South 
Africa. In the PRC, as well, Worthy pursued these issues, speaking with an African 
American GI who had opted to stay in China following the Korean War.23 
Coming on the heels of the PRC’s invitation to American newsmen, the media 
frenzy surrounding Worthy, Stevens, and Harrington no doubt placed additional pressure 
on Eisenhower and Dulles to modify, or at least clarify, Washington’s policy on 
journalist visits to the PRC. While most in the journalism community criticized 
Washington’s initial restrictive travel policy, in the end they had acquiesced to the
government’s demands. The three visits in late 1956 thus stood out as unexpected acts of 
defiance.24 Complicating this was the fact that the three men emerged as mainstream 
personalities and earned the sympathy of the American public. This was especially 
significant in regard to Worthy, who became the unofficial spokesman in opposition to 
the travel bans. Despite being a self-proclaimed socialist, Worthy framed the debate over 
his trip in terms of the “right to travel” and “freedom of speech” as opposed to explicit 
criticism of U.S. Cold War policy. Speaking about his trip before an audience at Cornell 
University, for example, Worthy “made an excellent impression.” State Department 
                                                
23 For examples, see William Worthy, “This is Russia: From Ford to Stalingrad,” Baltimore Afro-American, 
13 August 1955; William Worthy, “Louisiana Senator Makes Bad Impression In Moscow,” Baltimore 
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David Lawrence, 7 August 1956, Series 2A, Box 5, JFD; Broussard and Cooley, “William Worthy,” 387. 
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officials even conceded that his account was noticeably balanced and nuanced, especially 
in regard to his discussion of Beijing’s censorship and brainwashing practices.25  
Adding to this boost of credibility, in March 1957, as officials debated the 
appropriate response to Worthy’s actions, Worthy testified as a witness before the Senate 
Constitutional Rights subcommittee in an effort to reform State Department ravel policy. 
Missouri Senator Thomas Hennings, who was very critical of the administration’s travel 
policy and its treatment of Worthy, had invited Worthy to speak at the hearing. In this 
capacity, Worthy was not the focus of vitriol and criticism but instead served as a 
knowledgeable expert on the topic of passport restrictions. Worthy and other witnesses 
argued that the visit had not only left Washington’s foreign policy undamaged; it actually 
had furthered U.S. interests in the PRC, specifically in terms of the well-publicized POW 
issue. Using Washington’s own generally liberal policies toward international ravel as a 
basis for criticism, a representative for the ACLU insisted that the Stat Department 
travel ban was “anachronistic” in the post-World War II period, when most countries – 
the United States included – were urging an increase in international travel and a 
reduction in travel barriers.26 In this and other settings, Worthy’s demeanor helped 
convince most Americans that government restrictions on travel to the PRC were less a 
means of containing domestic communism or protecting U.S. interests than they were of 
denying the freedom of movement. 
Washington officials, nonetheless, tried to marginalize Worthy, insisting that his 
case – which involved an explicit violation of U.S. law – had nothing to do with the 
                                                
25 Aylward to McConaughy, “William Worthy’s Visit at Cornell,” no date, General Records of the 
Department of State, Entry #48, Box 2, NARA. 
26 “Worthy Before Senate on Friday,” Baltimore Afro-American, 30 March 1957; Trussell, “Newsman Cites 
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“right to travel” or the continuing debate over the PRC’s open invitation to American 
journalists. To the chagrin of the Eisenhower administration, however, “to the public 
[they] were directly related.”27 Following Worthy’s return, national media agencies 
increasingly lost faith in the government’s travel ban and amplified their demands for 
unrestricted travel to China. The New York Post, which carried many of Worthy’s stories, 
called his trip “a mission for the whole American press.” While the Post acknowledged 
that there was likely a legal case against Worthy, “morally, we beli ve, he has rendered a 
memorable service.” Edward R. Murrow hailed Worthy’s visit as “an historic event” and 
he forged a close bond between Worthy and CBS.28 Based on media coverage, there 
seemed to be a general consensus that the Worthy case and the ongoing effort to secure a 
newsmen exchange both placed the U.S. government on the very unpopular side of 
restricting travel.29 
More than just a talking point for journalists and liberal critics, mainstream 
politicians and administration officials, who genuinely desired more information on 
“current conditions within China,” railed against the travel ban.30 A healthy majority of 
the American public, as well, opposed restrictions. Gallup Polls released in 1957 showed 
that while an overwhelming majority of Americans still opposed seating the PRC in the 
                                                
27 Memorandum of conversation, “Travel of Newsmen to Communist China Meeting,” 28 March 1957, 
General Records of the Department of State, Entry #48, Box 3, NARA. 
28 “A Newspaperman’s Mission,” New York Post, 2 January 1957, quoted in “New York Newspaper 
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United Nations and engaging the PRC in non-strategic trade, 57 percent favored letting 
newsmen travel to the PRC while only 26 percent opposed.31 
 
III 
The public controversy surrounding Worthy’s visit sparked a number of other 
visits to the PRC over the next several years. The increase in unlawful travel, no doubt, 
posed a significant problem for U.S. officials. Despite Washington officials’ frequent 
protestations to the contrary, the general prohibition on travel to the PRC was intimately 
connected to Washington’s non-recognition policy toward China; while sporadic 
violations of the travel ban likely would not permanently damage American standing in 
the region, the steady erosion of restrictions that would result from increased violations 
seemed to undermine Washington’s position vis-à-vis the PRC.  
Officials in the Eisenhower administration also deplored the travel violations 
because they were, as seen in the Worthy case, often associated with liberal politic l 
organizations or individuals sympathetic with the Chinese Communist regime. Only a 
few years after the end of the Korean War and at the peak of domestic McCarthyism, 
many officials saw these violators as little more than communist dissident . The 
characterization was not always hyperbole. In general, Americans who traveled to the 
PRC in the decades prior to the 1970s were disillusioned, to some extent, with U.S. 
society and were searching for “political and spiritual alternatives.” They were, 
moreover, fed up with the cursory or hostile treatment of the PRC in the American press 
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and among U.S. policymakers, using their trips to correct misconceptions and showcase 
Communist reforms in a more positive light.32  
Several visits by Americans exemplify what sociologist Paul Hollander calls 
“political pilgrimages” and what historian Brenda Gayle Plummer calls “revolutionary 
tourism.”33 In October 1952 Henry and Anita Wilcox circumvented the U.S. travel ban 
and visited Beijing to attend the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regons. 
Along with twelve other members of the American delegation, the Wilcoxes insisted that 
the United States was engaging in biological warfare in Korea.34 Seven years later, in the 
midst of the Great Leap Forward, W.E.B. Du Bois and his wife Shirley, not yet 
convinced that the socialist experiment in China was a failure, traveled to the PRC. Over 
the course of a ten-week visit, Du Bois met with Mao Zedong, dined twice with Foreign 
Minister Zhou Enlai, and wrote rich, laudatory accounts of the “glorious…miracle” of 
China. He blamed the Cold War – and the West’s consequential fear of socialism – for 
the inability of Americans to visit the PRC and “learn the truth about the Revolution.”35 
Du Bois, soon to become an official member of the American Communist Party, seemed 
to relish his emerging status as an American exile and an adopted Chinese, recalling how 
he spent his ninety-first birthday with Chinese ministers of state, artists, professionals, 
and other “exiled” fellow travelers such as Anna Louise Strong.36 Traveling at the same 
time as Du Bois, former Treasury and International Monetary Fund official Frank Coe 
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War, ed. Allen Hunter, 133-153 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998). 
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traveled to the PRC following a lengthy investigation into his involvement in the 
Communist Party and alleged espionage activities. Like Du Bois, Coe wrote extensively 
on the Great Leap Forward and published a favorable overview of his visit in a Beijing 
periodical.37  
While these cases strengthened the associations between unlawful travel and 
communist sympathies, not all American visitors to the PRC were communist, nor were 
they all intent on promoting their trip as an anti-American political statement. Worthy, 
for instance, was eager to deny any affiliation with the Communist Partyand, when 
testifying before a Senate Committee, dared senators to ask him the “$64 question” so he 
could respond in the negative.38 Instead, the bulk of these tourists portrayed themselves 
as curious, nonpolitical travelers, intent on bringing more knowledge of the PRC into 
their own lives and to the American public.  
This was certainly true for a group of American students who, in August 1957, 
traveled to the PRC.39 In this case, as well, Washington officials tried to marginalize the 
students as radical leftists. Such an approach was not entirely surprising. It was following 
an appearance at the 1957 Moscow Youth Festival that the All-China Youth Federation 
(ACYF) – a CCP-run organization that aimed to develop national loyalty and 
international connections among the younger generation – extended invitations for 160 
American students to visit the PRC. Spotting an opportunity to travel in this forbidden 
land, forty-one of the Americans chose to make the trip. Washington officials, who were 
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already frustrated that the students (legally) traveled to Moscow to take part in the 
Festival, became irate when discovering the students’ intention to visit the PRC. In an 
attempt to undermine the students’ credibility, one memorandum noted that while 
officials “have not been able to establish any direct connection [to communist 
organizations], it is interesting to note that of those ‘students’ who continued on into Red 
China…43 percent claim residence in the Greater New York City area.”40  
Despite these efforts in Washington, the students’ visit to the PRC had far more to 
do with personal curiosity and search for the exotic than it did leftist politics.41 Most of 
the students recognized that their Chinese tour could be politically beneficial for the PRC 
regime but, while motivations behind the visit varied, few made the trip explicitly to 
challenge or damage Washington’s international standing. For American travelers, more 
so than their European counterparts (many of whom came from countries that recogniz d 
the PRC), mainland China carried an air of excitement, adventure, and novelty; this siren 
call from behind the Bamboo Curtain, no doubt, was incentive enough for many of the 
students to violate the ban. Peggy Seeger, the half-sister of folk-singer Pete Seeger, 
considered herself naïve on political issues and made the trip to fulfill her own 
curiosity.42 Roderic O’Connor suggested that the “greatest inducement” for travel to the 
Soviet Union and the PRC, both of which were heavily subsidized by the Moscow and 
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Beijing governments, was the “greatly reduced rate of travel costs.”43 By the time they 
left, moreover, most of the students in the group had lined up deals with publishers to 
write articles or books about their trip and thus personal profit and publicity were 
overwhelming incentives to accept the invitation. 
Regardless of their reasons for travel, most of the students saw the trip as a valid 
and innocuous form of expression; thirty-two of them signed a statement reaffirming their 
“belief in the right of U.S. citizens to travel,” and maintained that the trip was “consistent 
with loyalty to our country.”44 Shelby Tucker, in fact, claimed to be a voice for patriotism 
and conservative ideology, leading what he called a “rightist faction” within the student 
group. He insisted he made the trip to demonstrate the freedom of the United States and 
to rebut any potential anti-American statements coming from the more liberal wing of the 
student group. To this end, Tucker stood alone in his opposition to hand his passport over 
to PRC authorities – an act that he believed would have violated U.S. law.45 
Like Worthy’s visit, the students’ trip to the PRC certainly left an impact on U.S.
China policy and Sino-American relations. Both intentionally and unintentionally, the 
students engaged in a sort of intimate, non-official diplomacy that no doubt complicated 
the objectives of policymakers back in the United States. The students regularly engaged 
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local Chinese in political discussion and they often had to explain American domestic 
issues such as the civil rights movement and racial segregation. Some of the students, 
following on the heels of Worthy, met with, interviewed, and relayed information on a 
handful of the American POWs. The interviews, organized by the ACYF and publicized 
extensively in American newspapers, provided a rare glimpse at these prisoners and 
offered the prisoners’ families some consolation. The students reported the men in good 
health, eager for release, and absent of any signs of brainwashing or abuse.46 The 
students, moreover, held a lengthy question and answer session with Zhou Enlai. They 
queried Zhou on the still unsettled newsmen exchange, the imprisonment of American 
POWs, the remaining Chinese students in the United States, the development of atomic 
weapons, Chinese admission to the United Nations, and the status of Taiwan. Responding 
to the group, Zhou noted that the students were “pioneers” and that the task of improving 
Sino-American relations was not “for professional diplomats alone.”47  
Even upon their return some of the students continued to play up their role as 
renegade, political tourists. Nina Landau, David Hollister, and Sheila Greenberg gave a 
series of talks in New York sponsored by the Young Socialist Alliance, promising to 
divulge the “eye-witness report of the ‘forbidden’ trip!”48 Bob Cohen, at the urging of 
NBC, had filmed much of trip. NBC’s “Huntley-Brinkley Report” and “Today Show” ran 
                                                
46 According to Ruth Redmond, whose son Hugh was one of the American prisoners in the PRC, the 
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footage of Cohen’s Inside Red China special and Cohen took his film on tour to 
universities across the country. In all his broadcasts Cohen assured the public that “not a 
single frame was censored or even seen by the Communists.”49 Despite his claims of 
objectivity, the general tone of Cohen’s documentary was, nonetheless, one of accptan e 
and admiration. 
The political implications of the students’ visit also emerged from the fact th t 
their trip was one component of a larger, cultural and touristic “offensive” launched by 
the PRC government that spanned from 1955 to 1959.50 As Worthy, Du Bois, and the 
American students were slipping through the cracks and visiting the PRC in violation of 
Washington’s travel ban, thousands of foreigners from other countries legally toured
China. The majority of these visitors were from the Soviet Union and other communist 
countries. But other tourist delegations – from India, France, Sweden, Canada, Britain
Israel, and Colombia – visited the PRC as well. The number of foreign tourists coming 
into the PRC was never large. The number in 1955, for example, was around 5,000.51 The 
PRC’s version of suitcase diplomacy – though quantitatively far smaller than programs in 
the United States, Europe, South America, and elsewhere in Asia – was, nonetheless, 
surprisingly effective since the government was able to “control and focus the entir  
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experience.”52 In a closed society like the PRC, government officials chose who could 
visit the country, what sights they could see, with whom they could interact, and when 
they had to return home.53 Foreign visitors were – in the words of French journalist 
Jacque Marcuse – VIPPs (Very Important Potential Propagandists). In this context, PRC 
officials hoped that these travelers would develop and spread sympathy for Chinese 
international and domestic policies.54 The resulting images and stories that these tourists 
produced – in the form of newspaper articles, memoirs, and lectures – thus passed on 
inaccurate or skewed information to eager listeners back at home. 
As this approach suggests, in the PRC there was little distinction between 
political, propagandistic exchange and recreational tourism. Just months before the 
students arrived in the PRC, the government-run Chinese Intourist agency had issued an 
announcement that tourists from all countries were welcome in China. Through Intourist 
the PRC welcomed, guided, and supervised all sorts of recreational, diplomatic, and 
cultural delegations. The warm reception that the American students received from 
Chinese youth as their train pulled into the Beijing Railway Station, therefore, was more 
likely a calculated effort on the part of the PRC government than it was a spontaneous 
outpouring of pro-American sympathy.  
Almost every visitor to the PRC – regardless of country of origin or motivation 
for travel – had a similar experience. The cablegram that granted William Worthy a visa, 
for instance, instructed him to contact Intourist for all his travel and accommodation 
needs. The official agency oversaw every aspect of Worthy’s visit, including his hotel 
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rooms, tours, transportation, interpreters, and interviews.55 Li a Hobbs, an Australian-
born journalist for the San Francisco Examiner, noted that “[e]very foreigner in China, 
even paying tourist groups, is there at the behest of the Chinese Government and is 
regarded as a guest.”56 The story was much the same with William Kinmond, a Canadian 
journalist who entered the PRC in 1957. Kinmond recalled “Miss Fen” – “an 
indefatigable representative of China Intourist” – boarding his train upon arrival in 
Canton, rushing him to his hotel, and then guiding him on what he referred to as an 
“ideological tour” of China. Kinmond was, in his words, completely dependent on the 
Intourist interpreters to the point that they provided “a strange feeling of security” and 
induced a “state of somnolent happiness.”57 French journalist Robert Gullain, traveling in 
China around the same time as the American students, commented that the Bamboo 
Curtain materialized as a “subtle veil…skillfully and firmly drawn between China and 
myself.” Gullain recalled that despite the monumental population of China, “I was never 
left alone to speak with one of them [an average Chinese citizen] without a witness, a d 
if I was, it was a put-up job.”58 
The students’ association with the ACYF, moreover, was standard for incoming 
tourists. While Intourist was responsible for all incoming visitors, most tourists received 
assistance, funding, or supervision from various front organizations that matched their 
particular group dynamic. W.E.B. Du Bois and his wife, for instance, received joint 
sponsorship from the Communist People’s Association for Cultural Relations with 
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Foreign Countries and the Communist China Peace Committee.59 Th se organizations 
often subsidized the visits, assuming that such treatment would result in “a small cru b 
of favorable comment when they return to their home countries.” William Kinmond 
commented on the number of “freeloading” tourists in the PRC, noting that of the 300 
foreign guests at Beijing’s Chen Men Hotel, he was the only one to pay a bill.60 
Detailing the level of PRC supervision of tourists, Robert Loh testified before 
Congress on the means by which the Chinese “hoodwinked” incoming travelers. Chinese 
officials spent months preparing for individual travelers in order to ensure that the 
resulting exchange was beneficial to the interests of the PRC. Visitors could see only 
certain cities, visit pre-selected factories, and reside in exclusive hotels. Though visitors 
were “nominally” free to choose their activities, in actuality they were “choosing only the 
places previously designated by the Communists.” Officials selected dozens of 
“showplaces” – homes of “average” Chinese workers, cotton mills, and universities – in 
order to be prepared for any “improvised” request on the part of tourists. Loh himself 
played a role, posing as a token “reformed capitalist” for visitors who were intr sted in 
how PRC officials dealt with these sort of ideological dissidents.61 British journalist Felix 
Greene, visiting China shortly after the students, for instance, remembered meting with 
“Mr. Wang,” a wealthy Chinese businessman, who lauded China’s economic framework 
and proudly called himself a “Communist capitalist.”62  
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The American students, as well, followed a set itinerary during their visit. Like 
these other “guided tours,” the students visited China’s industrial center in Manchuri , a 
prison in Shanghai, traveled by train between Canton and Hankow, and, not surprisingly, 
witnessed the dazzling array of military, cultural, and political delegations at Beijing’s 
October 1 National Day parade.63 Few of the foreign visitors to the PRC, however, 
recognized the restrictive nature of their visits. Three of the American students – Peggy 
Seeger, Robert Cohen, and Earl Williamson – insisted that the PRC regime did not inhibit 
their visit. Journalist Lisa Hobbs, likewise, denied any sense of supervision: “I 
experienced no restrictions as to when and where I wandered. I went for walks at sunup, 
noon and night – I wandered in and out of markets, poked my nose into backyard 
factories, mingled with crowds sunning in the park….Not once did I have any reason to 
believe I was being watched or followed.”64 Even journalists like Tillman Durdin, writing 
from Hong Kong on the students’ visit, concurred with this rosy view of Chinese tourism. 
While some students remained under Communist guidance, Durdin noted, other 
“individualists” were able to “roam around alone…to find out things for themselves.”65 
From personal accounts, however, it is clear that their options were limited. The 
students did not travel to Tibet, forced labor camps, areas ravaged by flood or famine, or 
regions occupied by ethnic minorities. Because of the language barrier and the 
omnipresent guides and interpreters, the students interacted with a limited, and highly 
supervised, segment of Chinese society. Their interview with Zhou Enlai, as opposed to 
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being a significant achievement that proved the visit went far beyond the ordinary, 
actually highlighted the all too common way in which the tourist’s PRC experience was 
constructed by official opinions, statistics, and anecdotes. As Robert Loh succinctly 
noted, “whatever the foreign visitors ask, they are bound to hear lies.”66 
Though the experiences and “knowledge” that the American students took from 
their trip to the PRC were largely constructed and fabricated, to categoriz  the trip as 
purely a matter of political propaganda would be too dramatic. As mentioned above, the 
students did not see themselves as unwilling tools of the Communist regime; instead, they 
perceived their trip more as a touristic adventure. In this context, despite their 
confinement by the standard PRC itinerary, the students engaged in recreational 
sightseeing activities that were common among other tourists in the PRC at the time and 
would be on the itineraries of American tourists twenty years later, when the PRC fully 
opened its doors. Like their fellow tourists, the group attended a performance at the 
Peking Opera, wandered around the Temple of Heaven, took pedicab tours of Beijing, 
and traveled to a summer resort at Hangzhou.67 The diary of David Hollister, one of the 
American students, reads much like a traditional tourist account and exemplifies the 
recreational nature of the students’ visit: 
 
10 a.m. left in bus for Great Wall. Stopped for lunch along the way….From 2 to 3 
clambered up and down Great Wall at a busy spot where much restoring going on. Left at 
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3 for Ming Tombs. Saw main Ming Tomb….Return to Peking, arr[ived] around 8 p.m. 
Exhausting ride.68 
 
The students’ visit, which some U.S. officials legitimately saw as an extesion of both 
leftist politics and national disloyalty and which Chinese officials saw as a means of 
bolstering PRC propaganda, can thus also be seen in the context of leisure, exploration, 
excitement, and self-improvement – all of which were motivations behind mass touri m 
to more traditional locales.69 
 
IV 
The ease by which travel maneuvered between the political and the apolitical, and 
the ambiguity between subversive travel and innocuous recreational tourism, made it
difficult for U.S. policymakers to determine appropriate punishment for violators. 
Generally speaking, U.S. officials viewed the visits as violations of travel estrictions and 
thus means of undermining Washington’s position and legitimacy in the Far East. 
Formulating a response to these violations, however, was not so straightforward. 
Policymakers had to determine whether the loss of prestige the United States would 
suffer if they backed away from firm travel restrictions was more detrim ntal than the 
political headache they would likely encounter if they punished violators too harshly.  
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Setting the stage for this policy decision, State Department officials, upon 
learning of William Worthy’s arrival in the PRC, were convinced that a direct and 
punitive response was only appropriate. While such a position would likely “arouse 
strong opposition in journalistic circles,” it would also successfully “discourage most if 
not all of those who would travel to Communist China” and “encourage respect for 
passport restrictions in general.”70 To this end, the State Department chose to make 
Worthy’s passport valid only for return to the United States and sought to confiscate his 
passport upon arrival. Several officials, moreover, advocated freezing Worthy’s bank 
accounts and prosecuting him under the Trading With the Enemy Act.71
Harsh rhetoric surrounded the students’ tour to the PRC as well. The State 
Department issued a statement defining the trip as “subversive of American foreign 
policy” and Under Secretary of State Christian Herter made personal phone calls to each 
student considering the trip, threatening passport confiscation, arrest, high bail, and jail 
time if they crossed into the PRC.72 U.S. congressmen followed a similar path of 
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intimidation following the students’ visit, calling several before the House Un-American 
Activities Committee to defend their actions.73 
In general, however, the threats issued from inside Washington proved to be 
bluster. The individuals had clearly violated passport restrictions, the Logan Act, and 
several Treasury regulations.74 Based on existing criminal statutes, they could have been 
fined $2,000 and sentenced to five years in prison.75 Roderic O’Connor, however, quickly 
qualified the severity of the travel ban, explaining that the limitations were m ant more to 
protect American travelers than they were to serve as a basis for punishment.76 Indeed, 
despite promises to act otherwise, the State Department never even confiscated the 
passports of Worthy, Stevens, Harrington, the students, or Du Bois. In regard to Worthy, 
who posed the most trouble for the Eisenhower administration, officials opted to take the 
more passive route of allowing his passport to expire and rejecting renewal 
applications.77 But even this seemed too harsh for some policymakers. Senator Hennings, 
for instance, introduced a resolution to put Congress on record as opposing the State 
Department’s decision on Worthy’s passport and requesting that Worthy’s application be 
                                                
73 Some policymakers felt that punishments for the students should vary depending on their individual 
motivations for making the visit. Roderic O’Connor noted the difficulty in punishing Shelby Tucker, the 
head of the “rightist” delegation within the student group, “in view [of his] alleged anti-communist 
activities…and his apparently sincere but misguided efforts to avoid violating regulations.” In the end, 
however, State Department officials refused to treat Tucker differently than the other students, insisting that 
to do so would “undermine our whole policy of seeking to prevent travel by Americans to Communist 
China.” O’Connor to Herter, 5 September 1957, General Records of the Department of State, Entry #48, 
Box 3, NARA; Robertson to Dulles, 13 September 1957, General Records of the Department of State, 
Entry #48, Box 3, NARA. 
74 Transcript of informal hearing at Passport Office in regard to William Worthy, 6 May 1957, General 
Records of the Department of State, Entry #48. Box 2, NARA. 
75 Based on Title 18, Section 1544, U.S. Section Code on “Misuse of Passport.” Anthony Lewis, “Peiping 
Lifts Ban on U.S. News Men,” New York Times, 7 August 1956. 
76 It appears, moreover, that U.S. officials had always intended to approach travel violations in a moderate 
manner. In August 1955, when officials had discussed th  (then hypothetical) possibility of a journalist 
violating the travel ban, passport confiscation hadbeen the “sole immediate sanction” that officials would 
pursue. Clough to Robertson, “Travel of William Worthy to Communist China,” 26 December 1956, 
General Records of the Department of State, Entry #48, Box 2, NARA; “U.S. is Softening Passport 
Policy,” New York Times, 26 September 1957. 
77 “Senate Inquiry to Hear Worthy,” Baltimore Sun, 23 March 1957. 
 225 
 
approved. The State Department, too, muted its response to Worthy. Though Department 
officials remained steadfast in their opposition to passport renewal, two months after 
Worthy’s return officials they had seemingly abandoned any thoughts of pursuing 
prosecution.78 The students, as well, faced some problems getting back into the United 
States, but once home suffered few major consequences for their transgressions. Even 
while the students were still abroad, four members of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee doubted that officials would mete out any serious punishment, lightly noting
that they should be given “a good spanking.”79 
By minimizing the punishment dealt out to these travelers, Eisenhower’s State 
Department began removing the tough exterior of its travel ban. This development was, 
moreover, somewhat intentional. In a speech to the Advertising Council and Federal Bar 
Association of Maryland, Roderic O’Connor downplayed the punishments awaiting 
transgressors, implying that travel violators could, in fact, hold onto their passports if 
they promised not to breach the travel ban in the future. The New York Times, in several 
news stories, latched on to this “second-chance” principle.80  
Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson railed against O’Connor f r this 
misleading depiction of U.S. policy, but O’Connor’s speech accurately described 
Washington’s approach to those who traveled to the PRC in violation of restrictions.81 
When Worthy testified before the State Department’s Board of Passport Apeals, for 
example, officials asked if he would “state under oath that he would live up to the travel 
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restrictions if his passport were renewed,” implying that promises of good behavior 
would result in a second chance. In the subsequent letter rejecting Worthy’s application 
for passport renewal, Frances Knight of the Passport Office cited not only Worthy’s 
initial travel to the PRC, but also his apparent unwillingness to abide by passport 
restrictions in the future.82 Further reinforcing the State Department’s unofficial “second-
chance” policy, officials temporarily held the students’ passports after they eturned 
home, but hinted that the students could easily regain them if they swore not to return to 
the PRC. Stevens and Harrington, both of whom had cooperated with U.S. officials 
following their departure from the PRC, were also able to reacquire their travel 
documents. Even Du Bois, despite his impending membership to the Communist Party, 
retained his passport by signing an affidavit swearing he would not repeat his action . 
Among those early violators, William Worthy – who explicitly refused to limit his future 
travel plans and, in fact, conceded that he would violate travel restrictions agai  in the 
near future – faced the most serious problems when he returned.83 But even in his case, 
U.S. officials never sought any punitive measures beyond passport confiscation and non-
renewal.  The same moderate punishment came to Du Bois in 1962 when he violated the 
terms of his earlier pledge and made another visit to the PRC.84 
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The decision not to take punitive actions against these sojourners was a significant 
move on the part of the State Department, in part because U.S. officials recognizd that 
weak punishments would likely encourage future and more frequent violations. Director 
of the Office of Chinese Affairs Ralph Clough, for instance, warned Walter Roberts n 
that if Worthy did not receive a harsh punishment, “the ban on travel…will collapse 
rapidly.”85 Such advice was not uncommon, pointing to the conclusion that most 
policymakers either looked forward to that result or were simply unwillig to take the 
necessary steps to ensure it would not happen. 
More striking, in August 1957 the State Department floated its own 
counterproposal for correspondents’ travel, agreeing to provide representatives from 
twenty-four news agencies with valid passports.86 Given the earlier ambivalence of 
Dulles and other U.S. officials toward the travel ban, along with growing pressure from 
the American public, the move was not a total surprise. Dulles and others in the State 
Department had been actively working on the initiative since March; the major sticking 
point had been devising a means of assuaging the journalism community without 
completely dissolving the government’s ban on travel.87  
Aside from developing a compromise that officials felt would satisfy the bulk of 
the American public while protecting U.S. interests in the Far East, several factors made 
mid-1957 an auspicious time to make a move. The PRC’s “people diplomacy” – by 
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which officials had actively and publicly lobbied for the visits of American newsmen – 
put serious pressure on the Eisenhower administration.88 Coupled with this was the vocal 
domestic criticism that had risen dramatically in the wake of the Chinese invitation. On 
top of external and internal pressures, the visits and safe returns of Stevens, Harri gton, 
Worthy, and the American students, all of whom came across as relatively harmess and 
sympathetic, made Washington’s travel ban front-page news and made it more difficult
for U.S. officials to defend it as vital to national security.  
China watchers within the administration also likely noted that in the early 
months of 1957, Mao had grown more hostile toward the United States. Stepping up his 
fight against U.S. aggression and imperialism, Mao’s policies in early 1957 
foreshadowed the PRC’s anti-Western, anti-conservative Great Leap Forward, which 
commenced the following year.89 For this reason, Washington officials could safely 
assume that Mao would likely never accept a U.S. travel initiative. By choosing this 
moment to forward the travel initiative and force the Chinese to make the next move, 
U.S. officials could take the upper hand and paint the Chinese as the antagonists. To this 
end, U.S. officials actively encouraged news agencies to take full advantage of he State 
Department’s new policy and apply for passports valid for the PRC. Not only would this 
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put added pressure on the Chinese government, it would also directly address domestic 
claims that the State Department was to blame for the logjam.90  
From Beijing’s perspective, the sudden shift in Washington’s travel policy 
suggested that Chinese efforts to pressure Washington were succeeding and PRC officials 
proceeded to push the issue further by demanding reciprocity for any travel exchange that 
took place. When U.S. officials announced that they would agree to “de facto” 
reciprocity, the Chinese insisted that Washington and Beijing officials sign a formal, 
“equality and reciprocity” agreement.91 For the Chinese, the ongoing dialogue was never 
really about the right to travel or the free exchange of ideas; instead, as historian Yafeng 
Xia notes, “there was a clear preoccupation with issues of sovereignty and mutual 
equality.” The back and forth on the newsmen was only useful, therefore, if it led to 
increased respect from the West and resolution of broader issues such as Taiwan and UN 
membership.92 In this way, the dialogue on the newsmen exchange reinforced the 
“fundamental tendency” of the Chinese to bring all international policy questions back to 
the issues of Taiwan and diplomatic recognition – a development that emerged during 
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Korean War negotiations at Kaesong and Panjumon and again at the ongoing talks at 
Geneva.93  
The Eisenhower administration was only willing to go so far in giving the 
Chinese the respect they desired. The sudden call for a formal reciprocity agreement 
signaled to the administration that the Chinese were merely toying with the Americans 
and that they would continue to push the finish line back farther and farther. Dulles’s 
rejection of Chinese demands for reciprocity, in turn, provided Beijing adequate 
justification for rejecting Washington’s initiative. The P ople’s Daily criticized the State 
Department’s travel proposal as a “clumsy deception” and placed the blame for the 
exchange’s failure squarely on Washington.94 From this point on, both sides recognized 
that the exchange proposals were unlikely to bear any immediate fruit.  
The exceptions that proved the rule were the cases of John Strohm, an agricultural 
writer and editor for Ford Farmer’s Almanac, and famed writer Edgar Snow, both of 
whom received valid passports under the State Department’s 1957 proposal. Strohm’s 
opportunity came first. In September 1958, working through the Chinese Embassy in 
Finland, Strohm received a visa from PRC officials and visited China for three weeks.95 
News of Strohm’s admission caught U.S. officials by surprise and set off a wave of 
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speculation. There was disagreement within the State Department over whether t  
Chinese, when they invited Strohm to visit, knew that he was one of the accredited 
newsmen. Andrew Berding, of the State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs, ws 
convinced the Chinese saw Strohm as an “agricultural specialist,” not a government-
approved journalist. But Walter Robertson and others in the Far East Division were 
inclined to think that the Chinese knew of Strohm’s status. PRC officials were, by this 
point, somewhat familiar with the language of U.S. passports and knew that each passport 
included clear language prohibiting travel to “Communist China.” When the State 
Department had validated Strohm’s passport for travel to the PRC, U.S. officials had 
stricken the anti-PRC language from his travel papers; this in itself should have been a 
strong hint that he was one of the State Department-sanctioned journalists.96  
In summer 1960 Edgar Snow followed suit. Because of Snow’s background as a 
writer sympathetic to Mao’s regime, the events leading up to his admission to the PRC 
caused even more disagreement and confusion in Washington. As Snow recalled, the 
Eisenhower administration was firmly set against the visit, doing “everything but compel 
me to go to China illegally, if at all.”97 By the time the State Department floated its own 
newsmen exchange proposal – a move that Snow criticized as halfhearted – PRC officials 
were clearly uninclined to allow American journalists to visit. To ease anxieties on the 
Chinese side and to avoid being completely shut out of the PRC, Snow applied for 
admission as a “writer,” as opposed to a “journalist.” To placate Washington officials, 
Snow sought the support of Look magazine, which made Snow its news representative in 
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China. “Very grudgingly,” Washington allowed the validation process to move forward. 
But because of the differing viewpoints from Beijing and Washington – the Chinese 
seeing Snow as “a-writer-not-a-correspondent” and Washington officials insisting he was 
“a-correspondent-not-a-writer,” few officials in Washington saw Snow’s visit as a sign of 
Sino-American cooperation.98 
Neither Strohm’s nor Snow’s visit was a coup for the Sino-American newsmen 
exchange. Instead, many U.S. officials saw them as oversights on the part of the Chinese 
or further evidence that PRC officials would grant entry only to those who were 
sympathetic to the Communist cause. Nonetheless, between 1958 and the mid-1960s 
Strohm’s and Snow’s visits were the only ones that materialized out of the Sino-
American newsmen exchange proposals. While the State Department renewed its offer n 
October 1958 and again in 1961 – and even “dared” the Chinese in April 1959 to send 
their own reporters to the United States – the Chinese continued to object.99 
Critics on the American side were quick to point fingers. They charged that U.S. 
officials floated their proposal without a reciprocity clause knowing that the Chinese 
would reject it.100 There is no doubt that Washington improved its image somewhat as a 
result of PRC non-compliance. At a March 1957 meeting on a possible newsmen 
exchange, for example, Dulles and most of the other participating officials voiced 
confidence that the Chinese would reject Washington’s pending offer, but noted, “this 
would be beneficial to us.”101 To this end, in a call to Roderic O’Connor in late 1958, 
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Dulles suggested State Department officials should “violate our own rules a little by 
being a little more liberal [with passport distribution].” Since he was confidet that the 
PRC would never grant visas to American visitors, the proliferation of valid passport  to 
“a few people of good repute” would serve only to quiet frustrated would-be travelers and 
embarrass the Chinese regime.102 The political benefit of Chinese rejection was still 
apparent a decade later when Secretary of State Dean Rusk acknowledged that the 
continuation of “our willingness to promote such contact in contrast to Chinese 
Communist intransigence has scored heavily for us here and abroad.”103 
While U.S. officials recognized the political benefit of the unrequited travel 
proposal, they simultaneously worked to downplay the significance of their offer. There
was an overwhelming concern that the American media and PRC officials would 
exaggerate the significance of the newsmen offer and perceive it as a sudden an  
dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy. To avoid this, State Department instructions to 
USIA officials stated that announcements regarding the proposal “should not be given 
major emphasis.” The decision to allow American newsmen into the PRC was “in no 
sense intended to be a step towards the opening of cultural relations,” nor did it implya 
change in political recognition, UN membership, or “any slackening of our opposition to 
the Chinese Communist regime.”104 In internal memoranda and press statements, officials 
stressed that the new travel policy was not a sign of “softness” and had less to do wi h 
rewarding the Chinese as it did removing “restrictions on Americans’ freedom of 
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action.”105 As late as 1965, officials were still keeping information on travel ban 
“exceptions” out of the press. In one conversation between State Department officials and 
members of the journalism community, for instance, it was clear that the Department had 
not sufficiently advertised its recent decision to increase the number of journalists that 
each authorized newspaper could send to the PRC. To have done so, one State 
Department official noted, would “be taken mistakenly as a hint that we are loosening our 
China policy.”106 The newsmen exchange proposal was, in sum, an “exception” to the 
rule and thus did not foreshadow substantive changes to Washington’s China policy. Just 
as angry journalists had earlier insisted that Cold War geopolitics should not interfere 
with a citizens’ right to travel, so too it seemed that official travel policy should have 
little bearing on international relations.     
The State Department’s travel initiative, however, went beyond political posturing 
and its significance moved beyond the realm of policy anomaly. In this sense, U.S. 
officials were not merely toying with the PRC to assuage domestic critics and gain 
support internationally; the proposal, whether or not it bore immediate fruit, was 
substantive and consequential, though not necessarily in ways that U.S. officials 
intended. First, while the newsmen proposal helped calm some domestic critics and 
pleased most U.S. allies, it created notable tension between the Eisenhower 
administration, Taiwan officials, and frustrated American diehards. Jiang Jieshi strongly 
opposed the initiative, arguing that its disadvantages outweighed the advantages. Taiwan 
officials and most Taiwan newspapers, moreover, feared that U.S. agreement on the 
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newsmen issue would lead to future concessions toward the PRC.107 U.S. officials, 
similarly, anticipated that the proposal would complicate Washington’s position at the
ongoing Sino-American talks at Geneva. Coming on the heels of Washington’s 1956 
pronouncement that it would not allow Americans to travel to China as long as the PRC 
continued to hold prisoners, the 1957 exchange proposal could be interpreted as a 
significant step back. The Chinese, Ralph Clough feared, would believe that “time is on 
their side” and they would continue to hold the POWs as bargaining chips.108 
Second, some State Department officials considered it a real possibility that he 
U.S. and PRC would come to some agreement on the newsmen issue and Washington 
officials took steps toward ironing out the details of such an exchange. Going far beyond 
public statements of cooperation, State Department officials held countless me tings to 
discuss the minutiae of how they would select correspondents for travel to the PRC, how 
the correspondents would get to China, and how long the journalists should be able to 
stay. This tentative approach applied to the PRC as well. According to one U.S. 
intelligence report, the Chinese government had gone as far as setting up rooms with 
journalism equipment in anticipation for the American visitors. Jim Robinson of NBC, as 
well, noted that the China Travel Service had given him permission to bring all of his 
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equipment and his Chinese assistant with him to the PRC.109 Furthermore, in 1958 when 
the Chinese surprisingly allowed John Strohm into the PRC, it set off a firestorm of 
debate within Washington over what message the PRC was trying to send. There was 
little sense of frustration within Washington that the Chinese were actually gr nting visas 
to American correspondents; some officials in the State Department’s Far East Division, 
in fact, believed that the decision to let Strohm in the country “indicates a shift of 
intention” on the part of the Chinese.110 In 1959, in part to test this hypothesis, the State 
Department quietly removed from U.S. passports language that PRC officials deemed 
“insulting.”111  
Finally, U.S. policymakers realized that the decision to allow newsmen to receive 
valid passports – regardless of Beijing’s immediate response – made it inevitable that 
future liberalization would follow. Even though serious discussions of travel 
“exceptions” dealt only with newsmen, officials feared that such an exchange would lead 
to charges of arbitrariness or even legal challenges. Dulles, for one, was aware that it 
would be difficult to limit travel exchanges to journalists, noting that there was no 
precedent for allowing only one occupational group to travel to an “off-limits” 
destination. Writing to New York Times editor Arthur Sulzenberger, Dulles continued 
voicing his concerns, stating that he could see “no valid distinction between 
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newsgatherers and those members of other professions who claim a constitutional right to 
travel.”112 
This line of thinking, if carried to completion, suggested that once travel reform 
had begun, further “limiting would be quite difficult.”113 Walter McConaughy took this 
even further, arguing that the slightest change in the travel ban would eventually allow 
Chinese correspondents to enter the United States, which would pose an obvious 
“security threat.”114 For Dulles, this unintended side effect of liberalization had been, 
through mid-1957, justification enough not to allow the newsmen to travel. In the months 
before the State Department presented its proposal, Dulles routinely implied that he 
would support the exchange only if the Department could still maintain strict bans on all 
other travel to the PRC. Eisenhower, for the most part, concurred with his Secretary of 
State, concluding that Washington should “stick to the line that until the Americans were 
released we would not permit any Americans to go in.” If the State Department went 
down any other path, “it would be very difficult to find a stopping point once we 
started.”115 Writing a letter to U. Alexis Johnson in Geneva, Ralph Clough summed up 
the basic approach of the Eisenhower administration. While he agreed with the 
pessimistic conclusion that the State Department could do little to stop the steady erosion 
of the ban on travel to the PRC, he insisted that he and other officials were going to make 
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an attempt.116 As would be seen, however, the effort was largely in vain. In loosening 
restrictions to allow American journalists to receive passports, the State Department was 
tacitly – though often begrudgingly – allowing for gradual, yet consistent, liberalization 
of travel policy. 
 
VI 
In the years following the State Department’s travel proposal, the unwillingness 
and inability of U.S. officials to prohibit all American travel to the PRC became fr more 
evident. Almost immediately after the Department shifted its policy on the newsm n, it 
validated a handful of passports for travel to the PRC. First among these exceptions, in 
November 1957, was A. L. Wirin, the defense attorney in the sedition case of John and 
Sylvia Powell.117 The case of Wirin is especially significant in that U.S. officials had 
earlier voiced concern that if William Worthy did not receive a harsh punishment for his 
violation of the travel ban, other Americans – A. L. Wirin first among them – would take 
advantage of this development.118 A month later the State Department allowed the 
relatives of John Downey, Richard Fecteau, and Hugh Redmond – whom the Chinese 
were holding prisoner – to travel to the PRC to visit their kin.119 In May 1959 Secretary 
of State Herter validated a passport for former New York Governor W. Averell 
                                                
116 Clough to Johnson, 18 July 1957, General Records of the Department of State, Entry #48, Box 3, 
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117 A U.S. judge, in January 1957, sanctioned the travel of Wirin to the PRC on the condition that he leav  
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1957 U.S. officials felt that the situation had changed enough to allow the visit to proceed. Robertson o 
Dulles, “Travel to Communist China of Relatives of American Prisoners,” 16 November 1957, General 
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 239 
 
Harriman, who served as a representative of the North American Newspaper Alliance. 
This last exception, though technically part of the newsmen exchange, signaled that 
Washington was becoming quite loose with its definition of “journalist.” Most State 
Department officials, in fact, were unified in their opposition to the idea. Herter, Walter 
Robertson, and other leading officials, argued that granting Harriman a passport would 
appear as “a significant step towards a change in the Government’s basic policy towards 
the Peiping regime.”120 
Though U.S. officials qualified each of these “exceptions” with predictable 
assurances that they did not signify a change in U.S. policy toward the PRC, with every 
additional change to the travel policy, U.S. officials were opening themselves mor  and 
more to a wide range of legal, constitutional, and political challenges that would 
inevitably undermine all remaining travel prohibitions. The decision on Harriman, which 
critics said violated the spirit of the State Department’s passport policy, immediately set 
off a wave of other public officials – including a set of U.S. congressmen and a Supreme 
Court Justice – who desired to travel to China as “newsmen.”121 U.S. officials, moreover, 
were very much aware of these consequences as they developed their new passport
policies. Referring to the potential visit of A L. Wirin to the PRC, State Department 
officials noted that “the thin line being held preventing American citizens from traveling 
[to] Communist China could easily be broken” if Wirin were to make the trip. Wirin’s 
trip was, in this sense, the “key to Pandora’s Box” in terms of future American travel to 
                                                
120 While Wirin, and the families of Fecteau, Downey, and Redmond were successful in their efforts to 
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China.122 Dulles voiced a similar note of apprehension in regard to the families of the 
American POWs. Allowing them to visit the PRC, he acknowledged, “would mean 
another breach in our prohibition of American travel to Communist China” and it “would 
probably be interpreted in some quarters as the beginning of a softening in our policy.”123  
This concession of inevitable liberalization did not, however, mean that officials 
in the Eisenhower administration were eager to open the floodgates of American travel to 
the PRC. Instead, the administration attempted to control the speed and scope of 
liberalization by limiting travel to specific, carefully chosen “exceptions.” While travel 
often escaped the grasp of U.S. policymakers during the Eisenhower administratio  – s 
seen with the handful of American tourists who violated the State Department’s travel 
ban – on the whole Washington officials maintained a degree of control. When habitual 
traveler, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, for instance, tried to broaden the 
definition of “journalist” in order to receive State Department permission to the travel to 
the PRC, Walter Robertson explained that the exception for newsmen was not meant to 
be "a facade under which the ban on travel by Americans to Communist China could be 
nullified."124 John Hanes, of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, made the same 
judgment when Senator Gale McGee brought up the idea of traveling to the PRC under 
the guise of a journalist.125 Though the State Department’s decision to grant Harriman a 
passport dulled these rebuttals to some extent, on the whole the willingness of 
Eisenhower’s State Department to ease restrictions on travel to the PRC did not translate 
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into an eagerness to engage in any sort of organized cultural or educational exchanges 
with Communist China.126 One of the primary reasons that State Department officials 
were hesitant to approve the newsmen exchange in the first place was, in fact, the 
concern that the Chinese would perceive it or portray it as the commencement of a Sin -
American cultural exchange program.127 
State Department records from the decade or so following the establishment of the 
PRC are, nonetheless, filled with requests from politicians, business leaders, cultu al
delegates, and private citizens who desired permission to travel behind the Bamboo 
Curtain. Ironically, the stimulus for these requests was likely the handful of travel ban 
violators and the well-known reforms to U.S. travel policy. In addition to Justice Douglas 
and Senator McGee, journalists Theodore White and John Gunther, Philadelphia Mayor 
Richardson Dilworth, a group of University of Oklahoma students, and former Senator 
William Benton, among numerous others, all requested from the State Department valid 
passports for travel to the PRC. It was in this context, as well, that Robert Bren initiated 
his failed attempt to bring Porgy and Bess to Beijing. For the most part, these would-be 
travelers cited personal curiosity, a belief that their visit could bring about positive 
change to Sino-American relations, and an underlying faith in the right to travel. Though 
most individuals who made these requests received form letters rejecting their proposals, 
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U.S. officials, as in the case of the American newsmen, genuinely debated whether to 
sanction these sorts of cultural exchanges.128 
 
VII 
As more and more Americans headed over the Pacific, mass travel became 
another stage on which to wage the Sino-American conflict. The manner in which U.S. 
officials dealt with these travelers underscored their ambivalence toward the integration 
of tourism into Cold War policy. Pre-World War II travel to China – as seen in the 
prolific writing of Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Graham Peck, and others – had often 
been a vehicle for leftist politics and officials hoped to eliminate this aspect of tourism in 
the postwar years.129 Official support for the International Educational Exchange 
Program, the funding of luxury hotels overseas, subsidizing air and shipping lines, and 
participation in international travel associations, were all part of an attempt o liberate 
tourism from the left and secure its role as a middle-class, mainstream, patriotic 
pastime.130 When the State Department combined these “positive” actions with its 
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restrictive policy on travel to the PRC, moreover, officials were able to use travel as an 
effective means of strengthening Cold War containment. 
At the same time, Washington officials saw travel to the PRC as a potential 
mechanism for engaging the Chinese. Unlike modifications to the economic embargo or 
recognition policy, travel seemed to be a more innocuous arena for reform. Officials 
could, moreover, relegate potential travel exchanges to the realm of “exceptions” or 
justify them merely as efforts to bring Americans more information about “frbidden” 
lands. And because most Americans clearly distinguished these sorts of travel exchanges 
from other forms of U.S.-PRC interaction, U.S. officials risked less political backlash. 
These aspects of travel and travel policy – which applied to any nation to which 
Americans traveled – were especially applicable in regard to the PRC during the Cold 
War, with emotions running high and domestic and international politics seeming to 
operate in a zero-sum environment. 
But the very uniqueness that gave tourism the potential to build bridges across the 
Bamboo Curtain also circumscribed U.S. officials, making tourism an unwieldy conduit 
for foreign policy that easily evaded the grasp of policymakers. Becaus travel, in the 
post-World War II period, came to be associated with middle-class values, leisure, and 
escape, it seemed to operate outside the traditional confines of international politics. 
Compounding this was the fact that Washington’s efforts to manipulate travel to the PRC 
emerged alongside – and indeed were a part of – its own campaign to reduce travel 
barriers. Recognizing this seeming contradiction, many high-level U.S. officials in the 
Eisenhower administration and Congress were neither confident nor comfortable in their 
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jurisdiction over international travel, giving the government’s travel policy a truly 
schizophrenic nature.  
The American public, as well, latched on to this trend as individual tourists 
resisted the seemingly politicized travel restrictions. Armed with both a natural curiosity 
to see the world and the growing affluence to make it happen, tourists wanted (or at least
believed they should be allowed) to visit the PRC just as they did other, more traditional, 
destinations. When a few Americans slipped through the cracks of the travel ban, and 
returned home to talk about it, the usefulness of the restrictions seemed even more 
dubious. The general U.S. policy of minimizing obstacles to international travel thus had 
the unexpected result of strengthening the public’s “right to travel” campaign, a trend that 
gradually moved from liberal, fringe groups to the mainstream. By the end of the 
Eisenhower administration Americans had come to expect the freedom to travel and they 




Ch. 6 – The “Tourist Problem”: Efforts to Restrain Outbound 
Travel and the Continued Erosion of the China Travel Ban, 
1960-1968 
 
Why do the wrong people travel 
When the right people stay back home? 
What compulsion compels them 
And who the hell tells them 
To drag their bags to Zanzibar 
Instead of staying quietly in Omaha? 
 
-- Noel Coward, “Sail Away” (1962) 
 
Freedom to travel is constantly being eroded around the globe by political restrictions and 
economic barriers. This freedom does not exist in many lands and is under attack in 
others, including our own.1 
 
-- William D. Patterson, Pacific Travel News, 1963 
 
The discrepancy between what I had been led to expect and what I actually saw was t 
first bewildering and disturbing. No one can be in China for more than a few hours 
without sensing an almost tangible vitality and enormous optimism.2 
 
-- Felix Greene, Awakened China: The Country Americans Don’t Know (1961) 
 
In December 1964 Dr. Samuel Rosen, a renowned ear surgeon, received word 
from the State Department that he could travel to the PRC.3 The State Department’s 
decision was, to some extent, nothing extraordinary. As discussed above, in the decade 
prior to the Rosen case the Department had allowed a number of Americans to visit the 
PRC, or at least receive a valid passport. The episode involving Rosen, moreover, ended 
in familiar disappointment; only a week after sending the invitation the Chinese rescinded 
the offer.4 Despite the emerging stalemate and the fact that Washington and Beijing 
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quickly spun the incident in ways that were politically self-serving, the Stat 
Department’s decision to provide Rosen with a valid passport was significant. Whereas 
past decisions by the State Department to allow Americans to travel to the PRC always 
fell under the category of “exceptions,” in the case of Rosen, officials made less of an 
effort to marginalize the travel decision. Instead, a State Department spokesman justified 
it as a “humanitarian” gesture and defended it as “in the national interest.” 
By introducing these new standards for travel and by justifying Rosen’s trip as 
being consonant with U.S. interests, the State Department introduced a new phase in 
travel policy. The legality of Rosen’s trip from Washington’s point of view opened the 
floodgates for legal American travel to the PRC. Over the next few years the State 
Department provided passports for numerous writers, photographers, editors, television 
commentators, businessmen, and scholars – all of whom were expected to provide the 
public with “essential information about the restricted areas.” By the time the Lyndon 
Johnson administration left office, the State Department seemed willing to allow – or at 
least unable to stop – any American to travel to the PRC for any reason.5 
The Rosen episode suggests that the Democratic administrations of the 1960s, like 
the Eisenhower administration, attempted to reform travel bans as a means of engaging, 
and possibly embarrassing, the Chinese. At the same time, they continued to have 
difficulty defining the limits of those reforms and, subsequently, enforcing compliance to 
those limits. Adding to the difficulties Kennedy and Johnson faced in establishing a 
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usable travel policy, dramatic international economic changes suddenly threw doubt on 
the long-standing assumption that outbound American tourism was a positive 
phenomenon. Faced with the unenviable choice of risking U.S. economic stability or 
actively inserting the federal government as an impediment to international travel, the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations embarked down a shaky and ambiguous path. The 
manipulation of travel as a foreign policy tool was not an exact science; just asKennedy 
and Johnson would struggle to limit travel to the PRC, so too did they find that curtailing 
recreational tourism overseas was not entirely feasible. 
 
I 
In May 1960 Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs Bradley 
Fisk testified before Congress on the “tourist problem.” While he recognized the “infinite 
cultural value of travel,” Fisk questioned the economic logic behind continued federal 
promotion of outbound tourism. For one, foreign economies were improving; it no longer 
seemed necessary to use outbound American tourism as an economic stimulus for foreign 
nations. More significantly, as American tourists – and with them the American gold 
supply – continued to flow overseas, the international balance-of-payments problem 
began to reverse itself and U.S. officials faced potentially deleterious deficits. As of 1959 
the U.S. was facing an annual $3.7 billion trade deficit.6  
The outward flow of tourists, of course, was not the only factor in this economic 
shift; non-military foreign aid, in the form of technical assistance and developm nt loans, 
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for example, annually added $500 million to this imbalance.7 But the “tourist deficit” was 
a major part of this overall shortfall. Hovering around $1 billion dollars in 1959, the 
difference between U.S. expenditures overseas and expenditures spent by incoming 
tourists to the United States rose to $1.7 billion in 1963 and to $1.9 billion in 1966.8 Even 
as U.S. commercial exports rose and government expenditures fell in the mid-1960s – the 
combination of which led to an improvement of the balance-of-payments problem over 
1960 figures – consistently heavy overseas tourist spending offset any positive trend.9 As 
a result, nearly every memorandum on the balance-of-payments issue, from Eisenhower 
through Johnson, expounded the disparity between inbound and outbound travel as a 
major factor in the deficit and highlighted it as a logical place to cut costs. 
This objective of slowing the outbound stream of tourists or, at the least, bringing 
more foreign tourists to American shores, was not easily achieved. In an ironic twist, the 
success that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and industry leaders had in 
promoting and expanding American tourism overseas now meant that the domestic 
American tourism industry was woefully inadequate. This state of affairs h d, throughout 
the 1940s and most of the 1950s, been acceptable since economic realities demanded that 
international tourism be largely a one-way process. With relatively weak economies in 
postwar European and Asian nations, there had been little demand for international travel 
to the United States.10 Clarence Randall, moreover, had consciously ignored the domestic 
tourism market, noting that encouraging tourism to the United States would merely mean 
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“less correction of the [payments] imbalance.”11 By the end of Eisenhower’s second term, 
however, the international economic climate had changed dramatically and the weak 
American tourist industry became a liability.  
Despite these economic considerations, efforts to use federal funds to lure foreign
travelers to the United States ran into significant political opposition. Numerous 
congressmen saw the campaign as a waste of taxpayer money. Randall argued it was “not 
a proper function of Government” to support the domestic tourism industry. Using 
government money in this way, he noted, would “not only be in conflict with our basic 
concept of free enterprise but would be unfair to other segments of American industry 
who likewise are engaged in foreign trade.” Less diplomatically, in his private journal, 
Randall wrote that the domestic tourism industry would receive the money “over my 
dead body.”12 Limited in his options and facing budget shortfalls, Eisenhower fell back 
on symbolism and declared 1960 “Visit the U.S.A. Year.” But due to fiscal concerns in 
Congress and the White House, Eisenhower paradoxically coupled this declaration with a 
40 percent cut in the Commerce Department’s Office of International Travel.13 
Eisenhower’s domestic tourism program was, at best, a limited success. Under 
government supervision, and with the assistance of the private National Association of 
Travel Organizations, officials sent thousands of travel portfolios – containing pertinent 
information on the United States for potential foreign visitors – to overseas posts and 
travel agencies. Private tourism companies, including American Express and Trans 
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World Airlines, stepped up their own promotional campaigns, sending multilingual 
brochures and films overseas to stir up excitement about visiting the United Stats.  
But U.S. officials, despite their role in initiating tourism programs in the 
Caribbean, Europe, and Asia, seemed unfit for the task of reversing the direction of 
tourist traffic. The Saturday Review – which provided a leading voice in encouraging an 
expanded domestic tourism industry – criticized the government campaign as a 
“lukewarm national effort” and a “dismal failure.”14 Entry and exit policies for visiting 
tourists – which U.S. officials had consistently encouraged foreign governments to 
liberalize – remained fairly restrictive in the United States. Rumors also circulated that 
U.S. Customs agents treated incoming foreigners poorly, asking rude and inappropriate 
questions and encouraging unnecessary delays.15 A  noted by John Houser (who had 
recently made the move from Hilton to American Express), the primary succes of the 
“Visit the U.S.A.” campaign was the rapid recognition among Washington officials th t 
the United States was woefully behind other countries in terms of its domestic tourism 
program.16 Reflecting the consistent obstacles facing the domestic tourism industry, 1960 
saw one of the lowest numbers of foreign visitors to the United States of the previous 
decade.17 
                                                
14 “The U.S.A. as a Touristland,” Saturday Review, 9 January 1960; Sutton, “Why They Don’t Visit the 
U.S.A.,” Saturday Review, 15 October 1960. 
15 Several U.S. Senators, testifying before the Senate Commerce Committee in February 1961, recounted 
stories of humiliation, delays, and unfairness toward incoming tourists. A State Department questionnaire 
for incoming tourists, which asked whether individuals were visiting the United States for “immoral 
purposes,” caused significant outcry. In response, the Department scrapped the questionnaire in March 
1961. UPI, “Senators Decry Tourism Policy,” New York Times, 3 February 1961; Alfred Krusenstiern, 
“U.S. Drops ‘Immoral Purpose’ Part of Query Put to W uld-Be Visitors,” Washington Post and Times-
Herald, 6 March 1961. 
16 Quoted in Sutton, “Why They Don’t Visit the U.S.A.,” Saturday Review, 15 October 1960; Horace 
Sutton, “The Administration and the Traveler,” Saturday Review, 7 January 1961.   
17 Sutton, “The Administration and the Traveler,” Saturday Review, 7 January 1961. 
 251 
 
Eisenhower left office with the tourist problem still lingering. As the balance-of-
payments problems worsened during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, top-level 
approaches to international tourism became more aggressive. Kennedy – who sought to 
implement Eisenhower’s largely symbolic attempt at attracting foreign tourists – scored 
an early victory in 1961 with the establishment of the U.S. Travel Service. The 
government-run travel agency had been in the works for several years; New York Senator 
Jacob Javits had first introduced the idea in 1954 but was unable to bring it to fruition. 
The Service, located within the Commerce Department and headed by former Pan Am 
executive Voit Gilmore, worked closely with PATA, the National Association of Travel 
Organizations, and the American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) in “selling” the 
United States to foreign tourists, disseminating literature with the Service’s “Travel a 
New World” slogan. At the same time, the Service worked with the domestic tourism 
industry and service sector in an effort to make travel to the U.S. less burdensome. In an 
article in Pacific Travel News, Gilmore presented his new office as a logical means of 
both increasing dollar holdings and “broaden[ing] the avenues of friendship and 
understanding with the rest of the world.”18 
Even with the new Travel Service, however, efforts to bring more foreign 
travelers to the United States were not entirely effective. Numbers for incom g travelers 
did increase. The 331,000 visitors that came to the United States during the first half of 
1963, for example, marked a 50 percent increase over the 1961 figures. These increases, 
however, were not large enough and officials worried that such gains could not be 
maintained indefinitely.19 Again, funding was the primary issue. Policymakers were 
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unwilling to increase the Service’s initial $3 million budget, a figure that already fell far 
short of the tourism budget for nations like Canada and Greece.20 On top of this, 
outbound travel simply remained too popular. Kennedy and Johnson tried to counter this 
by increasing the number of charter flights to the United States and encouraging airlines 
to offer discounted prices on incoming flights.21 While these measures had some effect 
and inbound numbers continued to increase, they were still dwarfed by the millions of 
Americans headed overseas.  
With inbound tourism remaining woefully inadequate, the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations addressed the other side of the equation, working to discourage American 
travelers from leaving the country. To this end, the administrations promoted a voluntary, 
“See America First” approach. In a January 1, 1968 speech on the balance-of-payments 
crisis, in which Johnson laid out his goal of lowering the tourist deficit by $500 million, 
Johnson asked Americans “to help their country in this situation by deferring any travel 
outside the Western hemisphere that is possible to defer.” He repeated this appeal two 
weeks later in his State of the Union Address.22 Implicit in this approach, as journalists 
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak noted, was convincing Americans that “it’s chic as 
well as patriotic to see America.”23 Teaching by example, Lady Bird Johnson, along with 
other White House wives, took a well publicized two-day “Landscapes and Landmarks” 
tour of Virginia, in a joint effort to promote domestic tourism and Johnson’s highway-
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beautification program.24 Doing his part, Horace Sutton joked that the 1964 World’s Fair, 
held in New York, offered “tourists” a chance to see the world without leaving the 
country. With exhibits from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Israel, Argentina, and 
other countries, Americans could experience the “world tour” without having to boil 
drinking water or learn a new language.25  
While reducing the number of outbound American tourists was crucial to 
resolving the balance-of-payments crisis, the Johnson administration recognized that such 
moves were politically risky and quite unpopular among the American public. The “See 
America First” campaign, however, offered a tourist-friendly approach to t e balance-of-
payments crisis. Americans did not have to cancel their vacations or choose betwen 
patriotism and personal recreation; they merely had to change their destination, to replace 
the Eiffel Tower with the Grand Canyon. But the voluntary approach was not wholly 
effective. Members from Johnson’s cabinet, for instance, acknowledged that while the 
President’s appeals “may have some restraining effect on tourism abroad this year…it is 
difficult to see how we can approach the targeted savings on travel expenditures wihout
taking some further measures before the tourist season is in full swing.”26 I deed, 
policymakers in the 1960s took more punitive, aggressive action to combat the troubling 
deficits. Kennedy, in a drawn-out and highly controversial move, trimmed the duty-free 
exemption for tourists from $500 to $100 (a “whopping curtailment” according to the 
Saturday Review).27 Johnson institutionalized this approach, assembling a Tourism Task 
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Force in 1967 with the goal of “restrain[ing] American travel outside the western 
hemisphere.”28 He made clear that if American travelers did not voluntarily give up their 
vacations, or change the venue to the western hemisphere, he would absolutely pursue 
legislative tactics.29 Following up on this promise, Johnson proposed a number of tax 
increases, including a 40 percent surtax on plane and ship tickets, a 20-30 percent tax on 
overseas tourist expenditures, and $8-10 tax per tourist for every day spent overseas.30 
As could have been anticipated, this approach to international tourism was not 
without its critics. Numerous travel writers, U.S. policymakers, and foreign officials 
decried these attempts to limit international tourism. The Saturday Review led the way, 
launching regular attacks at the prohibitive measures. Editor William D. Patterson 
branded travel “one of modern man’s basic freedoms” and suggested that the ability to 
“freely leave one’s country and return…should be officially written into the charter of 
human freedoms.” To Patterson, the right to travel, which was consistently under attack 
behind the Iron Curtain, was now at risk within the United States. Moderate “restrictions” 
such as passport and visa requirements, along with more directly prohibitive measures 
such as travel taxes and travel bans, amounted to nothing less than an assault on human 
liberty. In another article, in light of the UN’s proclamation that 1965 was “International 
Cooperation Year,” Patterson thought it ironic and maddening that the U.S. government 
was “stifling one of the most basic contemporary expressions of cooperation: world travel 
and tourism.” While the dollar-gap was a legitimate problem, Patterson insisted, “a 
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‘Yankee Stay Home’ policy would work even more seriously against the national 
interest.”31 
International travel forums, as well, reacted unfavorably toward U.S. efforts to 
reduce the outward flow of tourists. Hawaii Governor William Quinn, speaking at the
1961 PATA conference, optimistically predicted that the Eisenhower administration (in 
its final days) would not stand in the way of Americans traveling overseas. To act
otherwise, Quinn noted, “would constitute a complete reversal of U.S. foreign policy.”32 
Other PATA delegates – forecasting some of the initiatives of the Kennedy ad Johnson 
administrations – worried that U.S. officials would either urge American travelers to 
“voluntarily boycott carriers of other nations” or use federal fiscal policies, such as 
decreasing duty-free allowances, to discourage overseas travel.33 When Johnson 
eventually went forward with his travel tax proposal, delegates at PATA’s 1968 
conference in Taipei unanimously adopted a resolution denouncing the initiative.34 
Executive director F. Marvin Plake announced his own concerns that the U.S. balance-of-
payments problem – “an acute malady which might easily spread in pandemic 
proportions throughout the world of travel” – would result in a constriction of American 
outbound tourism. He insisted (somewhat accurately) that American travel overseas was 
not “the prime culprit for this [trade] imbalance.” Plake contended that outbound tourism, 
in fact, worked to stimulate the U.S. economy by strengthening its international consumer 
base and profiting U.S.-based tourism companies. Instead of restricting outbound 
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tourism, he suggested that the United States “join the travel industry of the world”in 
making the country more attractive to potential visitors.35  
In a slightly different approach, foreign governments subtly challenged the 
shifting U.S. policy merely by expanding their own international tourism programs. 
Following the 14th Annual IUOTO Conference in Manila, Philippines President Carlos 
Garcia, for example, announced that 1961 would be “Visit the Orient Year.”36 The 
proposed campaign – supported by seven nations in the Far East including Taiwan – 
respectfully mimicked Eisenhower’s prior announcement on U.S. domestic tourism. The 
proposed campaign, moreover, pursued the very objectives that Washington officials, 
years earlier, had encouraged. Asian governments promised to step up their efforts in 
minimizing bureaucratic red tape, increasing restaurant and hotel facilities, modernizing 
airports and harbors, and developing effective advertising campaigns.37 Garcia did not 
intend his proposal to cause a confrontation between the U.S. and the Far East; instead, 
he saw his move as a natural outgrowth of the region’s steadily expanding tourism 
industry. When U.S. policymakers in the early 1960s suddenly shifted gears, hoping to 
replace American travel overseas with foreign travelers visiting the Unit d States, Garcia 
and other Asian tourism officials understandably cried foul.  
As exemplified by these concerns, anxiety surrounding Washington’s travel 
restrictions was especially high in the Far East. As mentioned above, Americans made up 
a far greater percentage of travelers to the Far East than they did travelers to Europe. 
Fluctuations in the U.S. economy, or legislation that dissuaded Americans from traveling 
or making purchases overseas, thus had a relatively larger impact on Far East 
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destinations. As early as 1962 officials in Hong Kong and Japan – travel destinations that 
appealed to American bargain-hunters – said they were feeling the impactof Kennedy’s 
reduction of the duty-free allowance.38 
The immediate and international backlash against Washington’s travel reforms 
seemed to pay off. Partly as a response to these persistent critics, U.S. officials toned 
down their rhetoric and backed off of several “anti-travel” initiatives. But Washington’s 
awkward position in the 1960s on the tourism front was not only a matter of public 
relations. From an economic perspective, such restrictions laid the groundwork for 
retaliatory action from other nations, which would likely neutralize any positive impact. 
As Horace Sutton pointed out: “We can scarcely ask other countries to lift their [duty-
free] limits when we have just lowered ours.”39 For many officials and private 
individuals, furthermore, there was something unseemly about a government 
discouraging its citizens from traveling. Despite clear evidence showing that tourism was 
a crucial factor in international money flow, most Americans and many U.S. officials 
continued to approach it as a recreational activity essential to all middle-class Americans. 
This prevailing connotation meant that U.S. officials were either unable or unwilling to 
turn travel into a policy issue.  
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Responding to the intense criticism from many Americans and exemplifying this 
disconnect between tourism and national policy, Voit Gilmore distributed a series of 
explanatory editorials to national newspapers and trade papers, including PATA’s Pacific 
Travel News. “If you’re staying at home because you think your government doesn’t 
want you to spend your vacation in another country,” Gilmore announced, “you can start 
traveling right now!” Gilmore brushed aside criticism of the recent reduction of duty-free 
limits to $100, noting that the prior increase to $500 had always been intended as a short-
term, temporary measure. A reduction in the duty-free allowance, moreover, was 
technically not a restriction on travel, but merely a restriction on purchases. Though 
Gilmore acknowledged that official travel policy had begun focusing more heavily on 
bringing foreign visitors to the United States, he insisted it was not a signal that traveling 
overseas was somehow “unpatriotic.” He defended Washington’s “anti-travel” policies as 
moderate and justifiable and he pointed readers toward simultaneous government actions 
such as the Commerce Department’s recent publication, The Future of Tourism in the 




The continued difficulty that Washington officials faced in curtailing or 
redirecting travel had repercussions that moved beyond economic deficits. For many of 
the same reasons that U.S. officials found it so hard to discourage American tourists from 
traveling overseas, the remaining restrictions on travel to the PRC – which had faced 
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steady erosion since the mid-1950s – became more and more difficult to maintain. 
Activists who had challenged the “anti-travel” policies that Kennedy and Johnson applied 
to recreational tourism, now aimed their arguments at bans on travel behind the Bamboo 
Curtain. 
Consistent efforts to overturn the travel ban raised concerns in Washington. Chief 
among these was that as U.S. officials liberalized passport policy, they risk d allowing 
critics of the United States to travel to the PRC in a relatively unsupervised manner. 
Though this concern was muted somewhat by the fact that the Chinese had allowed few 
Americans actually to enter the PRC, policymakers logically assumed that the Chinese 
would tend to grant visas to leftist or otherwise sympathetic travelers. The visits of 
W.E.B. Du Bois, the American students, and Edgar Snow – all with personal invitations – 
seemed to back up this assumption. If Washington were to expand the field of legal 
travelers, or potentially eliminate travel restrictions altogether, officials anticipated it 
would merely give the Chinese more opportunity to pick and choose. Thus, as Christina 
Klein writes, “travel…became a contested political terrain.”41 
But in the United States travel became a substantial constitutional issue as well. 
Starting near the end of the Eisenhower administration, in response to several cases 
involving individuals violating U.S. travel laws, along with efforts of Congress and the 
White House to curtail travel rights for certain groups of Americans, the federal courts 
entered the “right to travel” debate. The first major development in this regard came in 
1958 when the Supreme Court determined in Ke t v. Dulles that the State Department 
could not deny passports to members of the Communist Party. The Eisenhower 
administration, as would be expected, vehemently opposed the decision. Speaking to 
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Congress in the days after the ruling, Eisenhower insisted that the inability of the State 
Department to control the issuance of passports was contrary to “the orderly conduct of 
our foreign relations and…maintenance of our own national security.” Warning that the 
present legal environment “exposes us to great danger,” Eisenhower urged Congress to 
grant the Secretary of State additional powers in order to counteract the Kent decision.42 
Despite Eisenhower’s efforts, following Kent it became harder and harder for the 
federal government to maintain any travel restrictions; while the Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
and Johnson administrations scored some minor constitutional victories on the passport 
front, on the whole the federal courts worked to weaken government restrictions. The last 
significant rulings on the issue exemplify this trend. United States v. Laub (1967) and 
Lynd v. Rusk (1968), taken in sum, wholly decriminalized “illegal” travel. In Laub – 
which involved several dozen American students who visited Cuba in defiance of U.S. 
prohibitions – the Supreme Court ruled that while the State Department could continue to 
print travel restrictions in U.S. passports, those restrictions were not criminally 
enforceable. Since the students all possessed valid U.S. passports – though not valid for 
travel to Cuba – they could not face prosecution. A year later, in the Lynd decision – 
which involved a Yale University professor’s “peace mission” to North Vietnam – the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia acknowledged that while the Stat 
Department could prohibit the use of passports in travel to particular areas, it could not 
prohibit the travel itself.43 The State Department, moreover, could no longer deny 
passports to individuals on the basis of the traveler’s refusal to abide by travel bans in the 
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future. Taken together, the federal courts were allowing Americans – with or without 
valid U.S. passports – to travel to “off-limits” locales without fear of punishment.44 I  
other words, the fate that had awaited William Worthy, W.E.B. Du Bois, and other trav l
ban violators of the 1950s – namely confiscation of passports and rejection of renewal 
requests – was no longer a possibility.45 A 1968 New York Times headline succinctly 
interpreted the ruling: “Now You Can Travel Anywhere.”46 
Even in the rare cases in which the Supreme Court ruled in favor of federal 
restrictions, there was an underlying current of resignation to the inevitability of free 
travel to the PRC. In Zemel v. Rusk (1965), for example, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Secretary of State could impose restrictions “when in can be demonstrated that unlimited 
travel to the area would directly and materially interfere with the safety nd welfare of 
the area or the nation as a whole.”47 While the tumult of the PRC during the Cultural 
Revolution may have met this standard, by the end of the 1960s such an argument – 
especially when paired with later court rulings – seemed to lose credibility. Several top-
level State Department officials pointed out that while foreign visitors in the PRC were 
not entirely safe from detention or harassment, there was no indication that the removal 
of passport restrictions would aggravate this national security threat. Pointing to he past 
decade of gradual liberalization, moreover, officials noted that, generally speaking, the 
U.S. government and the American public “do not really consider the risks of American 
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travel serious enough to outweigh the benefits of opening a wide and mutually profitable 
range of peaceful contacts between the U.S. and Communist China.”48 
Faced with an unfriendly court system and vocal opponents to the government’s 
remaining travel bans, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations picked up where 
Eisenhower left off. By 1962 many State Department officials, particularly those within 
the Far Eastern Bureau, were pushing for a removal of all bans on travel to all communist 
countries, with the exception of Cuba. Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman, Marshall 
Green, and James Thomson, among others, led the way in pushing for a relaxation in U.S. 
travel policy.49 To these officials, travel to the PRC did not appear to present significant 
risks to American security. The absence of travel, moreover, sapped the United Sta es of 
a “valuable contact between decent elements in China and the outside world.”50 Other 
Kennedy insiders, including Adlai Stevenson and William Bundy, offered more qualified 
support for these changes, viewing them less as a step toward rapprochement and more as 
a means of strengthening containment.51 As part of this move to eliminate travel 
restrictions, top-level Kennedy officials began discussing the possibility of carving out a 
travel policy exception for scholars and other “deserving” applicants.  
While many in the State Department remained supportive of the proposal 
throughout Kennedy’s tenure, the idea of allowing scholars to visit the PRC – much like 
the newsmen exchange proposal – was rife with legalistic complexities. Determining 
what groups would receive valid passports was sure to bring charges of arbitrariness or 
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prejudice. As Lindsey Grant of the Office of East Asian and Pacific Affairs noted, “such 
a policy would be legally unenforceable.”52 Also on the minds of policymakers was the 
possibility that the Chinese would use the change in policy to offer visas only to 
“sympathetic” visitors. Articulating these concerns in provocative fashion, Fra ces 
Knight, the vehement anticommunist head of the Passport Office, predicted that Chinese 
officials would use scholars’ visits for propagandistic purposes. Referencing Edgar Snow, 
whose visit to the PRC was legal under the newsmen exchange, Knight sarcastically 
asked: “What value did the American public gain by his ‘objective’ reporting of events in 
China?” Under any new exception for scholars, Knight was sure that individuals like 
Owen Lattimore – who she derisively lumped in the same category as Snow – would find 
their way into the PRC, providing more psychological advantage for the Communist 
regime.53 
Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, on the whole, agreed with the spirit 
of Knight’s concerns and they denied any sort of dramatic elimination of travelb ns. 
Despite hopes and expectations from many liberals – who saw in the youthful JFK a 
rejection of the unhelpful containment policies of Truman and Eisenhower – Kennedy 
developed an increasingly strict posture toward the PRC. His personal anticommunis , 
fears of being labeled “soft” on foreign policy, the PRC’s 1962 border war with India, 
and Chinese officials’ determination to secure a nuclear weapon, kept Kennedy from 
making any sudden moves toward travel reform. On top of this, because the Chinese had 
made no indication that they would allow large numbers of American travelers into the 
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country, a change in policy in Washington would have had no practical effect.54 
Eisenhower had come to this realization as well, but whereas his administration used it as 
justification to weaken travel restrictions – as a means of embarrassing the Chinese – 
Kennedy instead saw it as yet another reason not to rock the boat. In the end, while 
Kennedy renewed the newsmen exchange proposal in 1961, he hesitated to venture much 
further in this direction. Thus, as historian James Giglio notes, “Kennedy’s China polcy 
represented no appreciable departure from Eisenhower’s.”55 
 
III 
Kennedy’s tentative approach to travel, like much of his foreign policy, carried 
over into the Johnson administration. Even with consistent prodding from the Far East 
Bureau, the new President was hesitant to weaken travel bans any further. In part this was 
a matter of loyalty – both political and personal – to the Kennedy legacy. But Johnson’s 
tentativeness also stemmed from a genuine concern that travel reforms would intimate a 
“softening” of U.S. China policy. Especially after 1964, in the wake of France’s 
recognition of the PRC, Washington officials wanted to avoid any misunderstanding.56  
Despite these concerns, the Johnson administration showed more willingness than 
his predecessor to engage in suitcase diplomacy – a trend that became more noticeable 
following the 1964 presidential election. The December 1964 decision to authorize 
passports for Dr. Samuel Rosen and his wife, on the grounds of humanitarianism and 
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national interest, was a case in point. The administration immediately tried to marginalize 
the decision, stating that it was no different from earlier authorizations of travel on 
“national interest grounds.” But officials struggled to find examples of when the federal 
government had done this in the past. In a memorandum answering anticipated questions 
from the press, State Department officials pointed only to the 1954 case of William Jack 
Ranallo, a United Nations employee who had accompanied Secretary General Dag 
Hammarskjöld on a mission to the PRC, and the 1957 case of lawyer A.L. Wirin. These 
cases – the first of which involved a UN mission and the second of which was necessary 
in order to prevent a sedition case from being thrown out of court – seemed to be on an 
entirely different level than the Rosen case. The importance of Rosen’s trip, asstated by 
U.S. officials, was that he was a world-renowned ear surgeon who was on a multi-
country tour demonstrating his method for relieving deafness.57 While it was not a total 
stretch to locate such a mission within the “national interest,” U.S. officials had, from 
1949 onward, routinely turned down proposals that closely resembled Rosen’s.  Thus, 
despite the best efforts of the Johnson administration to downplay the decision, it seemed
to foreshadow further erosion of the travel ban. 
Reinforcing the significance of the Rosen decision, beginning in 1965 the Johnson 
administration made a series of explicit liberalization gestures. That autumn the State 
Department used its new “humanitarian” standard to validate passports for doctors and 
members of the health field.58 The following July it added professional reporters, 
scientists, scholars, and representatives of the Red Cross to the list of those who would 
receive consideration for passports on an “ad hoc” basis. In addition to these groups, 
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moreover, the State Department created a “discretionary category” of writers, athletes, 
businessmen, artists, and other professionals – all of whom could easily fit within the 
“national interest” rubric.59 In a sign that the State Department intended to approach these 
categories very broadly, one of the first people to receive a passport under the nw policy 
was William Miller, an industrialist from Rhode Island who, according to a Department 
spokesman, would be traveling as a “tourist,” not a businessman.60 
As Johnson’s State Department distributed valid passports to more and more 
groups in the mid-1960s, officials recognized that it was increasingly difficult to claim 
that unrestricted travel to the PRC would be detrimental to U.S. interests. While only 
around 200 individual Americans had, as of 1966, received valid passports to the PRC, 
“literally tens of thousands of individuals could qualify if they chose to apply.”61 Even 
Secretary of State Rusk – who was the most vocal and influential voice in the Johnson 
administration in favor of maintaining travel restrictions – noted in 1968 that an official 
policy of granting passports to “anyone who applies” would not be extraordinarily risky 
or controversial. In light of the gradual liberalization on the travel policy front that had 
taken place since the mid-1950s, a more dramatic and official move would “merely ratify 
what we have in fact been doing on individual applications for some time.”62 True 
restrictions on passport validation were a thing of the past and officials conceded that the 
gradual liberalization that had taken place since the end of the Korean War rendered any 
effort to stop travel to the PRC a waste of time. Officials, moreover, recognized that all 
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remaining travel restrictions merely provided the PRC with potential material for 
propaganda. Chinese officials allegedly told foreign visitors that the U.S. was “attempting 
to dictate…who they [the Chinese] may invite to their country.”63 
The fact that Beijing was not likely to reciprocate on the travel front, moreover, 
gradually emerged as an added incentive for ending travel restrictions. Returning to the 
methodology of the Eisenhower administration, Rusk justified the government’s 
liberalized policy, noting, “[t]he practical effect [of a U.S. travel policy change] will 
almost certainly be nil.”64 By the end of the Johnson administration, U.S. officials had 
settled on this type of “dare” diplomacy, offering validated passports – still on a case-to-
case basis – to nearly anyone with a desire to travel to the PRC. Even when the Nixon 
administration took this policy one step further in July 1969 – offering “automatic 
[passport] validations” for “certain categories of persons” – officials were still less than 
hopeful about Chinese acceptance.65 
Johnson’s approach to travel for scholars, in particular, is telling. As Frances 
Knight had predicted, as Washington officials modified the standards for determining 
legal travel to the PRC, Owen Lattimore applied for a valid passport. Lattimore – whose 
expertise on Chinese affairs and run-ins with Joseph McCarthy were well known 
throughout Washington – had been in contact with Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai and other 
PRC officials for some time in search of an invitation. In the early 1960s he had begun 
teaching at Leeds University in England and hoped his affiliation with a British school – 
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which was “in favour of a considerable increase in the development of cultural relations 
with China” – would boost his chances in getting support from both Beijing and 
Washington.66  
In early 1965 Lattimore initiated discussions with Averell Harriman and receiv d 
a “fairly encouraging” response. Because of Lattimore’s reputation within Washington as 
a communist sympathizer, however, the general consensus was to reject his travel bid. In 
the margins of a memorandum on travel for scholars, Marshall Green of the Far East 
Bureau scribbled: “we cannot possibly make a humanitarian or national interest 
justification for Lattimore – of all people!” Lindsay Grant, of the newly formed Office of 
Asian Communist Affairs, nonetheless, knew that U.S. travel policy was growing steadily 
less restrictive and he was aware that Lattimore was just as likely as any American to 
receive a valid visa from the PRC. If the situation became “really troublesom ” and State 
Department officials felt compelled to grant a passport to Lattimore, they could avoid the 
implication that Lattimore’s trip was in the national interest by encouraging him to 
acquire the accreditation of a news agency. This move, Grant noted, “would convert him 
to a ‘journalist’ for our purposes.”67  
Despite this lax approach, Johnson officials stayed clear of any blanket repeal of 
the travel ban. While the inclusion of “tourists” and certain scholars on the list ofthose 
who could receive a valid passport for the PRC implied that Washington officials had 
ended their effort to control which individuals traveled behind the Bamboo Curtain, the 
administration simultaneously clung to its new validation standards. In all passport 
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applications – be they from doctors, scholars, businessmen, or recreational tourists – 
Washington officials demanded that the potential traveler demonstrate the visi “would 
serve the national interest of the United States.”68 This approach served two primary 
roles. First, it afforded U.S. officials the ability to reject those applicants whose presence 
in China would be distracting or detrimental. Second, these standards allowed officials to 
maintain – as they had done throughout the 1950s – that legal travel to the PRC still 
proceeded on a case-by-case basis and did not signify a broader change in U.S. China 
policy. Thus, in spite of the nuanced approach toward travelers, by which the standards of 
national interest and humanitarianism remained purposefully vague and elastic, the 
Johnson administration was not willing fundamentally to eliminate the State 
Department’s right to pick and choose.69  
This decision to maintain control over passport distribution was especially 
important to hardliners in Congress and abroad. Anticipating criticism from conservativ  
policymakers at home, a State Department “talking points” memorandum insisted: “This 
is not softness; it is a step toward a less timid policy in the struggle of ideas.”70 Taiwan 
officials, as well, showed concern. When the story of Samuel Rosen’s trip first broke,
Samson Shen of the ROC Embassy in Washington “urgently” requested a meeting with 
State Department officials. The change in policy, and the fact that it occurred jst before 
the UN General Assembly was to debate PRC membership, had set off alarms in Taipei. 
Shen wanted assurances that the travel policy decision did not foreshadow larger shifts in
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U.S. China policy.71 Moreover, while Taiwan officials recognized that the travel of a few 
Americans to the PRC was of little significance in and of itself, they feared that “people 
in the Far East…might see in it a dilution of American firmness toward Communist 
China.” Meeting with Taiwan’s Defense Minister Jiang Jingguo in September 1965, on 
the eve of changing passport restrictions for doctors, Assistant Secretary of State for Far 
Eastern Affairs William Bundy insisted the decision “did not represent a change in actual 
practice.” From President Johnson’s perspective, Bundy continued, the “humanitarian 
considerations…should be separated from political problems.” Going even further, 
Bundy suggested the move might have the effect of strengthening the U.S. position vi -à-
vis the PRC.72  
The initiatives of the Johnson administration – especially in the context of the 
subsequent era of Sino-American rapprochement – have been a point of contention 
among diplomatic historians. Historian Michael Lumbers, among others, has recently 
used Johnson’s reforms on travel policy as a means of arguing that LBJ deserves some of 
the credit for “opening” China.73 This is a legitimate argument. Especially in comparison 
to Kennedy’s largely static China policy, Johnson’s State Department showed flexibility 
and nuance as it expanded the numbers of individuals who could legally visit the PRC. 
While the Johnson administration never went as far as allowing all Americans to visit the 
PRC without the approval of the State Department – a move finalized by its successor – 
Johnson oversaw a period in which practically anyone who applied for a valid passport 
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would receive one. This was, moreover, part of Johnson’s larger strategy of pursuing 
“containment without isolation” – a moderate effort to engage the PRC while still 
remaining loyal to the Nationalist government in Taiwan.74 Despite this significant 
liberalization policy, Johnson was not the earliest president to embark down this road. 
More notable – because of the timing – was the Eisenhower administration’s precedent of 
establishing “exceptions” to the travel bans. The moves of the Johnson administration, 
therefore, did not represent an early incarnation of rapprochement as much as they 
reinforced the gradual inability and unwillingness of the State Department o force 
bans on travel to the PRC. 
Regardless of whether Johnson’s policies signified a precursor to rapprochement, 
his moves on travel did not lead to a huge influx in American travelers to the PRC. This 
was due primarily to the negative response coming out of Beijing. Chinese officials 
consistently maintained that until the Taiwan issue was resolved, no improvement could 
be made to Sino-American relations. More dramatically, the Cultural Revolution – which 
emerged alongside the Johnson administration’s modest efforts to reduce travel 
restrictions – was, by its definition, an anti-Western, radical movement; until its 
conclusion there was little chance that the PRC would open its doors to outsiders. Thus, 
in a development that closely resembled the Eisenhower administration’s unsuccessf l 
newsmen initiative, in the mid-1960s valid U.S. passports were somewhat meaningless 
without a corresponding PRC visa.  
The case Supreme Court Justice William Douglas offers one example. In 1966 the 
State Department finally granted permission for his travel to the PRC – an event that 
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marked the culmination of fourteen years of failed efforts to go behind the Bamboo 
Curtain. Despite Douglas’s consistent and vocal opposition to Washington’s China 
policy, State Department officials readily placed the Justice within the “public affairs” 
category of the new travel policy and approved his trip. The widely publicized, and 
frequently maligned trip collapsed, however, when Chinese officials announced that they 
had never invited Douglas to visit, nor would they consider the possibility.75  
In the context of the Cultural Revolution, moreover, it was not only potential 
American visitors who were denied access. Thousands of European, Latin American, 
Canadian, and Japanese tourists – all of whom had received valid visas from Beijing – 
found they were no longer welcome to enter the PRC.76 Educational and cultural 
exchanges to and from the PRC also declined rapidly in these years, due to “excessiv  
preoccupation with ‘Cultural Revolution’ at home [and] excessive proselytizing for the 
‘Cultural Revolution’ by [CCP] personnel abroad.”77 Those foreign travelers that 
remained in China throughout the Cultural Revolution, moreover, recalled a distinct and 
unfortunate shift in the attitudes of Chinese tourism workers. In what can best be 
described as PRC-Western tensions playing out at the grass-roots level, aCIA 
intelligence report described the changed demeanor of waiters, hotel staff, and store 
clerks: 
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The waiters at the Friendship and Hsin Chiao Hotels, in contrast to pre-Cultural 
Revolution days, did not show normal courtesies to foreigners. Orders were not readily 
taken and delivered quickly….In January 1968 one ambassador and his first secretary 
who were dining at the Hsin Chiao Hotel complained of the cold to the waiter. Th  waiter 
huffily answered that foreigners were always complaining of the cold when it wasn’t cold 




The PRC, nonetheless, did not stay entirely closed off to travelers. At the same 
time that the Supreme Court whittled away at the State Department’s travel policy and as 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations offered modest reforms, Beijing welcomed 
around 10,000 tourists and businessmen, most of whom came from communist or 
“friendly” nations.79 Scattered among these travelers were a handful of high profile 
American and Western visitors. The number of these latter travelers, as mentioned above, 
remained small. In a move that confirmed U.S. officials’ earlier suspicions about 
Beijing’s entry procedures, PRC authorities hand-selected only a few – who seemed to 
demonstrate sympathy with the PRC – to enter the country. Despite the small numbers, 
these travelers – like those Americans who violated travel bans in the 1950s – 
complicated U.S. policy toward the PRC. For one, these trips took place alongside 
Kennedy and Johnson’s own liberalization policies and thus hastened the erosion of U.S. 
travel bans. In addition, the bulk of these travelers held the Chinese Communist regime in 
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high esteem and disseminated positive reports on the PRC to the American public and 
media. 
Felix Greene, a British subject who maintained permanent residency in United 
States, traveled to the PRC five times (once with his American wife) in the 1950s and 
1960s by use of his British passport.80 Like William Worthy and many other Western 
intellectuals traveling to China in these years, Greene claimed his trip would contribute to 
American knowledge of China. The “prevailing assumptions and apprehensions generally 
prevalent in the United States,” Greene maintained, depicted a China far different from 
the one he actually visited. It was, moreover, Washington’s travel policy – which Greene 
called a “wall of ignorance and fear” – that contributed to these skewed perceptions.81 
Though he justified his trip as a defense of U.S. strategic interests, Greene cl arly 
traveled to China more out of personal curiosity and admiration for the PRC than he did 
concern for U.S. foreign policy objectives. 
Greene’s ability to bypass travel prohibitions caused divisions within Washington. 
While punitive action was, for the most part, off the table (because he traveled legally 
with a British passport), U.S. attitudes toward Greene’s visit closely resembled those 
directed at American scholars and other intellectuals who were itching to travel to the 
PRC. State Department officials had few nice words for Greene. Following Greene’s 
third trip to China in 1964, Philip Heymann of the Bureau of Security and Consular 
Affairs referred to Greene as a “sower of dissention” and Harald Jacobson f the Office 
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of Asian Communist Affairs called him a “crypto-Communist.”82 John Holdridge, Chief 
of the Political Section at the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong, was slightly more positive 
but still noted that Greene’s “judgment…remains colored by the flattering treatment he 
received and the desire to be a middleman for a ‘misunderstood’ China to what he 
considers a dangerously misinformed American public.”83 These officials all represented 
a significant faction within Washington that worried Greene’s frequent (and unimpeded) 
visits to China would both reinforce the inability of Washington to control travel and 
provide the pro-PRC viewpoint with a degree of legitimacy.  
But other policymakers approached the Greene case with less anxiety. Part of this 
was a matter of calculus. Considering that Washington officials had been loosening U.S. 
travel restrictions for years, there was little chance they could stop a journ list with 
credentials and a British passport from visiting the PRC. Attempting to do so would have 
merely weakened U.S. officials’ argument that it was Beijing, not Washington, that was 
hindering travel exchanges. This sense of resignation continued as Greene left the PRC 
and tried to regain entry into the United States. As a permanent U.S. resident who 
traveled to an off-limits destination, Greene was required to acquire a new immigration 
visa before re-entering the United States. But officials hesitated to give Greene any 
trouble in acquiring his documents, arguing that such a move would merely make 
Greene’s case a “cause celebre.”84 
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Other policymakers went even further, leaning on Greene for intelligence on th  
PRC that could not be gathered from outposts in Hong Kong or Southeast Asia. During a 
lunch with Lindsey Grant, Greene cited figures he had gathered while visiting an 
operating hydroelectric plant sixty miles west of Lanzhou – a “useful item of 
information,” according to Grant.85 More comprehensively, after returning to the U.S. in 
1964, Greene offered to sell a copy of his documentary (about 12,000 feet of color film) 
to the State Department or the CIA. Response was mixed. Marshall Green of the Far
Eastern Bureau saw Greene’s footage as highly “manipulated” and thus of little 
intelligence value. By purchasing the film, moreover, U.S. officials would basically be 
“subsidizing the distribution of something very close to straight Chinese Communist 
propaganda.”86 Far East Asian expert Robert W. Barnett disagreed, arguing that while 
much of Greene’s footage had been “staged” and was “highly selective,” such 
considerations did not detract from “the desirability of having at hand recent pitorial 
evidence of what [Greene’s] Communists hosts wanted him to see.” Averell Harriman, as 
well, did not see why there was “such as fuss” about Greene’s film and he insistd that 
CIA officials seriously consider making the purchase.87  
The story was much the same with Lisa Hobbs, an Australian native who worked 
in the U.S. for the San Francisco Examiner. In 1965 she used her Australian passport to 
visit the PRC. Hobbs noted that the U.S. officials she dealt with in Washington “gave me 
nothing but encouragement.” With limited intelligence on the PRC, U.S. officials saw 
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Hobbs one of the “few sources of direct information…for keeping in touch with 
developments within China.”88 Though there is no evidence that officials used Hobbs’s 
reports directly, policymakers in Washington certainly relied on this sort of casual 
intelligence from tourists in the development of foreign policy. This sort of intelligence 
gathering was seen in the transition years of 1949-50 as U.S. officials called on American 
scholars in the PRC to provide insight on the new regime. This tactic was still used in the 
late 1960s. In 1968 NSC official Alfred Jenkins, for instance, complained about a lack of 
intelligence on the PRC, in part because “the populace is shunning travelers.”89 Those 
Western correspondents who were more critical of the PRC, in particular, were of sp cial 
interest to U.S. officials. One Norwegian journalist, who voiced skepticism of China’s 
“guided tours” and detailed cases of political indoctrination throughout the country, for 
example, caught the attention of policymakers. John Holdridge, at the U.S. Consulate in 
Hong Kong, requested copies of any articles that the journalist might produce.90 
While the reports of these Western travelers, when filtered through the U.S. 
intelligence apparatus, could be of use to government officials, it was an entirely different 
story when these travelers disseminated reports of their trips directly to various channels 
of the American public and media. Regardless of the destination, travel tended to boost 
one’s sympathies with the host country. This was especially noticeable in regard to the 
PRC. Much of the original drive to visit the PRC in the 1950s and 1960s derived from 
Washington’s prohibition of travel and its generally hostile demeanor toward Mao’s 
government; those that actually made the trip, therefore, carried with them res ntm nt 
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toward the U.S. government and a heightened desire to prove Washington officials 
wrong. As Paul Hollander notes, this “blend of attitudes…rarely stimulates the exercise 
of critical faculties.”91  
Indeed, most of the ensuing reports – coming in the form of films, travelogues, 
speeches, and memoirs – depicted the PRC in a positive light. Travelers held up the PRC 
as a “virtuous underdog,” exaggerating the nation’s progress and glossing over obvious 
flaws.92 Travelers also tended to locate in China the antithesis of everything they disliked 
in the United States. China’s quaint technology reminded them of “the good old days” in 
the United States when rural self-reliance had reigned supreme. In the 1960s, when 
bureaucracy came under fire in the U.S., Western travelers saw in the PRC’s Cultural 
Revolution a purer and less cumbersome system of political rule. And the modest, puritan 
nature of China was a welcome divergence from the hedonistic, materialistic culture back 
at home.93 Thus, in terms of their impact on public perceptions, there was little 
differentiation between legal and illegal travelers to the PRC. Worthy, Du Bois, the 
American students, and other travel ban violators were no doubt part of this phenomenon; 
while they aimed differing levels of criticism toward Chinese brainwashing, political 
suppression, censorship, and violence, on the whole they left the PRC with a positive 
impression of the country.94 
If these positive reports had been limited to the individual traveler, the impact on 
U.S. foreign relations and public opinion would have negligible. The discourse on the 
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PRC, however, quickly took on a larger role. Just as Christina Klein notes how travel 
guides and travelogues shaped American knowledge of “Free Asia” and reinforced the 
Cold War consensus, so too did they contribute to Americans’ awareness of and 
sympathy with events behind the Bamboo Curtain. Highlighting this point, Morton Fried, 
in a Saturday Review article, noted that laudatory reports, films, and speeches from 
travelers (both lawful and unlawful) returning from the PRC, was one of the primary 
means by which Americans learned about Communist China.95  
Felix Greene, in particular, returned with an increased admiration for the PRC and 
a commensurate desire to make his views heard. While in the country he held intimate 
meetings with leading PRC officials and he was confident that the country was in better 
shape than in years past. “Living conditions, food supplies, supply of consumer goods, 
and the general attitude of officials and the people” had all shown considerable 
improvement.96 “No one,” Greene announced, “can come away from a visit to China 
today without being impressed, even overwhelmed, by the experience.” The “freedom” 
and “dignity” by which Chinese propagandists defined the PRC were, according to 
Greene, genuine expressions of the Chinese people. The U.S. policy of supporting Jiang 
Jieshi and designating Taiwan as the true China, on the other hand, was a “mistaken and 
detrimental” policy.97  
In between trips to the PRC, Greene toured the United States, sharing his 
experiences and these personal assessments with local radio shows, civic groups, and 
college audiences. He published four travelogues/monographs on the PRC by 1973 and 
                                                
95 Fried, “Breaching the China Wall,” Saturday Review, 19 March 1960. 
96 Memorandum of conversation, “Felix Greene’s Trip to Communist China,” 18 February 1964, General 
Records of the Department of State, Entry #5409, Box 3, NARA. 
97 Greene, Awakened China, 388-91. 
 280 
 
showcased the premier of his feature-length documentary “China” – the result of the 
footage Greene had offered to U.S. officials – at Carnegie Hall in May 1965. After 
showing in New York theaters for five months, it started runs in Washington, D.C., Los 
Angeles, and other major U.S. cities. Parts of the film, moreover, were shown on British 
television and his interview with Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai broadcast in the United 
States.98  
While positive reviews of the film described it as a “shattering eye-opener,” more 
common were reviews that pointed out its extreme biases.99 William F. Buckley, Jr., in a 
particularly scathing review, commented that Greene’s next project could depict “Hitler 
Germany…as a wildly exciting place to live in – full of energy and joy!”100 Critics of 
Greene’s writing, as well, pointed to his explicit bias. Commenting on Greene’s 
travelogue Awakened China, journalist Tillman Durdin, himself a vocal critic of 
Washington’s China policy, questioned the author’s generally unqualified admiration of 
the PRC and noted the book was “simply not a balanced and objective work.”101 
Lisa Hobbs was somewhat more evenhanded, detailing her disgust at some of the 
anti-American propaganda she encountered. Critiquing Felix Greene and other 
“journalists who had claimed that communism had changed China from top to bottom,” 
Hobbs insisted that they “were guilty…of optimistic exaggeration.” On the stre t  of 
China, she wrote, “there was no immediate evidence of radical social change.”102 On the 
whole, however, Hobbs, as well, presented a laudatory account of the PRC. The standard 
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of living for the nation’s masses, she wrote, was surprisingly comfortable and cities were 
filled with “masses of adequately fed, warm, and cleanly dressed people whose general 
demeanor is one of dignity and confidence.” “[U]nder the Communist regime,” Hobbs 
concluded, “the masses of China are not only better off than they were before, but also 
have freedoms that they never before experienced.”103 Her story, too, quickly left its 
impact on the American public. Hobbs’s travelogue, I Saw Red China, proved a hit 
among American audiences, spending three weeks on the New York Times’ best-seller list 
and earning accolades from Pearl Buck and William O. Douglas. In the promotion of her 




 While the activities of these Western travelers signified the ways in which 
continued travel to the PRC was starkly politicized, the gradual erosion of restrictions 
also had the opposite effect. As travel behind the Bamboo Curtain became more 
acceptable and more common, it lost some of its political edge. In a sense, travel to the 
PRC began to lose its place in the Sino-American rivalry and more closely re mbled 
recreational tourism to popular destinations around the world. 
 These developments, which began under Eisenhower and continued modestly 
during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, emerged more fully upon Richard 
Nixon’s entry into the White House. In March 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers, 
extended the general ban on American travel to the PRC. Though the move reinforced 
Washington’s strict travel policy, Rogers opted for a six-month, as opposed to a one-year, 
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extension. The move was a not so subtle sign that the new administration intended to 
make a thorough review of the State Department’s travel policy.104 Confirming these 
assumptions, in the summer Nixon made official many of the changes that his 
predecessors had initiated. Students, teachers, and other scholars could now receive 
“automatic validation” for travel to the PRC, as opposed to the previous system in which 
their cases were reviewed (almost always favorably) on a case-by case basis.  
Nixon, moreover, modified the Comprehensive Certificates of Origin (CCO) 
regulations, allowing American travelers to purchase and bring home up to $100 worth of 
Chinese-made goods.105 The decision had implications in both Hong Kong and the PRC. 
In Hong Kong, the move freed the American tourist of the inconvenience and stigma 
associated with souvenir purchases. U.S. officials were aware that it would also likely 
stimulate tourism to the British colony and possibly encourage more overseas spending. 
If every American tourist spent the full $100, Hong Kong would net nearly $20 million 
more in tourist expenditures.106 Addressing this possibility, Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
– who had tossed around the idea in the final days of the Johnson administration – noted 
that while he supported the removal of CCO restrictions, it was likely to have “some 
balance-of-payments implications in the current situation.”107 Moving beyond the 
economic repercussions, the modification of purchase restrictions seemed to move the 
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region’s tourism further outside the framework of the Cold War. For American tourists to 
Hong Kong, the CCOs were the most blatant reminder of Sino-American tension and the 
most explicit effort on the part of Washington officials to link travel policy to the larger 
strategy of containment. The policy change had a similar symbolic effectin regard to the 
PRC. Because the modified customs restrictions applied only to “noncommercial” goods, 
it was not likely to have a large, direct economic impact. American businesses still could 
not conduct trade with the PRC and since few American tourists could visit, there would 
be no one to take advantage of the new regulations. Despite this, the initiative was 
symbolic and significant; it intimated that U.S.-PRC tourism was likely in the near future 
and a modification of purchase restrictions was one step toward facilitating that 
development. 
 The private tourism industry, as well, began operating under the assumption that 
American tourism to the PRC would emerge in the short-term. In early 1970 Pan 
American Airways officials first brought up the idea of initiating service to Shanghai “in 
the not too distant future.”108 Working through contacts with the Chinese that had 
developed in the 1940s, when Pan Am still flew into Shanghai, airline executives hoped 
to discover where the PRC regime stood on the issue of resuming air connections.109 The 
incident brought immediate criticism from Taiwan officials, who pointed out that 
resumption of service to the PRC would violate the spirit of U.S.-Taiwan civil aviation 
agreements. Though U.S. officials assuaged the Nationalists with promises to follow the 
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provisions of the joint agreements, the Nixon administration showed remarkable 
indifference toward the “unofficial contacts or soundings” of Pan American.110 
The mutterings of Pan American – in combination with the visits to the PRC of 
the American table tennis team and President Nixon – were enough to light a fire under 
the U.S. travel industry. Adding to this was the fact that other airlines from non-
communist nations began bringing tourists to the PRC. By 1973, Pakistan International 
Airlines flew to Beijing, and both Air France and Ethiopian Airlines flew to Shangi.111 
Anticipating an imminent opening for American tourism, travel agencies, tour organizers, 
and cultural exchange organizations began developing itineraries and signing up potential 
travelers.112 The excitement was somewhat premature, as Pan American – the first U.S. 
airline to establish routes to the PRC – did not commence U.S.-PRC flights until August 
1979. But even the rumors of air travel between the U.S. and the PRC altered the tone of 
the travel debate; the question changed from whether the United States should support 
such contact to when those contacts should commence.  
The American public seemed eager to spur this along, showing an “insatiable 
curiosity” about recreational tourism to the PRC. Aiming to fill this need, in 1972 Eugene 
Fodor published his guide to Beijing, the first such travel guide to be published in the 
United States since the establishment of the PRC. While most Americans still could not 
travel there – a fact that Fodor’s Peking mentions in its early pages – the first U.S. edition 
of the book sold out quickly, signaling an eagerness among the American public to 
vacation behind the Bamboo Curtain. The contents of the guide were a fascinating mix of 
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caveats for traveling in “totalitarian” China – with its guided tours and government-run 
travel service – and detailed lists of restaurants, shopping, museums, and hotels. Absent 
from the guide were any suggestions that tourism to the PRC posed any particular 
dangers or that choosing the PRC as a destination somehow violated Western values or 
threatened the future of Washington’s Asian allies.113  
 
VI 
Washington’s difficulties in ensuring that the right sort of people traveled abroad, 
and only to the right places, underscored that tourism, like all forms of foreign relations, 
had flaws. Making this form of foreign relations even more difficult to manage, most 
Americans and many U.S. officials continued to categorize tourism as an apolitic l 
activity – a form of recreation on which the federal government had no claim. 
Considering the significant potential impact of tourism on the international economy, 
political relationships, and public perceptions, this disconnect was bound to cause 
problems. 
This “tourist problem” was clearest in the enormous gap between American 
expenditures overseas and foreign expenditures in the United States. Due to years of
success in building up tourism industries in Europe, Latin America, and the Far East, the 
domestic U.S. industry was woefully inadequate. As long as the United States enjoyed a 
balance-of-payments surplus, this reality of one-way tourism was acceptable and even 
beneficial. When the economic climate changed at the end of the Eisenhower 
administration, however, the lack of inbound tourists became a crisis in the making. 
                                                
113 Odile Cail, Fodor’s Peking (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1973), x, 7. 
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In regard to the PRC, the “tourist problem” metastasized differently. As opposed 
to contributing to the balance-of-payments deficit, the ongoing debate over the “right to 
travel” – played out in Congress, the federal courts, and American popular culture – led 
to further erosion of Washington’s travel bans and introduced more challenges to U.S. 
China policy. As was true during the Eisenhower administration, liberalization of travel 
restrictions was, in part, the intention of Kennedy and Johnson officials. By increasig 
the number of individuals who could legally visit the PRC, the White House during the 
1960s attempted simultaneously to quiet domestic protest, test the waters of Sino-
American accommodation, and score political points against the Chinese regim.  
On all fronts of the “tourist problem,” the Kennedy and Johnson administration 
walked a fine line between prohibiting travel completely and endangering U.S. national 
interests. Efforts to discourage Americans from traveling overseas for recreation had only 
minor successes and the administrations soon resigned themselves to the fact that such 
outbound travel was inevitable. Kennedy and Johnson had notably more control over 
American travel to the PRC. Fearing both the political and international repercussions of 
eliminating the ban completely, neither Kennedy nor Johnson was keen on making any 
bold moves on the travel front. They made modest concessions to domestic activists, but 
explicitly refused to go all the way. In their trepidation, they were, ironically, ssisted by 
the fact that PRC officials – in almost all cases – refused to grant American t avelers 
necessary visas.   
But in a pattern that should have been familiar to U.S. officials, travel was not a 
foreign policy tool that the government could turn on and off as it pleased. With the 
window for legal American travel opened a bit wider, and with the numbers of Western 
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travelers in the PRC increasing, Washington officials faced the problem of travel slipping 
beyond their control. Leftist scholars, critical journalists, and provocative filmmakers all 
made their way to the PRC, often to the consternation of U.S. officials at home. Possibly 
more significantly, by the end of the Johnson presidency and the start of Nixon’s, even 
private American tourists were able to travel to the PRC. With the gradual emerg nce of 
recreational travel – which still maintained a connotation of apolitical leisure – tourism to 






The development of suitcase diplomacy was a clear feature of U.S. foreign 
relations but one that few diplomatic historians have explored. The reasons are 
understandable. The image of a tourist – playing shuffleboard on the deck of a cruise 
liner, freely spending cash on predictable souvenirs, and imposing his camera on the local 
residents and scenery – does not instantly evoke thoughts of high-level diplomacy. 
Outwardly tourists seem, instead, to be trivial, though at times burdensome, outsiders – 
neither a true representative of their home culture nor an integral part of the society in 
which they are visiting. But considering that tourism today comprises the largest industry 
in the world and that, alongside war and natural disaster, serves as a primary st ulus for 
international migration, tourism should be of utmost interest to scholars of international 
and diplomatic history.1  
Suitcase diplomacy, aside from being a crucial factor in economic, political, and 
cultural exchange, is also worthy of exploration because of its unique qualities s a form 
of foreign relations. An anecdote from the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong underscores 
these distinctive characteristics. In July 1967 the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong 
sent a hurried telegram to the State Department in regard to a “People-to-People” student 
delegation that was set to arrive. Standing in the way of this visit, the riots that erupted 
over tensions between Communists, pro-Nationalists, and British officials, continued into 
the summer months.  A week before the students were to arrive, Chinese Communists 
                                                
1 Engerman, “Research Agenda for the History of Tourism.”  
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killed five members of the Hong Kong police and injured twelve others.2 U.S. officials in 
Hong Kong, obviously flustered over the recent events, informed the State Department 
that they would not be able to put together a “meaningful program” for the students. If 
the group wanted to visit Hong Kong “as tourists,” however, Consulate officials had no 
objection.3  
As the Hong Kong riots demonstrated, tourism was not entirely immune to the 
violence and tensions of the Cold War. Making this point more explicit, on the eleventh 
day of the Hong Kong riots, rowdy crowds gathered just outside the Hong Kong Hilton. 
Despite calls for the rioters to disperse, one member of the crowd shattered  la ge plate-
glass window in the Hilton coffee shop, bringing shards of glass down on diners inside.4 
Travel writer Hudson Strode, visiting Hong Kong at that time, wrote of the Chinese 
Communist “scare tactics” and recalled an incident soon after his arrival in which a 
“Communist agent” was chased and apprehended by Hong Kong police.5 Va ations thus 
often had a way of butting up against Cold War realities. This was not only a matter of 
outright violence. Tourists to Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s recalled seeing giant posters 
of President Jiang Jieshi with slogans about retaking the mainland. Tourists to Hong 
Kong, who spent the bulk of their vacations shopping, were reminded of the Cold War 
every time they had to fill out a CCO for their purchases. 
Though occasional outbursts of chaos or more subtle reminders of U.S.-PRC 
conflict were regular features of the tourist experience, the fact that tourism to Hong 
                                                
2 “Four in Hong Kong Killed in Clashes,” New York Times, 10 July 1967. 
3 American Consulate General Hong Kong to State Department, “People-to-People Student Delegation,” 16 
July 1967, General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric File, Box 316, NARA. 
4 Charles Mohr, “A Noisy Standoff,” New York Times, 22 May 1967. 
5 Hudson Strode, Ultimates in the Far East: Travels in the Orient and I dia (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), 94-95.  
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Kong continued in the midst of the riots – though government-sponsored tours could not 
– highlights how recreational travel could bypass much of the fear and violence of the 
Cold War. Strode, despite warnings from friends about the “dirty water and bombing” 
that would await him in Hong Kong, made the trip. He wrote about the visit in his travel 
guide: “we decided to chance uprisings and sporadic bombings – in which no white 
persons had been killed, only unfortunate Chinese.”6 A HKTA survey found that most 
tourists were only “slightly inconvenienced” by the ongoing riots.7 Similarly, a CIA 
intelligence report noted that while tourism had been “temporarily curtailed to some 
degree…it is still difficult to get reservations at first class Hong Kong hotels.”8  
On a broader scale, cruise ships had, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, served as a 
means of seeing China without encountering the military realities of the country. Even as 
more American tourists flew to their destination and stayed in local hotels, touri m still 
seemed to provide a buffer to the outside. Western-style hotel rooms and restaurant  
served as “imperturbable oases” in the midst of unfamiliarity and potential danger.9 
Popular advertisements showed serene landscapes and bustling marketplaces, or simply
focused on the luxury ships and airplanes that would take tourists on their vacation. 
Government officials and private travel boosters, moreover, worked to increase security, 
develop uniform travel itineraries, and encourage locals to treat tourists with respect – all 
of which meant that the tourist vacation was a comfortable, though not necessarily 
genuine, representation of the host country. Thus, in a task that only tourism could 
accomplish, the Cold War somehow faded to the background. 
                                                
6 Ibid., 95. 
7 Rich, “China in a Gray Flannel Suit,” in Fodor’s Guide to Japan and East Asia 1968, 479. 
8 CIA, “The Outlook for Hong Kong,” 15 August 1967, DDRS. 
9 “The Great Hotels: Imperturbable Oases in a Clamorous World,” Fortune, November 1967. 
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 The way by which U.S. officials in riotous Hong Kong easily transformed the 
incoming student delegation into “tourists,” moreover, highlights the fluidity of these 
categories of travel. Despite the habit of scholars to isolate “tourists” from “travelers” and 
“travelers” from “adventurers,” U.S. foreign policy has shown that, on the ground, these
distinctions made little difference. To U.S. officials, recreational tourists served the same 
purpose as cultural delegations, though they likely required less attention. All visitors – 
whether they traveled as recreational tourists, curious scholars, or part of a government-
sponsored exchange program – served as potential agents of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. 
officials, as long as they were able, consequently offered abundant support and guidance. 
Even from the perspective of travelers themselves, distinctions were ambiguous and self-
serving. While many Americans refused to view themselves as “tourists” – with all the 
negative connotations that term carried – they still overwhelmingly sought out hotels, 
restaurants, and attractions that offered familiarity and comfort.  
Suitcase diplomacy’s ability simultaneously to persevere in unstable climates and 
blur the lines between various forms of travel, makes it an extraordinarily complex 
addition to an understanding of how foreign relations develop and how they correspond 
to geopolitical realities. In addition, suitcase diplomacy contributes to several ar as of the 
vast historiography of Cold War diplomacy and, specifically, Sino-American reltions. 
First, between 1949 and 1968 travel, because it both reinforced and transcended Cold 
War divisions, served as a unique component of Washington’s China policy. The 
complicated way by which U.S. officials ended American travel to the PRC in thewak  
of the Communist takeover and then increasingly revived travel contacts in the years that 
followed, demonstrated that they saw the benefit of subtle Sino-American contact. 
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Successive administrations used travel as a politically safe way of testing Sino-American 
relations or as a means of embarrassing the Communist regime without the fear of 
upsetting Cold War allies or hardliners at home. At the same time, however, U.S. 
officials were never able to harness fully this style of foreign policy. Small cracks in 
travel prohibitions – brought about by Americans traveling in violation of the passport 
restrictions, foreigners traveling legally to the PRC, and State Department officials 
making modest reforms – resulted in a steady erosion of the ban on travel to the PRC that 
proved impossible to stop. 
Even in regard to Taiwan and Hong Kong – the governments of which maintained 
close allegiance to the United States – tourism was only partly integrated into 
Washington’s Cold War arsenal. The expansive International Educational Exchange 
Program and Washington’s tangible influence on PATA were two of the most blatant 
examples of how tourism could be an effective resource for Cold War containment. An 
examination of travel periodicals and travel guides, however, reveals that tourists were 
not entirely eager to become spokespeople for Washington’s policy nor did their 
motivations for travel always match up with the official agenda. Escape, leisure, and 
exoticism, more than the spread of democratic ideals and Western values, dominated the 
travel discourse. This disconnect reared its head quite clearly when U.S. officials, acing 
a deleterious balance-of-payments deficit in the early 1960s, attempted to scale ba k 
outbound tourism for the sake of the national economy and, tangentially, U.S. dominance 
in the Cold War. Unable to convince Americans to give up this activity – which many 
now believed was a right – Washington officials had to seek out other ways to stop the 
outward flow of U.S. dollars. The fact that travel policy – both intentionally and 
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unintentionally – could follow a different trajectory than other components of U.S. 
foreign policy, underscores the complexity of post-World War II international affairs and 
the need for diplomatic historians to approach the period with a broader lens. 
Second, by questioning the Cold War’s exclusive hold on the post-World War II 
period, suitcase diplomacy expands the international approach to diplomatic history. 
Previous works in this vein have urged historians to move beyond the bipolar framework 
of the Cold War and thus examine a wider set of international actors. By examining the 
policies and strategies of Third World or smaller European powers – which pursued non-
alignment or sought to play each camp off of the other – these works show that looking 
only to superpowers and bipolarity is not sufficient. Along these same lines, non-state 
actors deserve a central position in this narrative. Beyond a corporatist approach, which 
examines how private business and special interest groups collaborated and influenced 
government policy, a focus on non-state actors also suggests that “ordinary people”were, 
in and of themselves, engaged in international relations and therefore worthy of study.10  
Suitcase diplomacy takes the international methodology one step further. In 
addition to examining the unique objectives and contributions of governments other than 
the United States and the Soviet Union, and placing travel writers, airline executives, and 
tourists at the center of the historical narrative, suitcase diplomacy locates themes and 
international trends that do not immediately relate to Cold War rivalries. Mas tourism, 
escapism, engagement, consumerism, economic growth, and cultural exchange – all of 
which developed in the decades following World War II – helped to shape the 
international landscape and thus deserve the attention of diplomatic historians. 
                                                
10 Michael Hunt, “The Long Crisis in Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure,” Diplomatic History 16 
(Winter 1992), 115-140. 
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Third, suitcase diplomacy redesigns the geography of Sino-American histories. 
Too often, diplomatic historians have cast off Taiwan and Hong Kong as part of a 
“sideshow” or explored them only in the context of U.S.-PRC relations. An examination 
of tourism to the region, on the other hand, forces Taiwan and Hong Kong to the 
forefront. To tourists, Taiwan and Hong Kong appeared not as counterpoints to the PRC, 
but as attractive destinations in and of themselves that fulfilled Americans’ desires to 
experience a “Chinese” vacation. Washington officials, as well, regularly approached 
these destinations on their own terms. Tourism’s contributions to international cultural 
exchange, technical and foreign assistance, balance-of-payments problems, trade 
disputes, and economic diversification – though all tangentially related to the Cold War 
and U.S.-PRC geopolitics – demonstrate that the place of Taiwan and Hong Kong in the 
postwar world was not solely linked to the affairs of their larger, Communist neighbor.  
More than just central actors in the history of Sino-American relations, Taiwan 
and Hong Kong also functioned as a “Free China” unit, of sorts, in regard to American 
travel. Whereas Taiwan and Hong Kong played dramatically different roles in trms of 
U.S. economic, political, and military policy, on the travel front the two were quite 
compatible. Tourist itineraries for the Far East rarely included only one destination; 
instead, American travelers usually made the rounds, visiting several Asian locales in the 
course of their trip. Hong Kong was an attraction in and of itself, but Taiwan travel 
boosters proudly played up their country as an inexpensive, and attractive, add-on. 
Tourists, moreover, associated Taiwan and Hong Kong as the “Chinese” destinations, a 
label that brought the two regions together in the minds of Americans. U.S. officials, as 
well, saw the two destinations as being linked. The structure of the International 
 295 
 
Educational Exchange Program, in particular, which regularly sent participnts back and 
forth from Taiwan to Hong Kong, saw those destinations as equally and uniquely integral 
to the task of destabilizing the PRC. By holding up both Taiwan and Hong Kong as 
legitimate outposts of Chinese culture, moreover, Washington officials reinforced their 
bonds to one another and their significant position in international relations. 
 
II 
Writing on the state of diplomatic history as a scholarly field, Michael Hogan 
laments how, “to the extent that diplomatic history itself has spawned fresh ideas and 
ways of thinking, it has done so largely in work that deals with the twentieth century a d 
especially the Cold War.” The fact that America in the World – Hogan’s collection of 
historiographical essays covering the period of 1941 to the present – is more than twice 
the length of his counterpart collection that covers the 150 years prior to World Wa  II, 
underscores his point and is suggestive of the state of the field.11 The focus of this 
dissertation, to some extent, adds yet another study to the cluttered historiography of the 
Cold War. At the same time, however, this work suggests that in addition to expanding 
the scope of diplomatic relations beyond the temporal confines of the familiar post-World 
War II landscape, historians need to rethink the nature of that landscape itself. With the 
Soviet-American conflict past, it is time to reconsider the character of he postwar period 
and offer fresh perspectives on the place of Cold War in historical studies.      
                                                
11 Michael J. Hogan, “Introduction,” in Paths to Power: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations 
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